Maurice LeBlanc, Arsene Lupin vs Herlock Sholmes

 Introduction

Opening Passage: 

On the eighth day of last December, Mon. Gerbois, professor of mathematics at the College of Versailles, while rummaging in an old curiosity-shop, unearthed a small mahogany writing-desk which pleased him very much on account of the multiplicity of its drawers. (p. 1)

Summary: Mon. Gerbois buys a writing desk for his daughter. It is soon stolen by Arsène Lupin, and Mon. Gerbois shortly afterward realizes that he had accidentally left a lottery ticket in the desk that turns out to have the winning numbers. Lupin offers to return it if he gets half the winnings, and, partly at the instigation of the detective Ganimard, Gerbois agrees so that Ganimard can lay a trap. Lupin, however, gets away scot-free by escaping with a blonde lady. When the blonde lady becomes associated with a later theft of a blue diamond, Ganimard deduces that Lupin was involved. The victims of the theft in the meantime make an appeal to the greatest detective in Europe, Herlock Sholmes. Quite by accident, in a restaurant Lupin and his biographer happen to meet Herlock Sholmes and his enthusiastic biographer Dr. Wilson; they agree that the case will be resolved one way or another within ten days. There is quite a bit of back-and-forth, as the detective who always solves the case tracks down everything he needs to reclaim the blue diamond and get Lupin arrested. Sholmes does in fact succeed. But if he is the detective who always solves the case, Lupin is the thief who always gets away, and despite being arrested, as Sholmes and Wilson are heading back home, Lupin, having escaped the French police, stops by to wish them farewell, and it is clear that they will face off again.

The opportunity comes along a bit later when Sholmes receives a letter from France asking for his help in recovering a Jewish lamp, and at the same time a letter from Lupin telling him not to get involved. This, of course, guarantees that Sholmes makes the trip to France again, and again they face off against each other. But Sholmes is perhaps forgetting that there can be collateral damage in his pursuit of criminals.

This is a delightfully funny book. I think the blue diamond case is much more interesting in some ways than the Jewish lamp case, but both have great moments. I particularly liked the ingenuity with which Lupin lays traps for Sholmes, at one point locking him in a house for a night (but courteously providing him with a picnic) and at another getting him tied up and put on a boat for Southampton (which, however, will not be as successful as he hoped). They easily put Lupin in the heady circle of foes genuinely fit for Sherlock Holmes (and despite the transparent legal cover of 'Herlock Sholmes', there is no question that LeBlanc's intent is to write a plausible Sherlock Holmes, at least as to cleverness of reasoning). In Lupin's case, he's not exactly a nemesis. Unlike Moriarty, say, he's never a danger to the detective himself, and Holmes actually succeeds every time he squares off against Lupin -- albeit never in quite the way he wants to succeed. Rather he is an equal opposite, a rival of sorts. 

Of course, LeBlanc also doesn't hesitate at times to use Herlock Sholmes both to poke fun at the English and at the original Doyle stories. There is a running joke of Dr. Wilson being dense but admiring of Sholmes while Sholmes repeatedly puts Wilson in danger without any qualms, at one point remarking that it's lucky that Wilson's arm was broken rather than his own. And Sholmes has a continual inability to acknowledge his own emotions; my very favorite example of this, below, is when he says that nothing disturbs him while his voice is literally trembling with rage. But the fun is good fun, not malicious, and LeBlanc also at times uses Sholmes as a foil to make fun of the famous French sentimentalism and tendency to love affairs, which certainly characterize Europe's greatest thief.

Favorite Passage:

"Ah! Sholmes, you are a wonderful man! You have such a command over your temper. Nothing ever disturbs you."

"No, nothing disturbs me," replied Sholmes, in a voice that trembled from rage; "besides, what's the use of losing my temper?...I am quite confident of the final result; I shall have the last word." (p. 85)

Recommendation: Highly Recommended.

*****

Maurice LeBlanc, Arsène Lupin vs Herlock Sholmes, Fox Eye Publishing (Leicester, UK: 2022).

Music on My Mind

 

Caroline Cobb, "We Wait for You".

Isidorus Hispalensis

 Today is the feast of St. Isidore of Seville, Doctor of the Church. From his Etymologies, 6.19.38-42 (my translation):

The sacrifice [sacrificium] is said to be as it were a sacred act [sacrum factum] because by mystical prayer [prece mystica] it is consecrated [consecratur] to the memory of the Lord's suffering for us; thus at his bidding we call it the body and the blood of Christ, which, while it is made from the fruits of the earth, is sanctified [sanctificatur] and becomes a sacrament [fit sacramentum] by the Holy Spirit working invisibly [invisibiliter], of which sacrament [sacramentum] of bread and cup the Greeks call 'Eucharist', which is interpreted in Latin as 'good grace' [bona gratia]. And what is better than the body and blood of Christ? The sacrament [sacramentum] occurs in a celebration when a deed done is understood as to signify something that is received in a holy way [sancte]. And so baptism and chrism, body and blood, are sacraments [sacramenta]. These are called sacraments [sacramenta] because, under the bodily skin of the thing, the divine power secretly [secretius] works the salvation pertaining to those sacraments [sacramenta]; thus on the basis of secret power [secretis virtutibus] or sacred power [sacris] they are called 'sacraments'. These are fruitfully accomplished in the hands of the Church because the Holy Spirit dwelling in it works the effect of the sacraments [sacramentorum] in a hidden way [latenter]. Thus, whether they are dispensed within the church of God by good or bad ministers, still the Holy Spirit, who once appeared in the times of the apostles by visible works, mystically [mystice] vivifies them. These gifts are neither amplified by the merits of good dispensers nor attenuated by those of the bad, because (1 Cor 3:7) 'Neither is he that plants anything, nor he that waters, but God gives the increase.' Thus in Greek it is called 'mystery' [mysterium], because it has a secret [secretum] and concealed disposition.

'Secretum' and its cognates are quite difficult to translate in contexts like this; 'secretum' literally means 'separated or set apart', but can also mean secluded, severed, rejected, excluded, nonobvious, confided, entrusted, private, hidden, personal, consecrated, and, of course (though less often than one might think), secret or clandestine. It's not surprising that Isidore interprets 'eucharist' as 'bona gratia', but it's interesting that he seems to interpret this as specifically indicating its value ("And what is better than the body and blood of Christ?"), so that the emphasis is on the 'bona'.

Etymologiae (Re-Post)

 Tomorrow is the feast of St. Isidore of Seville, so here is a re-post (slightly revised) from 2019.

************

 

I was looking at Isidore's Etymologiae today and had an insight into the medieval practice of etymologia. I've noted before that it's a mistake to overhistoricize what the medievals were doing with their etymologies. For us, etymology is a historical reconstruction, but while the medievals thought there was some kind of rough historical connection, the medievals aren't trying to reconstruct the history. For them, etymologia is not a historical origin, per se, but an imperfect definition -- it is a definition-like thing, not a history-like thing, that falls short of the full conditions for a good definition. In particular, if you are giving the etymologia of a word, you are defining it (imperfectly) in terms of similar words.

Now, this is to us an odd thing to take seriously; why would there be any particular importance in using similar words? If we were doing it in English, it would usually be a game. Nonetheless, you still can find cases here and there where it's obviously relevant. I've noted before it's actually essential to understanding 'parameter' that people in colloquial English take parameters to establish perimeters, even though the only reason for this is that 'parameter' and 'perimeter' are similar words. English is a blocky language, so it's even easier to see in common phrases than in particular words: the common misuse of the original technical term 'begging the question' is inevitable, and even people who insist on keeping the technical meaning will often, if you ask what the phrase means, try to fit the 'begging' in somehow, even though it's only there due to an oddly strong and overliteral translation of the Latin petitio, not because it has anything to do with begging as such. The use of the word 'begging' creates, however, an almost irresistible attraction toward explanation in terms of begging, and almost certainly influences how the phrase is actually used.

But, of course, the medievals were not thinking in terms of English but in terms of Latin and (sometimes) Greek. And, structurally, what is Latin like? It consists of roots, prefixes, suffixes, case endings, and the like, and shortened forms are actually fairly common. So what St. Isidore is doing is just rationally extrapolating this to the limit, and proceeding on the assumption that every non-basic Latin word consists of further roots. All Latin words break up into little bits anyway; lots of those little bits obviously contribute to the meaning; it at least raises the question what the other little bits might be doing.

So, for instance, Isidore's etymology for gladius, sword, is gulam dividere, splitting the throat. What is his reasoning? He's not merely playing a word game. As he sees it, gladius breaks up into smaller elements:

g(*)la
di

The component g(*)la is shared with gula; the component di is shared with dividere -- and, indeed, it is found in lots of Latin words that have something to do with dividing. So we get gulam dividere; and since it makes sense to think of a sword as a throat-splitter, he takes that we have here come up with a plausible candidate for more basic words using the same components that capture the meaning of gladius at least roughly. (And Isidore is never really dogmatic about his etymologies, often willing to propose alternatives, although some of his proposals are so catchy that once he proposes them they become how people think of the original words anyway.)

A bigger stretch is spes, which he explains as pes progrediendi. Spes and pes obviously share a component; so to make sense of how this component in 'foot' can apply to 'hope' as well, we need to ask, "What hope-like things does a foot do?" And Isidore's answer is the obvious one: it moves forward.

