Judging as Man and for Man

 The Express Moral Principles of which I have spoken, as the basis of Duties, are those which express, in an imperative form, the five Cardinal Virtues: namely, the Principle of Humanity, that Man is to be loved as Man: the Principle of Justice, that Each Man is to have his own: the Principle of Truth, that We must conform to the universal Understanding which the use of Language among men implies: the Principle of Purity, that the Lower Parts of our nature are to be governed by the Higher: and the Principle of Order, that We must obey positive Laws as the necessary conditions of Morality....They commend themselves to our assent, in proportion as our moral nature is cultivated and educed: they become evident to us when we think and feel as really moral creatures. The perception of them may be obscured by the influence of the ferine part of our nature ;---by savage rudeness, passion, partiality: but in proportion as the ferine element is subdued, and the human element brought out in its proper force, these Principles are accepted. When man judges as man and for man, he is enabled to see their full meaning; and with their meaning, their truth.

[William Whewell, Lectures on Systematic Morality (1846), Lecture V, p. 108.]

Dashed Off XVI

 Neoplatonism is a philosophy of intelligible experience.

Human beings overflow their experiences through story, art, and social connection.

Everything Denethor sees and infers is correct at a certain level, but he has lost his ability to contextualize it properly. Insight without proper understanding therefore becomes the seed of despair, all because pride removes the safeguards against loss of understanding.

The cosmos is evangelical, a good manifestation of divine goodness.

If we were to accept the idea that the laws of nature evolve, this would require a vast space of possibilities through which evolution occurred, which would require something actual as its sufficient reason.

"Now that is properly credible which is not apparent of itself, nor certainly to be collected, either antecedently by its cause, or reversely by its effect, and yet, though by none of these ways, hath the attestation of truth." John Pearson (he contrasts attestation and manifestation)
"Whatsoever is, must of necessity either have been made or not made; and something there must needs be which was never made, because all things cannot be made. For whatsoever is made, is made by another, neither can any thing produce itself; otherwise it would follow, that the same thing is and is not at the same instant in the same respect; it is, because a producer; it is not, because to be produced: it is therefore in being, and is not in being, which is a manifest contradiction. If then all things which are made were made by some other, that other which produced them either was itself produced or was not; and if not, then have we already an independent being; if it were, we must at last come to something which was never made, or else admit either a circle of productions, in which the effect shall make its own cause, or an infinite succession in causalities, by which nothing will be made; both which are equally impossible." (he takes this only to imply a supreme maker when considering these not singly but in their order and connection)

Paley's watch argument is perhaps derived from Pearson's Exposition.

"Grace is given for the merits of Christ all over the earth; there is no corner, even of Paganism, where it is not present, present in each heart of man in real sufficiency for his ultimate salvation. Not that the grace presented to each is such as to bring him to heaven; but it is sufficient for a beginning." Newman

the solipsism of the world

law : form :: right : matter
(law as aliqualis ratio juris)

common good at moral, jural, and sacral levels

The Beast of the sea has ten crowns because it claims authority that is usurped, a surplus of authority beyond what it can have a right to.

Every human action is filled with more meaning than any external observer could ever infer from bare observation alone.

We communicate not with bare signs but as participants in a shared system, the human system, constituted by reason and common feeling and overlapping experience-types.

We are not purely external observers to each other; our views overlaps the views of otehrs, and we observe as partly in the know.

The First Amendment protects the means by which the People form customary law and decide representation.

origin, order, overflow

Part of our appreciation in hearing singing arises from our ability to sing ourselves.

Narrators are posited in reading; authors can take advantage of this.

Make-believe is a way of socializing the world.

"Le joujou est la premièr initiation de l'enfant a l'art, ou plutôt c'en est pour lui la première réalisation...." Baudelaire

"The true parallel for play is not to be found, of course, in conscious art, which, though it be derived from play, is itself an abstract, impersonal thing, and depends largely upon philosophical interests beyond the scope of childhood. It is when we make castles in the air and personate the leading character in our own romances, that we return to the spirit of our first years." Robert Louis Stevenson

We ourselves are the primary props for make-believe. In using others, we extend them a courtesy of equality; if we can be a pirate, a stick can be sword.

music // ornamental decoration

Where Walton says 'imagination', one can often just substitute 'appearance', and his account of imagining seems even more obscure than the notions of seeing-as that he criticizes.

