And to the first one proceeds thus. It seems that gifts are not distinguished from virtues. For Gregory, in Moral. I, expositing Job, there were born to him seven sons, says, Seven sons were born to us when through conception of good thinking, seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arose in us. And he confirms this with Isaiah XI, And the spirit of intellection rests upon him, etc., where are enumerated the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are virtues.
Further, Augustine, in the book De Quaestionib. Evang., expositing what is found in Matth. XII, Therefore he goes and takes with him seven other spirits, etc., says, Seven vices are contrary to seven virtues of the Holy Spirit, that is the seven gifts. But the seven vices are contrary to virtues, commonly named. Therefore gifts are not distinguished from virtues, commonly named.
Further, those things whose definitions are the same, are the same. But the definition of virtue is appropriate to the gifts, for each gift is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, etc. Likewise, the definition of gift is appropriate to the infused virtues, for gift is unreturnable giving, according to the Philosopher. Therefore virtues and gifts are not distinguished.
Further, several of the things enumerated among gifts are virtues. For as was said above, wisdom and intellection and knowledge are intellectual virtues; counsel pertains to prudence; and piety is a kind of justice; and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that virtues are not distinguished from gifts.
But contrarwise is that Gregory, Moral I, distinguishes seven gifts, which are signified by seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which he says are signified by the three daughters of Job. And in Moral. II he distinguishes the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says are signified by the four corners of the house.
I reply that it must be said that if we speak of gifts and virtues according to the notion of the name, they have no opposition to each other. For the notion of virtue is drawn from what completes the human being for acting well, as was said above, but the notion of gift is drawn from comparison to the cause from which it is. But nothing forbids that which is from another as gift from being such as to complete [completiva] someone for acting well, especially since we said above that some virtues are infused into us from God. Thus according to this, gift and virtue are not able to be distinguished.
And therefore some have proposed that gifts should not be distinguished from virtues. But no lesser difficulty remains for them, to wit, to assign a reason for why some virtues are called gifts, and not all, and why some things are counted among gifts that are not counted among virtues, as is obvious from fear.
Hence others said that gifts should be distinguished from virtues, but they did not assign an appropriate cause of distinction, which, to wit, would be common to the virtues but in no way the gifts, or the converse. For some, considering that among the seven gifts, four pertain to reason, to wit, wisdom, knowledge, intellection, and counsel, and three to the striving impulse [vim appetitivam], to wit, fortitude, piety, and fear, held that gifts completed free judgment [liberum arbitrium] according as it is a faculty of reason, but virtues according as it is a faculty of will, because they discovered only two virtues in reason or intellect, to wit, faith and prudence, but others in the striving or receiving impulse [vi appetitiva vel affectiva]. But it ought to be, if this distinction were appropriate, for all virtues to be in the striving impulse, and all gifts in reason.
Some, however, considering what Gregory says in Moral. II, that the gift of the Holy Spirit, which in the mind subject to it forms temperance, prudence, justice, and fortitude, secures the same mind against any particular temptation through seven gifts, said that virtues are directed to working well, but gifts to resisting temptation. But even this distinction does not suffice. For virtues also resist temptations that lead to sins contrary to virtues, for everything whatsoever naturally resists its contrary. This is especially obvious with regard to charity, of which it is said in Cantic. VIII, Many waters were not able to extinguish charity.
But others, considering that these gifts are handed down in Scripture as they were in Christ, as is obvious in Isaiah XI, have said that virtues are simply ordered to working well, but gifts are ordered so that through them we are conformed to Christ, especially as to what He endured [passus est], because in His passion suchlike gifts blazed [resplenduerunt]. But this also does not seem to be sufficient, because the Lord Himself especially leads us to conformity to Him according to humility and meekness (Matth. XI, Learn from me because I am lowly and humble of heart) and according to charity (as in John XV, Love each other as I have loved you). And these virtues also especially blazed in Christ's passion.
And therefore, to distinguish gifts from virtues, we must follow the Scriptural way of speaking, in which they are handed down to us not indeed under the name of gifts, but rather under the name of spirits, for thus it is said in Isaiah XI, There shall rest upon him the spirit of wisdom and intellection, etc. From which words it is clearly given to be understood that these seven are enumerated there according as they are in us by divine inspiration. But inspiration signifies a sort of being changed from outside [motionem ab exteriori]. For it must be considered that there is in the human being a twofold source of changing, one indeed inside, which is reason, and the other outside, which is God, as was said above, and also the Philosopher says this, in the chapter on good fortune. Now it is clear that everything that is changed must be proportioned to the changer, and this is the completion of the changeable inasmuch as it is changeable, the disposition by which it is disposed to be changed well by its changer. Therefore by as much as the changer is higher, by so much it is necessary for the changeable to be proportioned to it by way of a more complete disposition, just as we see that a student needs to be more completely disposed in order to be capable of higher teaching from a teacher.
Now it is clear that human virtues complete a human being according as the human being is born to be changed according to reason in those things he does inwardly and outwardly. Therefore there needs to be in the human being higher completions according to which it is disposed to be changed by divinity. And these completions are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but because according to them the human being is disposed so as to be made readily changeable by divine inspiration, as is said in Isaiah I, The Lord opened my ear, but I do not contradict, I did not turn back. And the Philosopher also says, in the chapter on good fortune, that for those who are changed through divine instigation [instinctum], it does not benefit to be counseled according to human reason, but rather that they follow their inner instigation, because they are changed by a better source than human reason. And this is what some say, that gifts complete human beings for higher acts than acts of virtue.
To the first therefore it must be said that suchlike gifts are sometimes named virtues, according to the common notion of virtue. However, they have something supereminent over the common notion of virtue, inasmuch as they are sorts of divine virtues, completing the human being inasmuch as he is changed by God. Thus also the Philosopher, in Ethic. VII, places above common virtue a sort of heroic or divine virtue, according to which some are called divine men.
To the second it must be said that vices, inasmuch as they are against the good of reason, are contrary to virtues, but inasmuch as they are against divine instigation, they are contrary to gifts. For the same thing is contrary to God and reason, whose light is derived from God.
To the third it must be said that that definition is given to virtue according to the common way of virtue. Thus if we wish to restrict the definition to virtues as opposed to gifts, we will say that what is said, by which one lives rightly, is to be understood of rightness of life which is taken according to the rule of reason. Likewise, gift, as distinguished from infused virtue, is able to be said to be that which is given by God, in order to change one, to wit, that which makes a man follow well His instigation.
To the fourth it must be said that wisdom is called intellectual virtue inasmuch as it proceeds from the judgment of reason, but it is called gift inasmuch as it is worked from divine instigation. And likewise it must be said of the others.
We could spend more time on the virtues, which again are the habitudes everyone discusses the most, but what we have so far has been enough to touch on all of the essential principles. So we'll move on to the next kind of habitude: the gifts of the Holy Spirit. How we are to understand them as habitudes will come later, but we already get the essential principles here in distinguishing them from the infused virtues.