Completeness, Action, Beauty

 Diversity of statuses and offices in the Church pertains to three things. The very first, to completeness of the Church itself. For just as in the order of natural things, completeness, which in God is found simply and uniformly, in the universe of creatures is not able to be found except differently and plurally, so also the fullness of grace, which in Christ as in the head is united, to the members overflows in many ways, so that the body of the Church may be complete. And this is what the Apostle says, Eph. 4: He gave some as apostles, some as  prophets, others as evangelists, and others as shepherds and teachers, to the fulfillment of the saints. 

And secondly it pertains to the the necessity of the actions which are necessary in the Church. For it is fitting for diverse actions to be deputed to diverse men, in order that all may be accomplished readily and without confusion. And this is what the Apostle says, Rom. 12: As in one body we have many members, and all members do not have one act, so we many are one in Christ.

And thirdly, it pertains to the the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consists in a certain order. Wherefore it is said, 1 Kgs 10, that the Queen of Sheba on seeing the wisdom of Solomon, and the rooms of his servants, and the orders of his ministers, had no more spirit. Wherefore also the apostle says, 2 Tim. 2, that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay.

[Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2-2.183.2 corpus, my rough translation.]

Where the Fool Remains Forever and the April Comes No More

 The Aristocrat
by G. K. Chesterton 

 The Devil is a gentleman, and asks you down to stay
At the little place at What'sitsname (it isn't far away).
They say the sport is splendid; there is always something new,
And fairy scenes, and fearful feats that none but he can do;
He can shoot the feathered cherubs if they fly on the estate,
Or fish for Father Neptune with the mermaids for a bait;
He scaled amid the staggering stars that precipice, the sky,
And blew his trumpet above heaven, and got by mastery
The starry crown of God Himself, and shoved it on the shelf;
But the Devil is a gentleman, and doesn't brag himself. 

 O blind your eyes and break your heart and hack your hand away,
And lose your love and shave your head; but do not go to stay
At the little place in What'sitsname where folks are rich and clever;
The golden and the goodly house, where things grow worse for ever;
There are things you need not know of, though you live and die in vain,
There are souls more sick of pleasure than you are sick of pain;
There is a game of April Fool that's played behind its door,
Where the fool remains for ever and the April comes no more
Where the splendour of the daylight grows drearier than the dark,
And life droops like a vulture that once was such a lark:
And that is the Blue Devil that once was the Blue Bird;
For the Devil is a gentleman, and doesn't keep his word.

Admin Note

 About a year ago, I switched commenting systems; Disqus had become increasing bloated and unpleasant to use, so I switched to Commento, which had the advantage of being relatively cheap and, compared to Disqus, massively easier and quicker to load. As a transitional thing it worked well enough, but it quickly became clear that there was inadequate support and it would occasionally go rather inconsistent. Unfortunately, it has grown increasingly inconsistent in the past month or so, to the extent that it is very unpredictable. And I've occasionally been locked out of comments myself recently. Commento wasn't expensive, but I'm certainly not paying for a third-party commenting platform in order not to have access to the commenting system. So it's definitely time to move on.

And it is as tricky a matter as one might expect; most of the commenting systems out there are either absurdly expensive (obviously for businesses rather than little blogging endeavors) or overloaded (with indefinite waiting lists) or are obviously lacking in other ways. After some research, I've decided to try CommentBox for a while. Because Commento is acting up, I'm not sure I'll be able to import any Commento comments, so if you were extraordinarily proud of some comment you left in the past year, I apologize, I guess, since it might be lost to all but the omniscience of God.

It allows for simple Markdown (*italic* for italic, **bold** for bold, > for blockquote). Replies to comments are not particularly good, I'm afraid, although there is a little icon near the name for the comment which if clicked gives a menu by which you can reply to a comment (which in practice, I think, just means that it puts it below the comment to which you are replying and lets those who have clicked the box for emailed replies get a notification.). Comments can be edited for about eight minutes after posting.  It requires sign-in (by social media or email) but once you've signed in, there's a little box you can click to post anonymously, and another if you want emailed replies. As with Commento, it will only be on the web version. (I'm sure there's a way it could be done on the mobile site, but the problem is that it would require extensive experimentation with figuring out how to put the relevant snippets in the HTML, and Blogger does not make that easy anymore.) We'll see how it does with spam (which is not as big a problem as it once was, but still occasionally causes problems); the moderation options are not particularly extensive, but as it's a roughly-free commenting service for the moment (it only costs if you get above a certain number of comments a month, a number that I have not reached in a few years now). 

Let me know if it gives you trouble.

Say the Word

 The whole span of my life disperses and vanishes vainly in the confusion of the vanities of this world. And because I have not even desired, for a single hour, to prepare myself for tackling work in the spiritual vineyard, I do not expect to receive the wage prepared for the just. But, for the hidden wounds of my sins, I ask forgiveness from you, unworthy though I am. And because of this, before I stand before your frightful judgment seat and am found guilty of my crimes by your just judgment, say the word, and I will be healed by your mercies: O Friend of mankind, glory to you!

[From the Basilica Hymn for the Fifth Week of Lent, in The Book of Before and After: The Liturgy of the Hours of the Church of the East, Fr. Andrew Younan, ed. and tr., The Catholic University of America Press (Washington, DC: 2024), p. 483.]

Links of Note

 * Rebekah Wallace, Legacy of angels, at "Aeon"

* Chris Pruett, Divine Command Theory, Robust Normative Realism, and the Argument from Psychopathy: A Reply to Erik Wielenberg (PDF)

* Andrew Chignell and Derk Pereboom, Natural Theology and Natural Religion, at the SEP

* Jean-Luc Solère & Nicholas Westberg, Descartes on God and Duration, Revisited (PDF)

* Louis Daoust reviews Deborah Boyle's Mary Shepherd: A Guide.

* Austen McDougal, Loving Your Enemy (PDF)

* Edmund Waldstein, Happiness as the Principle of Ethics, Law, and Rights, at "The Josiah"

* Nevim Borçin, Rethinking Natural Slavery in Aristotle (PDF)

* Kailani B., I Am Not the Main Character in Fictional Stories, at "Damsel in the Library"

* Sofia Calvente, Hierarchy of Beings and Equality of Men and Women in Catherine Trotter Cockburn (PDF)

* Edward Feser, A Catholic Defense of Enforcing Immigration Laws, at "Public Discourse"

* Michelle Kassorla and Eugenia Novokshanova, If Academic Neutral Isn't Dead Yet, It Soon Will Be, at "The Multimodal AI Project"

* Sue Curry Jansen and Jeff Pooley, For this unsung philosopher, metaphors make life an adventure, on Susanne Langer, at "Psyche"

* David Schleicher and Nicholas Bagley, The state capacity crisis, at Niskanen Center

* Victoria, The Anglo-Latin haibun, at "Horace & friends"

* Hilarius Bookbinder, The average college student today, at "Scriptorium Philosophica". The description is recognizable, although, of course, the degree to which it fits is variable; and complaints of this sort are very common among college professors. The problem, of course, is that by the point students get to college, all the damage is already done, and only the most motivated students will be able to correct course by this point. And, contrary to almost every bloviator with an easy solution, the problems are so pervasive and across so many domains that they quite obviously cannot be monocausal. Yes, phones are a serious problem, but students also generally don't have sufficient reading skills, which directly implies that they haven't read enough to develop the reading skills, since that's the only way one develops them, and something similar is true of basic writing and arithmetical skills; they often haven't been socialized enough to hold themselves to basic obligations or courtesies, and they sometimes take trying to bluff and fake their way through anything difficult to a truly extraordinary level, and, perhaps worst of all, they are extremely inclined to give up at the first serious challenge, to such an extent that they will fail to make use of second chance opportunities even when they need them. All of these problems are regular complaints, and none of them can be due entirely to the same thing. (I think a lot of them are tied to the fact that many students have never really been challenged before, as modern teenagers often don't have a wide range of opportunities for doing challenging things or incentive for using the opportunities they do have, but this is not a single problem, either.) 

It's also true, of course, that there are many students who don't have these problems, or at least don't have them so severely as to damage their ability to get through just fine; but if you're not already that sort of student, there is no way to solve such problems on the fly in a college course. The closest one can get on the professor side is just to design the course in such a way that students are forced to do things in their head like memorization and analysis instead of trying to google answers, and required to do things in full view, like reading, that we have often just left to the discretion of the student; that is, one can bring directly into the class the sorts of things that they should be doing outside the class. But there's only so much time, and only so far one can go in doing this; almost everything substantial in higher education, necessarily and inevitably, depends on the initiative and self-instruction of the student. That's the whole point of it; college teachers are only there to give you resources and assistance in doing the learning yourself, not to try futilely to shove things into your head while you're scrolling the internet.

Of course, lest we be unfair, it is worth noting that many professors are idiots and stupidly think that they are brilliant at teaching because their college has a good pre-selection process in which the particular students who end up in their classes don't need much teaching in order to learn. And you get the common problem of the Myth of the Method, in which college teachers think that if only they have the right method, which must exist somewhere out there, all problems are solved. And you get the tech-hounds who think that the obvious problem is that professors are Luddites who can't get with the times, and who repeatedly ignore the very large amount of evidence that none of their tech solutions actually have the extraordinary results they claim, and sometimes have worse results than the old-fashioned technology of pen-and-paper. Perhaps it's not surprising that the problems are so complicated when so many people keep making them worse.