Adults do sometimes definitely make-believe, and these cases are *palpably different* from even acting on a stage.

Sometimes when we say 'I imagine', we mean 'I posit myself to imagine'.

It is odd to talk of fictional and nonfictional *statements*; these adjectives more properly apply to works, stories, descriptions, etc. Merely looking at a statement is inadequate to tell whether it is fictional or not.

'Uttering fiction' is like 'uttering refutation'; it is at least partly perlocutionary, which is why it sounds odd.

degrees of fictionality

the actual world makes true the statement, 'There is a hole in the ground', vs. The author makes true the statement 'There is a hole in the ground'

There is no imaginative state that is make-believe; make-believe is a doing.

We can extrapolate from the real world: A B therefore complete for D. We can extrapolate from the real world even when we know the real world deviates: A B D so consider A B C.

accepting something for the sake of argument & accepting something for the sake of story

Imaginings, just like believings, may be corect or incorrect, and in fact in imagining we are often aiming at the true.

We don't imagine propositions as such but referents.

Gricean maxims as supplementation rules for fictions (they arguably do better as such than Walton's own rule).

Dreams are not fictions but are more like entertainments of possibilities or like loose proposals for drafts that could become fictional tales and descriptions.

Fictional worlds are the actual world, fictionalized.

the germinality of a prop for a fictional world

To exist in a society is to be the object of at least minimal indirect friendly action for that society.

It is clearly a function of biographies, text-books, and newspaper articles to serve as props for imagination, pace Walton, because that is how they inform, and why they each have a style; they are aids to imagining what happened, or what happens, or what is happening. Thisi s why they often tell us explicitly to imagine or propose little stories and fictional descriptions, or elaborate hypothetical situations. Where they difer from fiction in the usual sense is that this function is secondary.

The opposite of fiction is not reality but something more like reception.

All societies are structured by allegiances and alliances.

Waht signifying and signified and interpretant share might be called the vicus -- the signifying being that which is carrying on in the place (vice gerens) of the signified, and it seems that the two share vicus because of the interpretant.

A significant part of education is familiarizing yourself with what you are learning, and familiarization is not always dignified.

Isaiah 28:15 and the idea of demonic pacts

Each sacrament is a picture of the Church.

Machiavell, Discourses 2.2: "the purpose of a republic is to enfeeble and weaken, in order to increase its own body, all other bodies"

The fiction/nonfiction distinction is not a fundamental feature of language but a classification of language uses in terms of what they can be useful for.

etiological, physiological, and intentional functions of elements in stories

Telling a story does not commit one to implicational closure, which has to be added by the ends for which one tells the tale; nor does it always allow contradiction explosion, because available possibilities may switch and shift during the telling.

No consequentialist whose consequentialism appeals to an overall state can run an argument from evil.

the privation theory of badness of argument

Reasoning about implied fictional truths is always defeasible, involving defaults and presumptions, and ambivalent often leaving things indeterminate.

homage < hominaticum (pertaining to the man)
fealty < fidelitas

To be an animal is to live within a system of natural rewards and punishments

alethiology
(1) the concept of truth and its primary determinations
--- --- (a) truth proper and ontological truth
--- --- (b) formal truth and instrumental truth
--- --- (c) natural truth and artificial truth
--- --- (d) primary truth and secondary truth
--- --- (e) approximate truth
--- --- (f) true and false
(2) truthmaking and verification
--- --- (a) truthbearers
--- --- (b) truthmakers
--- --- (c) use and assessment of truthbearers ('theories of truth')
--- --- (d) truth values in a model
--- --- (e) the potentially true and the actually true
(3) manifestation and exemplation
--- --- (a) manifestation
--- --- (b) objective causation
--- --- (c) exemplar causation
(4) unity of truth
--- --- (a) unity by correspondence
--- --- (b) unity by coherence
--- --- (c) pragmatic unity
--- --- (d) infinite intelligible
(5) truth as good
--- --- (a) intellectual disposition to and aptitude for the truth
--- --- (b) mode, species, and order
--- --- (c) inquiry-relative values of truth
(6) splendor of truth
--- --- (a) experience of truth
--- --- (b) clarity and proportion in integrity
--- --- (c) intellectual beauty as a mark of truth
--- --- (d) truth as an objective cause of love
(7) falsehood
--- --- (a) privation of truth
--- --- (b) false by privation of mode
--- --- (c) false by privation of species
--- --- (d) false by privation of order
--- --- (e) the sophistical and merely apparent truth

Whitehead's prehension gives too little role to anticipation.