The Divine Guru

The Divine Guru is our mother, the Divine Guru is our father;
the Divine Guru is our Lord and Master, the Transcendent Lord.
The Divine Guru is my companion, the Destroyer of ignorance;
the Divine Guru is my relative and brother.
The Divine Guru is the Giver, the Teacher of the Lord’s Name.
The Divine Guru is the Mantra which never fails.
The Divine Guru is the image of peace, truth and wisdom.
The Divine Guru is the Philosopher’s Stone -- touching it, one is transformed.
The Divine Guru is the sacred shrine of pilgrimage, and the pool of divine nectar;
bathing in the Guru’s wisdom, one experiences the Infinite. 
The Divine Guru is the Creator, and the Destroyer of all sins;
the Divine Guru is the Purifier of sinners. 
The Divine Guru existed in the very beginning, throughout the ages, in each and every age.
The Divine Guru is the Mantra of the Lord’s Name; chanting it, one is saved.
O God, please be merciful to me, so that I may be with the Divine Guru;
I am a foolish sinner, but holding onto Him, I will be carried across.
The Divine Guru is the True Guru, the Supreme Lord God, the Transcendent Lord;
Nanak bows in humble reverence to the Lord, the Divine Guru.

Sri Guru Granth Sahib 262

Herlock Sholmès on the Trail of Arsène Lupin

 The first part of Arsène Lupin vs Herlock Sholmes, called "The Blonde Lady", sees France's greatest thief and England's greatest detective playing cat-and-mouse games all over Paris, so I began to wonder how it would look on a map. I started to piece together such a map, but as it turns out (perhaps unsurprisingly) someone had already done it -- Bernadette Pivote, who does a lot on what might be called Literary Paris, the city as seen through novels. 

Her brief summaries of the places and how they appear in "La Dame blonde" (in French) are worth reading, and I highly recommend them -- especially if you are reading the novel, of course, but it is also interesting in itself.

Dashed Off VII

 Dancing to music is something suggested by the physical way we experience music, feeling the beat and the melody.

"Understanding music involves the active creation of an intentional world in which mere sounds are transfigured into movements, harmonies, rhythms -- metaphorical gestures in a metaphorical space. And into these metaphorical gestures a metaphorical soul is breathed by the sympathetic listener." Scruton
"Every sound intentionally made is instinctively taken to be an attempt at communication. And this is as true of music as it is of speech. In the presence of sound intentionally produced, and intentionally organized, we feel ourselves within another person's ambit."

cosmological arguments in the alethic order, in the deontic order, in the epistemic and doxastic order?

questions as a sign of our cognitive contingency

Extremisms often arise from an inadequate attention to everyday duties.

colors as actings (emission), sounds as products (emitted)

the sounding vs the sound
the experience of being acted upon by way of sound vs the acousmatic experience of sound

The physical and spatial experiences of singing and playing instrumetns give us orientations in the figurative space of music, as if we built a kind of coordinate system out of them.

the kinaesthetic inness and outness of speaking and singing

In experience of music we are in music and not of it.

virtual causality in acousmatic space

osculans, os, osculum as Trinitarian (Giles of Rome)

There is not a single order of existence, and existence that is not vague with respect to one order may be vague with respect to another.

A musical cover is not merely an instance of the music but an allusion to another instance of music, which serves as a sort of exemplar (although to varying degrees).

We experience music as both an acting and a product. (This is true of dance as well.) The product-ness is instrumental to the action-ness.

The acousmatic character of sound is experienced as received.

cives optimo iure vs. cives sine suffragio
-- note that in the Roman system, cives sine suffragio are specifically 'sine suffagio' in Rome -- they could have suffrage in their own communities, on independent grounds, but in Rome they had legal protection but no right to vote or hold office.

resonance : auditory medium :: transparency : visual medium

"Our Imagination loves to be filled with an Object, or to grasp at anything that is too big for its Capacity. We are flung into a pleasing Astonishment at such unbounded Views, and feel a delightful Stillness and Amazement in the Soul at the Apprehension of them." Addison (Spect 412, 23 June 1712)

Dante's Inferno is a depiction of the forms of being anti-creative.

Cantor's definition of a set requires
(1) a collecting operation
(2) resulting in wholes with parts
(3) where the parts are definite,
(4) separate,
(5) objects of intuition or thought.

The measure of how consistent a social movement or political position  is with a free society, is how it treats pacific opposition. All free societies require a principle of respect for peaceable disagreement.

The handing down of tradition over a long period of time requires an interweaving of organic recoveries, artificial recoveries, extrapolations from precedent, restorative repairs, conserving actions, improvements of scaffolding, anticipatory preparations, functional substitutions, etc.

the Humean general (T 3.3.1.15) or common (T 3.3.1.30, EPM 9.6) point of view in aesthetics, unites us in 'the party of humankind' (EPM 9.5) against disorder and ugliness
-- involves putting ourselves in other spectators' perspectives than our own (cf. T 3.3.3.2)
-- lets us establish general rules (cf. T 3.3.1.20) that ignore possible responses dependent on happenstance circumstances (e.g., whether we are feeling sick or not at the moment)
-- lets us have common ground for aesthetic discussion (cf. T 3.3.1.15) and develop an appropriate language for it (cf. T 3.3.1.16)
-- facilitates practical coordination in aesthetic projects

the role of the principle of humanity (EPM 9.6) in aesthetic judgment

All virtues are useful and agreeable both to the person himself and to others.

Hume's claim that the 'monkish virtues' are not agreeable to their possessors does not exactly square with the history of the practices involved; the same is true of the claim that they are not useful to society.

Hume's 'artificial virtues' are not made-up virtues but virtues involving artifice, i.e., some sort of social machinery like a government, a legal system, or social custom. Hume tends to talks as if they presupposed the machinery, but there is at least an argument to be made that they are actually involved in the building of it -- the virtuous work of our tool-use ability (property-justice) creating the rules of property, ofr instance, or social graciousness creating the rules of etiquette. All of the artificial virtues would then really be natural virtues of cooperation that make use of ingenuity.

What is due someone is not and cannot be a purely conventional matter.

Human beings experience something like Hume's and also Smith's sympathy (both) even for nonhuman animals, plants, and landmarks.

While Hume's general point of view is not ideal in the sense of being that of an ideal-spectator, it is ideal in the sense of being idealized.

The possible meanings of words cover ranges of things with varying degrees of centrality or marginality; the range is constrained by context to varying degrees of precision in actual meaning.

The Copenhagen interpretation effectively treats the world as consisting entirely of possible and actual measurements.

yes/no questions as possibilities of premises

the first four categories as the fundamental preconditions of measurement

ecology and life-dependent being (esse vitalis) -- niche, etc.

(1) Some X's are Y's; therefore (2) All of the X's which verify (1) are Y's.

tutiorism // totalitarianism
laxism // the more extreme forms of liberalism

Only death is fully egalitarian.

Many things must be tried to reach great discoveries; genius discovers how to try things not one by one but as a group or mass.

"If you leave a thing alone, you leave it to a torrent of change." Chesterton

There is no being-in-the-world without co-being-in-the-world.

music as a symbol of the Holy Spirit

The experience of music as an interplay of memory, attention, and anticipation.

the moral sphere, the jurisdiction, and the templum of marriage

'field' as the mediating concept between point-like measurement and area-like measurement

the physical as that which always has a mass-momentum and energy-time measurement relationship

kinds of prudential judgment
(1) disturbance mitigation
(2) feedforward control
(3) feedback control
(4) reference selection (planning)
(5) noise mitigation
(6) state estimation
(7) evaluative reflection

perversion of the state (deliberate use of the state as a means to an end inconsistent with its natural end)

When economists say, 'The economy is in bad shape', they are talking about overall measurements, when ordinary laymen say, 'The economy is in bad shape', they mean that the parts around them are organized in a bad way.

Hb 1:4 -- The Son receives by merit in exaltation what He already possessed by nature in original filiation.

Epiphanius in the Panarium (Aer 65.8) distinguishes homousios with the Father from heteroousios (Arians) and tautoousios (Sabellians).

Lk 1:53 & the ecuharist: "He has filled the hungry with good things."

"For nothing is ever atoned for which the blood of Christ did not atone for and repair." Albert

modes of being
(1) tantum in ratione: negation and privation
(2) admixed with negation and privation: motion and mutation
(3) weakly existing (in alio): quliaties, quantities, and properties of substances
(4) completely existing (in se): substances
-- (3) are referred to (4) as in substances, (2) to (4) as tending to substances or accidents, (1) to (4) as removing substance, accidents, motions.

In every substance there is a power to be, and to be like, and to be so, and to be with respect to another.

God as that being with which all being has co-being

Predicamental vestment as it were forms an extended substance by making one substance subordinate co-substance with another. There is a substance, and it is vested with a co-substance.

being clothed as a physically realized moral status

Every human person re-presents the universe that is present to him or her.

accidental predicaments as systemic capacities (this is certainly defensible for sex principia)

forms of systemic relation: resemblance, mensuration, action

Fictional characters are not purely imaginary but involve references to real and actual beings, and ultimately to the storytelling-testimony, spoken or written, that communicates them.

The artist purifies, illuminates, and completes the materials of the work of art in making it.

What phenomenologists call 'world' is a representation of the world.

If a normative claim is successfully applied, then it is also a descriptive claim.

"People truly have a kind of feeling from human nature (xingqing) that surpasses individual life and finds completion in affective connection with people and things." Tang Junyi
"The most important point for our affirming the value of a kind of cultural activity is that it directly reveals the value of the human spirit itself, and not its instrumental or utilitarian value."

ontic personhood : ground of value :: moral personhood : response to value

In recognizing the personhood of anything, we recognzie that attributing personhood to it is not arbitrary but requires principled attribution.

"Even knowing God, I cannot describe Him; He cannot be described in words." SGGS 2
"No matter how much anyone tries to explain and describe them, / the actions of the Creator cannot be counted."
"You created the vast expanse of the Universe with One Word!"
"Virtue and vice do not come by mere words; / actions repeated, over and over again, are engraved on the soul." SGGS 4
"If anyone presumes to describe God, /he shall be known as the greatest fool of fools!" SGGS 6
"Everyone says that God is the Greatest of the Great. No one calls Him any less. / No one can estimate His Worth. By speaking of Him, His Greatness is not increased." SGGS 15
"The Wine of Truth is not fermented from molasses. The True Name is contained within it."
"Bathe in the waters of Goodness and apply the scented oil of Truth to your body, / and your face shall become radiant. This is the gift of 100000 gifts." SGGS 16
"To reach your True Home after you die, you must conquer death while you are still alive." SGGS 21

Pew Research (June 29, 2021) on Religion in India

self-identified	Believe there is only one God	There is only one God with many manifestations	There are many gods
Hindus	29%	61%	7%
Muslims	66%	22%	3%
Christians	68%	24%	5%
Sikhs	57%	36%	0%
Buddhists	39%	22%	5%
Jains	41%	54%	5%

"A value is characterized not by its strength but by its depth, by the extent to which it brings order to experience." Scruton

As an architectural work, a building is not merely lived in but lived through.

Gothic architecture as an architecture of the uprising symbolic city

Modern church architecture seems primarily cocerned with creating buildings indicative of a congregation.

the aesthetic syllogism:
major (aesthetic reasons)
minor (features of aesthetic object)
conclusion (way of experiencing aesthetic object)

Learning to experience works of art is learning to reorganize one's attention.

As the Body, Soul, and Divinity of Christ are in the Eucharist sacramentally and by real presence, so the sacramental Body of Christ is in the Eucharist representatively and by symbolic presence, in its Head.

Music works on us by being both inside and outside us.

One of the most common patterns is that human beings are stiffnecked on religious matters; we all get obstinate about what we like and find convenient.

All virtues create responsibilities; justice (and its potential parts) create them in the form of obligations.

glorying as an act of hope

the gift vs the effect of the gift (with respect to actual conferring, proportion/suitability to the recipient, and durability of the need)
-- the effect of the gift is the gift in the recipient

zikkaron and the presence of Israel in the heavenly liturgy

The first thing God gave Adam was God.

fictionalizations of fictions and fictionalizations
-- this is a common way versions of fictional chracters are related, e.g., I can write a Holems pastiche that is fictionalization of the Sherlock Holmes

perception, punishment, and argument as the three natural means of persuasion

Dancing and music are things we naturally do, which are then 'packaged' as artifacts in which the dancing or music is intentionally presented as dancing or music.

"Dancing creates a 'sympathetic space' whose meaning is corporate." Scruton

festivity, solemnity, and sublimity as the key values of church architecture

One way we affect other minds is by affecting the possibilities available to them.

We treat our bodies as having meaning in such a way as to require the bodies of others to have meaning.

The body as we experience it is both 'just now' and 'soon' as well as 'right now'.

Fortified and Revitalized

 Hope is a virtue that very strongly befits the office of a knight, for through hope knights remember God in battle, in their trials and tribulations, and through the hope that they have in Him they receive succour and aid from God who triumphs in battle because of the hope and trust that the knights have in His power rather than in their strength or weapons. With hope the knight's courage is fortified and revitalized, and hope allows them to endure travails and makes them venture into the perils into which they place themselves, and hope makes them endure hunger and thirst in the castles and cities that they defend when they are besieged. And if there were no hope the knight would not have the wherewithal to fulfil the office of knighthood. 

[Ramon Llull, The Book of the Order of Chivalry, Fallows, tr., The Boydell Press (Woodbridge, Suffolk: 2013) pp. 71-72.]

Two Poem Drafts

 Love-Illness

I tremble like the blade;
my face is clear and dewy.
I feel ten parts alive,
yet ill, afflicted, fluey;

my voice no longer works,
dry-mouthed, my tongue is swelling,
yet heart now overflows,
too many words for telling.

Let all things be endured;
though I am poor and dying,
my heart is brightly fresh
like breeze in green grass sighing.

A fire thrills my skin;
thus changed, I am elated,
but starving -- how I starve! --
with need divine, unsated.

Three Ravens: A Fragment

Three ravens sat upon a tree;
hey down, derry down day,
hey down!
They sang a song as grim could be,
hey down, derry down day,
hey down!
My love is gone across the sea,
hey down, derry down day,
hey down! --
and I now hold just memory,
hey down, derry down day,
hey down!
Three ravens sat upon a tree,
hey down, derry down day,
hey down!
They sang the sadness deep in me,
hey down, derry down day,
hey down!

Annunciation

The Feast of the Announcement to Mary

The Angel went to Nazareth, Alleluia:
"Peace, O Mary, maiden given great grace,
blessed are you among women, greatly favored!
Have no fear! Your God is gracious to you,
and you shall conceive a Son whose name is Jesus." 

 Mary was with wonder filled: "I am but a girl,
a maiden; how can I bear a son?"
"Mary, the Holy Spirit overshadows you;
with divine might is descending on you,
You shall bear God's Son. With God all is possible." 

 Then did the holy Virgin say, "Let it be so,
for I am the handmaiden of the Lord!"
O Mary, receiving peace from God, you give peace;
you restored Eve's children to their true place;
in you the Word was made flesh to dwell among us. 

 O Lord, we do not understand and are amazed;
we are blinded by Your eternal flame.
The incense of our prayer alone can we give;
we hide behind its smoke in Your presence,
for great is the might that comes upon Your altar!

 Feast of the Annunciation
by Christina Rossetti 

 Whereto shall we liken this Blessed Mary Virgin,
Faithful shoot from Jesse's root graciously emerging?
Lily we might call her, but Christ alone is white;
Rose delicious, but that Jesus is the one Delight;
Flower of women, but her Firstborn is mankind's one flower:
He the Sun lights up all moons thro' their radiant hour.
'Blessed among women, highly favoured,' thus
Glorious Gabriel hailed her, teaching words to us:
Whom devoutly copying we too cry 'All hail!'
Echoing on the music of glorious Gabriel.

A Law of Nature and Reason

 ...We must admit the existence of a law of nature and reason that precedes civil coexistence, and that must be respected by all civil dispositions, and that against such law no civil power can do nor attempt to do anything. If this is fully admitted, sincerely in all its consequences; if the legislative branch submits itself to natural and rational law, which -- like it or not -- overpowers it; then and only then will the legislative branch cease to be despotic irrespective of any form taken by the will of the most, the many, the few, or the one -- as these are nothing but the forms of power, and not power itself. Power itself is what must humble itself before eternal law. Civil power and civil society themselves must recognize that they have no authority whatsoever against the rights that nature assigns to man and consequently all the associations of men independently from their civil association. 

 [Antonio Rosmini, The Constitution Under Social Justice, Mingardi, tr., Lexington Books (2007) p. 28.]

Wondrous Variations

 The world, in its construction, daily prepares and awakens rational creatures to the wonder and glory of that wise Creator. The wondrous variations, which oppose one another, harmonize within it: fire, water, earth, and vaporous air. But that we may not be led astray and think that, because of their diversity, they have many makers, he took and made, of creation, one body in the forming of man, and in him made known to us that he is the Lord of all.

[From the Basilica Hymn fro the Fourth Week of Lent, in The Book of Before and After: The Liturgy of the Hours of the Church of the East, Fr. Andrew Younan, ed. and tr., The Catholic University of America Press (Washington, DC: 2024), p. 481.]

Fortnightly Book, March 23

 I was considering several possibilities for the next Fortnightly Book, but the set-up of Arsène Lupin, Gentleman Burglar for the next published work in the series, Arsène Lupin vs Herlock Sholmes, wetted my appetite for the latter, particularly since, when I listened to a few audiobook versions of the books a while back, I remember this book as being, by far, the funniest of the books. 

In the last story of the first book, "Sherlock Holmes Arrives Too Soon", Arsène Lupin and Sherlock Holmes briefly meet, as Lupin is leaving and Holmes, having been sent for but having to cross the Channel, is just arriving:

When the last horseman had passed, Sherlock Holmes stepped forth and brushed the dust from his clothes. Then, for a moment, he and Arsène Lupin gazed at each other; and, if a person could have seen them at that moment, it would have been an interesting sight, and memorable as the first meeting of two remarkable men, so strange, so powerfully equipped, both of superior quality, and destined by fate, through their peculiar attributes, to hurl themselves at the other like two equal forces that nature opposes, one against the other, int he realms of space. (p. 188)

As it happens, Holmes has already deduced, based on the information he has on the case on which he was going to consult and Lupin's behavior, that the other man is Lupin, but he does not regard this as a major priority at the moment. Holmes continues to his destination, where he solves in ten minutes the key to a centuries-old puzzle, which Lupin also had solved, and sets to return. As he does so, however, he is met by a car -- Lupin sent it to him from the train station, knowing that Holmes would not need much time, and Holmes takes it for the compliment it is. But in the car is a box with a watch -- Holmes's watch, which Lupin had managed to lift in their brief meeting. Holmes does not take this gift so well:

The Englishman never moved a muscle. On the way to Dieppe, he never spoke a word, but fixed his gaze on the flying landscape. his silence was terrible, unfathomable, more violent than the wildest rage. At the railway station, he spoke calmly, but in a voice that impressed one with the vast energy and will power of that famous man. He said:

"Yes, he is a clever man, but someday I shall have the pleasure of placing on his shoulder the hand I now offer to you, Monsieur Devanne. And I believe that Arsène Lupin and Sherlock Holmes will meet again some day. Yes, the world is too small -- we will meet -- we must meet -- and then --" (p. 198)

The next Fortnightly Book, Arsène Lupin vs Herlock Sholmes, is the tale of their meeting again. Of course, as the story was being serialized, after the first two chapters were published in Je sais tout, Arthur Conan Doyle squelched the use of the name 'Sherlock Holmes'; so LeBlanc just started calling the detective 'Herlock Sholmes'. (He was not the first to use the name to get around Doyle and later the Doyle estate, although in many ways he was the most talented and successful.) This was how the whole story was done in book format.  Some English translations, perhaps a little less sure that they could evade the matter so easily, used 'Holmlock Shears' instead. Time has proved stronger than the litigiousness of the Doyle estate, so nowadays you can also occasionally find versions that just use 'Sherlock Holmes'.  My version has 'Herlock Sholmes'. The result, in any case, was perhaps the greatest non-Doyle Sherlock Holmes story ever written. Of course, being French, LeBlanc can't resist using the occasion to poke fun at English foibles, as well.

**********

Quotations from Maurice LeBlanc, Arsène Lupin, Gentleman Burglar, Fox Eye Publishing (Leicester, UK: 2022).

Links of Note

 * Matyáš Moravec, Ghosts among the philosophers, at "Aeon"

* Lillian Abadal, Challenging Aristotle's Privileged Virtue with Christ (PDF)

* Matthew J. Milliner, The Mary Underground, at "Comment"

* Brian Cutter, Three Roads from Sensory Awareness to Dualism (PDF)

* Andrew Latham, The Evolution of Papal Authority: Plenitudo Potestatis and Sovereignty in Medieval Canon Law, at "Medievalists.net"

* Baptiste Le Bihan, Emilia Margoni & Annica Vieser, Possibility in Physics (PDF)

* Parker Cotton, Other Worlds, Other Persons? Theological Encounters with Extraterrestrials in Early Modern Fiction, at "Journal of the History of Ideas Blog"

* Indrek Reiland, Recanati on Force, Mood, and Speech Acts (PDF)

* Henry Oliver, Evelyn Waugh's Decadent Redemption, at "Liberties"

* Rodrigo Gouvea, Departing from Searle in the metaphysics of institutions (PDF)

* Rob Alspaugh, Aquinas's Real Theory of Double Effect, at "Teaching Boys Badly"

* Claus A. Andersen, Decretum Concomitans. Bartolomeo Mastri on Divine Cognition and Free Will (PDF)

* Mikel Burley, Comparative Philosophy of Religion, at the SEP

* Jonathan Ichikawa, Consent Theory as Hermeneutical Injustice (PDF)

* Kelly Servick, Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility, at "Science"

* Philip Atkins, Impossible Objects and Other Anomalies (PDF)

* B. D. McClay, big fish, little fish, middle fish, at "Notebook"

Maurice LeBlanc, Arsene Lupin, Gentleman Burglar

 Introduction

Opening Passage: From the first story in the collection, "The Arrest of Arsene Lupin", which was also the first story published:

It was a strange ending to a voyage that had commenced in a most auspicious manner. The transatlantic steamship 'La Provenence' was a swift and comfrotable vessel, under the command of a most affable man. The passengers constituted a slect and delightful society. The charm of new acquaintances and improvised amusements served to make the time pass agreeably. We enjoyed the pleasant sensation of being separate from the world, living, as it were, upon an unknown island, and consequently obliged to be sociable with each other. (p. 1)

Summary: Arsene Lupin is France's (and the world's) greatest thief. A master at picking any lock, opening any window, forging any signature, he is also the supreme master of disguise, and in our first introduction to him, "The Arrest of Arsene Lupin", is so well disguised that that even the reader, with all the clues, cannot recognize him until he unveils himself. He is a master manipulator and grifter -- he is at least as likely to steal from you by arranging for you to give him the opportunity as he is to break in -- and we learn later ("Madame Imbert's Safe") that Arsene Lupin is not even his original name, but an identity he invented that he keeps using to remind himself of an important lesson. But perhaps just as important to all of this is that he is charming; if any thief can make you feel as if it were a courtesy and honor to be robbed, it is Lupin.

While this is a collection of short stories, it works very well as a collection; we start with Arsene Lupin's meeting with the potential love of his life, Miss Nelly, in the first story, "The Arrest of Arsene Lupin", and we meet her again in the last story, "Sherlock Holmes Arrives Too Late". "The Arrest of Arsene Lupin", "Arsene Lupin in Prison", and "The Escape of Arsene Lupin" form a trilogy whose parts are adequately designated by their titles, with "The Mysterious Traveller" forming a sort of sequel to the trilogy. In "The Queen's Necklace" we learn a bit about Lupin's origins; in "The Seven of Hearts" we learn how the narrator of the stories first met Lupin; in "Madame Imbert's Safe" we learn about one of Lupin's early failures and also the reason why he usually uses the name Lupin. I think one can see "The Black Pearl" as adding to our understanding of Lupin's character as a gentleman, which we also get more indirectly in "The Arrest of Arsene Lupin" and "The Queen's Necklace" and in snippets elsewhere. And of course, "Sherlock Holmes Arrives Too Late" shows us Lupin through the mirror of his equal and opposite, Sherlock Holmes, who is with Lupin the only one to discover the solution of a centuries-long mystery, and also teases the next book, in which they face off.

"Sherlock Holmes Arrives Too Late" is, I think, the most fun, followed by the original trilogy; I think "The Seven of Hearts" has the best mystery at its heart. But all of them are fun in their way, and filled with clever twists and turns of one kind or another, and are all very enjoyable.

Favorite Passage: One of the things that makes Lupin France's greatest thief is that he is also France's greatest self-promoter, regularly advertising his deeds in ironic and humorous ways. The following is from "The Black Pearl", in which Lupin is beaten to a theft by a murderer and takes his revenge in a characteristically Lupinesque way.

On the following day, this article wa spublished in the 'Echo of France' and was copied by the leading newspapers throughout the world:

"Yesterday, the famous black pearl came into the possession of Arsene Lupin, who recovered it from the murderer of the Countess d'Andillot. In a short term, facsimiles of that precious jewel will be exhibited 'in London, St. Petersburg, Calcutta, Buenos Ayres, and New York.

"Arsene Lupin will be pleased to consider all propositions submitted to him through his agents."

"And that is how crime is always punished and virtue rewarded," said Arsene Lupin, after he had told me the foregoing histor of the black pearl.

"And that is how you, under the assumed name of Grimaudan, ex-inspector of detectives, were chosen by fate to deprive the criminal of the benefit of his crime." (pp. 167-168)

Recommendation: Highly Recommended.

****

Maurice LeBlanc, Arsene Lupin, Gentleman Burglar, Fox Eye Publishing (Leicester, UK: 2022).

Dashed Off VI

 "...it is the function of feeling to act as a clue to something beyond itself." Pratima Bowes
"Metaphor is a tool for achieving economy in thought and expression and such economy is essential if we are not to lose our way in irrelevant wealth of detail."

Classification is how reasoning works back through judgment toward conception.

It seems common in ancient Middle Eastern literature to explore honestly a dark and difficult subject and then have an epilogue or close that makes clear that this honest discussion needs to be contextualized (Gilgamesh, Job, Ecclesiastes, etc.).

Burke's association of the sublime with terror is heavily focused on the sheer strength of the experience.

Ambrose, On Abraham 2.81,84, on infant baptism

Etiquette is a social power, both a tool and an armor, and one of the most accessible; thus the value of teaching it to children, as long as it is not done in an overly rigid way.

Many of our ideas of human beauty and attractiveness are organized (but not constituted) by signs of leisure.

Everything genius does is metaphor-like.

Prudence & art can both be externalized into other things; thus command and counsel for prudence and the work for art.

That someone is legally responsible, or guilty, or innocent, is both a matter of fact and a matter of value.

We know ourselves in great measure by triplex via.

We can be able to achieve a goal but not in a way that is relevant specifically to our being willing to do it, in the way we are willing to do it.

We treat as material causes not only material causes in the proper sense but also things that have as an end to provide a material cause, considered precisely insofar as they have this end. The same is true of formal causes (e.g., moulds).

The dust when raised / reveals the beam.

One important function of law is to establish default standards of equality for just action (i.e., what will we agree at least usually makes people 'even'?).

The Protevangelium represents Mary as symbolic Temple, and Joseph is chosen like Aaron to care for Mary.

Ex 26:31 & 2 Chr 3:14 -- the temple veil is woven from four colors (blue, scarlet, purple, linen)
-- Philo (Mos 2.88) and Josephus (BJ 5.5.4) interpret these as symbolic of the four elements

Protev 15:15 as a possible Trinitarian formula (cf. 1 Clem 58:2, Asc. Is. 3:13)

ens ut primum cognitum : intellectual experience :: ens inquantum ens : intellectual knowledge
quod quid est : intellectual experience :: causae : intellectual knowledge

Education is a drawing-out process.

definitional vs judicative concepts

Concepts are as it were the mediating coin of understanding, judgment, and reasoning.

The best times in life are draining, exhausting, sometimes impoverishing, sometimes exasperating or even frightening, and worth it all.

"He gave you the praanaa, the breath of life, and your mind and body." Sri Guru Granth Sahib 51

We imitate the Formless Lord by renouncing selfishness.

To improve flow of any kind, one must increase pressure or reduce impeding and resisting forces.

"You cannot love a fellow creature fully till you love God." CS Lewis

'X is imaginable in such a way that we can expect it to continue to be imaginable without paradox the more we know' -> 'X is probably possible'
'X is imaginable in such a way that we can in a regular way imagine the causes that would be necessary for it' -> 'X is probably possible'
'X is imaginable in a way that adequately conforms to our actual experience' -> 'X is probably possible'
'X is imaginable and serious study can find no reason to think it impossible, without any reason to think our study inadequate' -> 'X is probably possible'
[It seems like all of these imaginability to probable-possibility inferences are getting us subtly different kinds of possibility.]

It's notable that across many contexts and cultures, human beings describe authoritative positions and offices metonymically.

Even instrumentalist theories require realism about their grounds.

Great art and literature integrates the world into human life in ways that bring out their value, both inherent and newly acquired.

"Although the sense of hearing concerns consonance, nevertheless reason is the final judge." Boethius

Music as it were creates an ecosystem in which we find ourselves.

NB the Problemata's conception of music as having a character like moral character

music as a liberal art // prudence
Like prudence, music coordinates and integrates other actions, both internal and external.

habits of aimlessness

Wisdom, as that which sets in order, is fundamentally exemplar, and the pinnacle of exemplar causes.

"Man is not only a political but a speculative animal; and where he is left to himself he will fashion for himself a philosophy of life, never quite in harmony with his neighbours." Ronald Knox

"What is good is the fulfillment of being." John Wild

When Paul describes his argument with Peter, he clearly is implying that the matter was of such importance that he *even* argued with Peter, *even* to his face.

It is important for laity to be gracious to clergy and for clergy to be gracious to laity, and it is remarkable how often this breaks down in one or the other direction, and also how often it degenerates into a mere formality. It seems to be a point on which balance is difficult -- perhaps because clergy and laity alike are often careless about acting in ways with respect to which it would be easy to be gracious.

The moral hierarchy in episcopal office
(1) learned, competent, and holy
(2) competent and holy
(3) learned and holy
(4) holy, though neither learned nor competent
(5) learned and competent
(6) competent
(7) learned
(8) neither learned, nor competent, nor holy

the importance of presumptive rights in preserving liberties

"Valentinus came to Rome under Hyginus, flourished under Pius, and remained until the time of Anicetus." Irenaeus

The last definite historical evidence of the Valentinians is from 388, where we have evidence in Callinicum of an accidental fire that destroyed a Valentinian church. [Ambrose, Letter 40.16]

"multitudo est quoddam unum, et malum est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens." Aquinas ST 1.11.2 ad 1

"Truth consists in being and falsehoold only in non-being, so that the idea of the infinite, which includes all being, includes all that there is of truth in things." Descartes to Clerselier 23 April 1649 (AT V 356)

It is acting therefore it is // cogito ergo sum

The nunc ut primum cognitum is not a point and extends pastward and futureward.

"Each thing, insofar as it is simple and undivided, always remains in the same state, as far as it can, and never changes except from an external cause." Descartes, Principia Phil II sect. 37
-- NB that he takes motus to be relevantly simplex in sect. 41, and thus as the foundation of conservation of motion.

ens amplissimum

ens ut primum cognitum -> ens ut causatum -> ens ut causans -> ens ut primum

Evil exists because limited good exists; limited good exists because unlimited good exists.

In a virtuous society, the principle of utility would be a fairly good approximation; in a very vicious society, it is often not. The more vice, the more perverse our preferences and pleasures.

The earliest modern evidence for atoms were from chemistry (Dalton's ratios) and botany (Brown's microscopic studies of Clarkia pulchella, i.e., Brownian motion); the latter became clear evidence, however, only with Einstein.

"Assuredly all the just from the beginning of the world have Christ for their head." Augustine

"Clock time requires that we hold two motions together, the motion that is easily numbered and the one we wish to measure." Sokolowski
"For the motion to be involved clock timing, it has to be placed against some other motion, at least against some vague, undifferentiated process."
"Skills, virtues, and the ability to handle risk are required because there is imprecision and indeterminacy in being."
"Intelligence in discourse does not involve just saying and understanding a lot of things: it also involves being able to sustain a reference through a long period of disclosure, that is, being able to bring out a lot about the *same* issue, or being able to let the same issue present itself through many manifestations. Allowing a reference to slip out of place, not being able to hold onto a single theme, is a form of failure in thinking."
"The first principles of natural law are not a beginning for deductions but a perpetual engagement that we can never circumvent."

clocks & changes articulatable into distinct similars (articulatable self-similar changes)

sources of indeterminacy in measurement (Sokolowski)
(1) measuring interferes with measured
(2) measuring cannot be guaranteed adequately invariant (for level of precision)
(3) measured is not wholly stable or distinguishable

The Decalogue is given in a context in which the ethical and the cultic overlap.

As time passes, the written word becomes more and not less important.

"The creation of the world is a moral act (p'ula musarit) that finds its perfection in the Sinaitic revelation. The materialization of the revelational-ethics command constitutes a creative act. Mending reality constitutes a moral act (ma'aseh musari). In creating the world, the Creator materialized the highest ethical purpose (tachlit musarit). The source of morality (makor hamusari) is God, and its revelation is the creation." R. Joseph Dov Soloveitchik
"Man is destined by God to rule and be victorious. In the most important sense of sovereignty, it is an ethical purpose and man's efforts to acquire it is an ethical effort so long as he will be supplied with the appropriate tools."
"The peak of religious ethical perfection to which Judaism aspires is man as creator."
"The craving for beauty is nothing but the eternal longing for eternal noumeanl Being."
"The creation of the world is the materialization of God's kindness."

Gen 1:26 shows that the intention is to create man in God's image (tzelem) & likeness (demut); the actual creation in Gn 1:27 is explicitly of man in God's image.

Ta'anit 2:a -- "And what is that service which is of the heart? It is prayer." (on Dt 11:13)
-- the importance of prayer *as service*

"If a work of music means something, then, this is a fact about the way it sounds." Roger Scruton
"Musical communication is possible only because certain sounds are heard as music -- are heard as exhibiting the 'intentional order' of rhythm, melody and harmony. This order is not a material property of the physical world; it resides in the perceptual experience of those who hear with understanding."
"...music is not sound, it is sound understood in response. To aim to produce music is to aim to produce a musical response."

Dewey claims that teaching & learning are necessary complementary opposites like selling and buying, but fails to recognize the senses in which one may sell before and during the period no one is buying. The merchant booth sells things before the buyer buys them; the selling is only completed in the buying, but exists distinctly and dispositively.

Zen teachers often teach with the expectation that the student will not yet learn, may never learn, and indeed may teach with the expectation that the sutdent will not and cannot learn directly. For such a teacher, teaching is often seen as a provoking rather than itself a source of learning.

In general, good teachers do not teach to make students learn but to dispose students to learning. This is a matter of broad agreement between Platonism and Confucianism, for instance.

Pedagogical neutrality is not a matter of restraining the teacher (who may be frank and still exhibit it) but a matter of not restraining the student.

"The Church teaches us that God is a Being who has His cause in Himself and Who, apart from Himself, has no being that is independent and parallel to Him. She speaks to us of the perfect, living God Who is, consequently, 'pure act'. But when our understanding stops before this Being, He appears as a 'pure fact' on account of His primordial and absolute perfection." Sophrony Sakharov

Dietrich von Hildebrand claims that every good possessing a value imposes a sort of obligation to give it an adequate response, but this is certainly not true of most values. (It would be different if the claim were about *essential/integral* values and *common good*.)

Emergencies by their nature require prudence.

Attacks on marriage seem inevitably to become attacks on motherhood.

Consciousness as cognitive presence to the presentness of what is present to us. (NB the distinction of our presence and what is present to us.)

Consciousness is inherently reduplicative.

The freedom of every free society is home-brewed and custom-built.

More Light! More Light!

 Primacy of Mind
by Alfred Austin 

Mens agitat molem. Aeneidos Lib. vi. 

 I.  Above the glow of molten steel,
 The roar of furnace, forge, and shed,
 Protectress of the City's weal,
 Now, Learning rears her loftier head; 

 II.  That Progress may at length descry
 It lacks the clue to guide aright,
 And, conscious of its blindness, cry
 Unto the Muse, "More light! More light!" 

 III.  That Wealth may fitly yield the throne
 To Letters, Science, artist-skill,
 And Matter, willing subject, own
 Mind must be lord and master still. 

Probabilities and Just-So Stories

The notion of a 'just-so story' goes back to Rudyard Kipling's 1902 book, based on the fact that his daughter kept demanding that he tell stories 'just so', in exactly the right way; Just So Stories are fanciful stories about how the leopard got its spots, how the elephant got its trunk, and so forth. The phrase 'just-so story' became popular in the late 1970s when Stephen Jay Gould used it to criticize some of the explanations used in evolutionary psychology. Of course, as with all such labels, people have tried at various times to claim both that just-so stories are good and that just-so stories don't really exist. But of course, they do, and they fail as explanations. I saw one just recently, in which someone on Substack, I think, argued that people have difficulty with critical thinking because it takes up so much energy. It's the sort of thing that has a narrative plausibility but is completely unfounded. Current views of the brain all indicate that thinking takes very little energy (so little, in fact, that neuroscientists struggle sometimes even to estimate it with the methods available to them). Having a brain is immensely energy-expensive; but, given that, thinking hard costs almost nothing in comparison. The human brain is like an extremely powerful engine; just keeping it running consumes fuel like crazy. But this energy is all used to make it possible to do a lot of things with only just a little extra, so the difference between the engine idling and the engine applying its power this way or that is relatively tiny. It's a lot of work to have a brain; it's not a lot of work to use it. But it makes a good story, particularly since we've all had the experience of being tired after a lot of thinking (which is not, contrary to what one might think, due to your brain but due mostly to the fact that you use a lot more muscles when you are concentrating than you usually realize, combined with the fact that we often concentrate hardest when we are already stressed about something). Note that it's not the bare fact of explaining by a story that's the problem here; it's that the story, however plausible it may sound, is just a story despite the pretense that it is more. It's not even, in Plato's sense, a 'likely story', a story that is not a closely reasoned account but might be true, more or less, in some sense or other, because it captures things that are known to be true and that can be given a closely reasoned account. It's not a likely story; it just looks like one.

While the notion of a just-so story developed in the context of philosophy of biology, broadly construed, there are many other fields in which just-so stories are found. And I think they have been spreading like weeds in philosophy, in part due to uncritical and careless uses of broadly Bayesian kinds of reasoning -- uncritical, because the reasoning often goes with a failure to think through what the probabilities involved actually are, and careless, because there are often no serious safeguards. We're led through a story about how one might reason, but the story hangs in air and doesn't connect to anything. 

Probabilities are not random numbers, nor do we have direct insight into them, on any account of probability. Strictly speaking, a probability is a comparison of a subset of possibilities (like the ways five dice can land on 2) to the larger set of possibilities (like the ways five dice can land on any number). There are lots of different ways one can interpret these sets of possibilities, and preferred ways become elaborated in various philosophical accounts of probability, but to have any probability in any interpretation of probability, you have to know something about the possibilities on the table, and you have to be able to measure those possibilities in such a way as to compare the relevant subset to the total. If you significantly change the possibilities or how they are measured (for instance, if we switch from five dice to twelve dice, or from dice to coins), your probabilities stop being straightforwardly comparable -- you have shifted the comparison on which the numerical probability is based. The short of it is that, for a probability to mean anything, you have to have some way of knowing what possibilities are on the table, and some method of measurement.

People will argue like this. Suppose, just to take one example, naturalism, N, and suppose some particular evidence, E, and our background evidence, R. Then we can find the probability of E given N&R, and let us suppose it is much, much lower than the probability of E given ~N&R. Thus E is evidence against N, at least with respect to R. All well and good if the numbers, even handled algebraically mean anything. But there are problems right at the beginning in this particular case, because N doesn't really predict things. Naturalism is not a predictive hypothesis; it doesn't tell you what will be the case, but it is rather an incomplete framework fitting entire families of hypothesis -- it tells you (if true) what kind of hypothesis could possibly tell you what will be the case. Suppose we take something like, the existence of the human mind, and claim on the basis of some version or other, however modified, of the above argument that it is evidence against naturalism. The problem, though, is that naturalism on its own doesn't predict anything about the human mind; whether or not the human mind exists, naturalism purports to describe what kind of explanation you'll need to look for in order to explain that fact. It does, of course, rule out some things, namely, those things that are inconsistent with its assumptions or constituent features, but it tells us nothing either way about most things.

But, Brandon, you might say, surely it makes some of those other things more or less probable? No, not necessarily. For one thing, naturalism doesn't identify a well-defined set of possibilities; it is an open-ended framework and we don't know, even in a general way, all the possibilities consistent with it. We can, again, definitely rule some things out, based on what we can show to be inconsistent with its assumptions and definition, but that's hard work and we certainly have not plumbed the complete depths of that inquiry, which involves entirely different kinds of argument than the above argument. But it's also the case that these kinds of arguments involve no method of measurement that lets us compare one set of possibilities with another. How are we getting these numbers (or ranges, as the case may be)? Are we taking field surveys of possible worlds? Are we drawing on metaphysical experiments about the nature of reality? No, the numbers and ranges are made up. They are completely made up. Does naturalism or theism better predict the existence of a rational animal suffering? Show me the analysis of the possibilities on the table, and the method you are using to measure predictiveness, and the model you are using to put numbers to it all, and then maybe I will regard you as not just telling a Bayesian version of a just-so story. Otherwise, all you are telling me is a story based on narrative plausibilities, or what you think are narrative plausibilities, about the journey of discovery; that you throw some fictitious numbers into it doesn't change that.

It is probably impossible to break analytic philosophers of the superstitious habit of assuming that they have direct mystical insight into the probabilistic structure of reality, but that doesn't mean that nay of the rest of us have to treat it as more than a charming fictional story about how an elephant's nose got stretched into a trunk.

In the broad, traditional sense of 'probable', you can do probable inferences without any numbers even implied; all you need to know is that something is possible, that there are causal tendencies for it, and that the things that can prevent it are missing, or else you establish what is required for demonstrative argument for a conclusion and show that, while you can't fully deliver on all of them, you can deliver enough to make extrapolation of the rest reasonable. Nothing prevents these traditional kinds of probable inference still being available. But once you start using numbers, as in Bayesian arguments, you have to justify the numbers. (This is true, although there are subjective Bayesians who might try to deny it, even on the most subjective of subjective Bayesianisms, because in an argument for something you need to have something connecting the argument to reality.)

A different kind of case. I recently came across another argument (unfortunately I cannot find it again) on a different subject. The argument went something like,

(1) On moral realism, we would expect morality to robustly make sense in a unified way.
(2) Morality does not robustly make sense in a unified way, but in fact is very patchwork.
(3) Therefore, moral realism is wrong.

Whatever might be said of moral realism, this is an obviously bad argument. We have the same attempt to tell a story about "what we would expect" from moral realism. In this case, though, it's not just a matter of our not having done the work of measurement, it's that (1) is just wrong, and in the most glaring way. Moral realism is a position in which moral facts can't be merely assumed to depend on what makes sense to us; therefore, it's false that we would expect morality to make sense given moral realism on its own, at least if we are going on the definition of moral realism rather than associations in our imagination. It's a just-so story about how an inquiry might possibly reach a particular, pre-selected conclusion, and floats free of anything that is necessary to deliver the conclusion. It is not moral realism but moral anti-realism, or at least some forms of it, which would have a problem if it turned out that (2) is true, because in some forms of moral anti-realism, morality would in fact just be a byproduct or outgrowth of our own sense-making capacities. Moral realism, on the other hand, is consistent with the moral world being quite baroque and surprising, in need of extensive exploration and discovery in order to know what it even involves. It is also consistent with that other expectation, to be sure; here again, we have a situation in which, short of going through all the possibilities, we have no way of getting any definite probabilistic numbers or ranges, so there's no way to say which is more probable -- they are just possibilities on the table, and we don't have the means to compare them to the totality of all the relevant possibilities. If we try to get more specific, all we get is another just-so story. 

Winning with a Low Pair

 One of the most famous and recognizable series of paintings in the entire world is one that does not come to mind when one thinks of high art. The painter, Cassius Marcellus Coolidge, began the series without, I think, realizing that it would be a series, in 1894. He later did some work for an advertising firm, Brown & Bigelow (which still exists today), involving paintings using anthropomorphic dogs for advertising calendars. Several of those were variations of the original 1894 theme, and thus the series was born, known now as Dogs Playing Poker. (There's a story that Coolidge actually liked cats much more than dogs, but thought that dogs seemed more the poker-playing type.) The 1894 painting, Poker Game, that started it all:

If I recall correctly, my grandmother (who really loved card games) had a print of another in the series, usually known as A Waterloo (a 'waterloo' is a very large pot), although Coolidge's original title was Judge St. Bernard Wins on a Bluff:

In many ways, I think this is the best in the series. When I was younger, I never really appreciated the expressions on the dogs' faces at St. Bernard taking a huge pile of chips with a pair of deuces (I mostly just remember the collie), but they are great, especially the dog who had folded with a pair of Jacks. So goes the game of poker, in which anything might happen. The painting is actually a sequel to another painting, A Bold Bluff, in which we see Judge St. Bernard call with just the deuces and all the other dogs are looking suspiciously at him, trying to figure out how far he is bluffing. He just coolly stares them down.

Dogs Playing Poker is often classified as 'kitsch', but I'm not convinced that this is right. Kitsch, I've noted before, is the quasi-art of treating the art-work as wholly devoted to achieving an effect in the audience; it treats the end of the artwork as the whole point of the artistic making. This is not in the strictest sense possible, so kitsch attempts to cause an emotional effect by stereotyped and sometimes manipulative means; this is why kitsch is inferior to art in the proper sense. But, of course, having a work of art that has an effect in the audience is not necessarily kitsch; you don't do art in the proper sense just to get an effect, but that doesn't mean you don't aim for one at all. 

The Dogs Playing Poker series are comic paintings that became popular due to their use in advertisement. They are therefore in some sense 'low brow'. But it would be absurd to assume that any of the three are in themselves evidence of kitsch. The Mona Lisa is not made kitsch by being so popular that people hang prints of it around the house or put it on shirts or use it in advertisements (even if some of the uses are definitely kitsch); Renaissance paintings are not kitsch just because they were done on patronage, often as part of public relations, to proclaim the value of this or that noble house. Card games are a historically common theme for paintings; Coolidge just did a comic version of the theme (most of his work is comic and has a surreal quality). There's no reason why comic material would make a painting any more kitsch than tragic material does. This is not to say, of course, that Dogs Playing Poker has not spawned a lot of kitsch; but any good painting does, because people like to try to capture the mood, the feel, of the original in all sorts of different contexts. Painting has a reputation for being a somewhat more humorless field of art than, say, poetry, and perhaps this is what is really behind treating the series itself as kitsch. But the paintings work on their own terms, and they meet the most basic test of taste: people like them and keep liking them for reasons that are due to their artistic elements. And if we did insist on regarding them as kitsch, that does not in itself mean that they aren't worth having in the world. Puns are not high humor, but we dismiss them at our peril; if the pun is pictorial, the same is true. Either way, sometimes one wins a grand pot with a low pair, and sometimes one enters the heavenly hall of immortal painters with Dogs Playing Poker. 

Explorers

 These great philosophers are explorers. Those who are great are those who have discovered continents. Those who are not great are those who have only thought of being solemnly accepted at the Sorbonne.

 There is a certain world, a universe of thought. On the face of this world geographies can be drawn. In the depth of this world geologies can make deeper engravings. The public, so to speak, always believes, and the philosophers almost always believe, that they are quarreling over the the same terrain. Neither sees that they are plunging into different continents. 

[Charles Péguy, Notes on Bergson and Descartes, Ward, tr., Cascade Books (Eugene, OR: 2019) p. 58.]

As from Sheol

If you enter into judgment with your servant, O Lord God, what excuse will I find? And where can I beg for forgiveness? For I have rejected and broken all your laws, and have become a dead man in the greatness of my sins. As from Sheol, from the sea of sin draw me out, in your mercy: O Christ the King, have mercy on me!

[From the Basilica hymn for the Third Week of Lent, in The Book of Before and After: The Liturgy of the Hours of the Church of the East, Fr. Andrew Younan, ed. and tr., The Catholic University of America Press (Washington, DC: 2024), p. 479.]

To Show a Heart Grief-Rent

 To Keep a True Lent
by Robert Herrick 

 Is this a fast, to keep
The larder lean?
And clean
From fat of veals and sheep? 

 Is it to quit the dish
Of flesh, yet still
To fill
The platter high with fish?

 Is it to fast an hour,
Or ragg’d to go,
Or show
A downcast look and sour? 

 No; ‘tis a fast to dole
Thy sheaf of wheat,
And meat,
Unto the hungry soul. 

 It is to fast from strife,
From old debate
And hate;
To circumcise thy life. 

 To show a heart grief-rent;
To starve thy sin,
Not bin;
And that’s to keep thy Lent.

Links of Note

 * Troy Jollimore, I Used to Teach Students. Now I Catch ChatGPT Cheats., at "The Walrus"

* Heather Parry, Modern Life Is Ruining Storytelling, at "Persuasion"

* Simon Hewett, Elucidating the Eucharist (PDF). Transignification is inevitably an incomplete account of the Eucharist but, of course, it is one of the things that does occur.

* Bradley J. Birzer, The Breakfast Club at 40, at "Law & Liberty"

* Brandon Robshaw, The Necessity of Nussbaum, at "Aeon"

* Francesca Bellazi, The Metaphysics of Pregnancy (PDF)

* H. M. A. Leow, Debating the Definition of Taoism, at "JSTOR Daily"

* Michael Hannon, The Puzzle of Political Knowledge, at "Political Epistemology".

* Ragnar Van Der Merwe, Whewell's Fundamental Antithesis: A Lineage of Influence (PDF)

* Laurence R. Horn and Heinrich Wansing, Negation, at the SEP
Justin Winzenrieth, The Textual Transmission of the Aristotelian Corpus, at the SEP

* Apple Pie, Politika, at "Things to Read". Factor analysis always has to be taken with a box of salt, but it's generally useful for raising questions about the categories we use, and in politics the categories often carry a lot of baggage that can easily mislead.

* Louis Larue, Against Guala and Hindriks' functionalist theory of institutions (PDF)

* Colin Gorrie, When Poetry Didn't Rhyme, on alliterative poetry, at "Dead Language Society"

* Isaac Kolding, Why Is Uncle Tom's Cabin So Controversial?, at "Amateur Criticism"

* Samuel Meister, Aristotle's Nature-Bound Theology in Metaphysics Λ (PDF)

* Owen Flanagan, The shame felt in addiction isn't toxic -- it's healing, at "Psyche"

Aristotle on Intractable Problems

 In general, it is safe to suppose that, whenever any problem proves intractable, it either needs definition or else bears either several senses, or a metaphorical sense, or it is not far removed from the first principles; or else the reason is that we have yet to discover in the first place just this -- in which of the aforesaid directions the source of our difficulty lies: when we have made this clear, then obviously our business must be either to define or to distinguish, or to supply the intermediate premisses: for it is through these that the final conclusions are shown. 

 Aristotle, Topics VIII.3

Let Steady Reason Urge the Struggling Oar

 Epitaph, Intended for Himself
by James Beattie

Escap'd the gloom of mortal life, a soul
Here leaves its mouldering tenement of clay,
Safe, where no cares their whelming billows roll,
No doubts bewilder, and no hopes betray. 

Like thee, I once have stemm'd the sea of life;
Like thee, have languish'd after empty joys;
Like thee, have labour'd in the stormy strife;
Been griev'd for trifles, and amus'd with toys. 

Yet, for awhile, 'gainst Passion's threatful blast
Let steady Reason urge the struggling oar;
Shot through the dreary gloom, the morn at last
Gives to thy longing eye the blissful shore. 

Forget my frailties, thou art also frail;
Forgive my lapses, for thyself may'st fall;
Nor read, unmov'd, my artless tender tale,
I was a friend, O man! to thee, to all.

For Odour, Light, and Sound are Truthful Dreams

 Springtide
by Constance Naden 

 The silver birch, with pure-green flickering leaves,
 Flooded by morn with golden light, rejoices,
 And mingles with the kindred merriment
 Of perfume-laden winds and happy voices:
 No child of spring is lonely, but receives
 Some subtle charm, by diverse beauty lent,
 And with another life its own inweaves;
 E'en man's creative eyes win all their gain
 From light, whose glory, but for him, were vain.
 While bud the flowers, while May-tide sunshine beams,
 Through all the world of mind and body streams
 One constant rapture of melodious thought,
 One fragrant joy, with summer promise fraught,
 And one eternal love illumes the whole;
 For odour, light, and sound are truthful dreams,
 Inspired by Nature in the human soul.
 This fresh young life, whereof my own is part,
 With boundless hope all earth and heaven fills;
 The birds are waking music in my heart,
 A voiceless chant, more sweet than they can sing;
 My thoughts are sunbeams; all my being thrills
 With that exultant joy whose name is Spring.

The Genius of Metaphysick

 A person who called himself the Genius of Metaphysick was continually busied in turning a large engine, like that described in Gulliver's travels, which threw up an endless variety of combinations of words and letters, out of which were framed sentences and paragraphs, sections, chapters, and treatises. He told me, he was much employed, and had the custom of all the literati of the place, particularly of the Governour, who (he said) was his very good friend; adding, that if I had any job on hand in the bookmaking way, he would furnish me with materials in the neatest and newest fashion, and on the most reasonable terms.

James Beattie, "The Castle of Scepticism" [from Ernest Campbell Mossner, "Beattie's 'The Castle of Scepticism': An Unpublished Allegory Against Hume, Voltaire, and Hobbes", Studies in English, Vol. 27, No. 1 (JUNE, 1948), p. 134]. The "Governour" is Hume. This seems particularly appropriate in our age of LLMs that endlessly jabber.

I think it's an interesting thing about many of the most recent AI programs that (1) they are getting to be quite good but (2) it becomes clear when you 'chat' with them a while that they are as good as they are because they are set up so that you are in a weird way talking to yourself. They repeat back to you things that you say in slightly different forms; they do connect what you say to other things, but usually in a fairly typical and tedious way. It's not surprising, I think, that people are very impressed by the intelligence of something that keeps agreeing with them and finding obvious confirmations that they are right. The Great Impostor, Ferdinand Demara, used this method to great success. When asked how he was able to fake being a psychology professor so well for so long, he pointed out that, no matter what you say, nobody ever thinks you are stupid or ignorant if you tell them that you are convinced by them and ask them to explain themselves further. 

But there is room to worry in this, the point that AI seems to work like a successful con artist. I have yet to come across an AI program that does not disappoint in any field with which I am familiar myself; a form of talking to myself it may be, but it's talking to a weirdly more limited version of myself. The answers are never actually more likely to be right than they used to be. What is worrisome, though, is that the errors, which are still quite common, are trickier to catch. They are not any more right, but they sound more plausible. I recently 'chatted' with Grok 3 on the paradox of fiction; it got multiple things wrong, provably so, but always gave long, plausible-sounding arguments for the errors. Someone who had not been reading for quite a while on the paradox of fiction, as I have, would almost certainly not have caught most of the errors. Indeed, I cannot even be certain that I caught them all. Perhaps, for at least a lot of topics, they just have fewer and fewer signs of error when they are wrong.

Beattie's Genius of Metaphysick in the Castle of Scepticism has detached literature from reality; his point, of course, is that you can be as skeptical as you please if your words are just combinations that aren't about anything. It's the 'about something', however, that actually makes what you say matter, and it's the 'about something' that provides the standard of discourse. If you are talking with something that has no connection to the 'about something', you might as well just be discussing matters with an idle reverie in your own imagination. Idle reveries have their place; but you shouldn't trust them until you have completed the turn to reality.