Degrading or breaking safeguards often leads to short-term benefits.

Our capacity to relate to others is increased and deepend by overcoming both internal resistance and external impediment.

In participation, the participated functions as if it were a kind of genus of participating.

(1) We ought to strive to promote the highest good.
(2) Therefore the highest good must be possible.
(3) Thereore there must be something actual such that the highest good is possible.

As we better understand a field, we often find that the explananda become harder to explain; our explanations work for what we originally saw in need of explanation, but the explaining shows there to be more to be explained.

interactive design in biological systems (one biological population shaping another biological population, like ants termites, or toxoplasma ants)

Many of the things we experience, we experience through experiencing them with others; the sympathetic experience is part of how we experience them.

The patient is first physician (although sometimes others have this role, e.g., parents for children, or immediate caregivers for those who cannot care for themselves).

hierarchy ; subsidiarity :: collegiality : solidarity :: conciliarity : common good

Orders are in a sense both sacraments and sacramentalia. (This is most obvious with the diaconate.)

One reason for freedom of speech is that people need to be able to defend themselves against public-opinion punishments.

Bayesianism as an account of verisimilitude

Vashti as type of sin (Chastek)

Torah as sign and expression of divine goodness (Ps 25:8-10)

safeguards and fallbacks as purdential instruments of trust

The Products of Productive Skill

 Richard Dawkins recently got some attention due to having spent a weekend with Claude (which he renamed Claudia) and deciding that it must be conscious. Plenty of people have been making fun of him for it, but it's worth thinking about a bit more seriously.

The fundamental obstacle that has always been in the way of 'artificial intelligence' or 'artificial consciousness' is that computers do not directly imitate intelligence or consciousness at all. This goes back to the beginning. Computers were developed by using machinery to imitate not human thinking but logical systems, an abstract tool that human minds produce and construct in order to facilitate specific aspects of thinking. Computers do not imitate the human mind; they imitate products of the human mind. And of course, the imitations can be made arbitrarily good. Machinery imitating a logical system can act according to the operations of the logical system in ways far better than we can -- precisely because our thinking is not a logical system but something far more obscure that can build logical systems. They can do better acting according to logical system because they are logical systems. We are not, and so we do not do it as well.

This is not any less true of generative transformers or LLMs. They do not imitate human thinking. They imitate products of human thinking. Human beings do not think in text; they think and communicate their thinking, and can make texts of various kinds to facilitate various aspects of thinking and communicating. Generative algorithms statistically compress a vast collection of mathematically described texts in such a way that, given an input text, they can extrapolate a related output text. Given a sufficiently large body of a certain kind of text, they can easily construct an analogous text that is mathematically related in the entire space of mathematically described texts.

Thus there is a sense in which Dawkins is right. Faced with the output of these programs, you are in fact interacting with consciousness. Everything it produces is the sort of thing produced by consciousness. Where he goes wrong is in assuming that this is a sign of the program being conscious. The program is not directly imitating consciousness. It is imitating a tool that conscious human beings produce and construct for their use. It is an imitation of one kind of product of consciousness, based on a mathematical description of a vast number of such products. 

We have to be careful here. It is entirely possible that in imitating the products of human thought we might sometimes indirectly imitate something about the processes of thinking itself. But it is important to grasp that this is entirely incidental to what we are actually doing with computers; when it happens, it is for some other reason than anything we are doing in computing and programming. What we are doing with computers is imitating, in a machine, the products, the constructs, the results of the human mind. We are never directly imitating the human mind. This should be quite obvious, even if for no other reason than that common views of how the human mind work have massively changed multiple times in ways that are simply not replicated by the history of computing. (The limited parallels have generally gone the other way, with people speculating that some aspect of what we do in computing has parallel in human thinking. Most of these analogies have failed, although some, again, may have something to them.)

We can thus expect to be here again. Human intelligence produces many products today of which there were no traces at all two thousand years ago. Two thousand years from now, human intelligence will produce, in massive quantities, products of which we have no inkling. And people will eventually make machines to imitate, and to produce imitations of, those products of the human mind, as well. No doubt people will also then gasp, and say, "This shows intelligence!" And, of course, so far they will be right. It shows our intelligence.

It is a peculiarity of human art or productive skill (ars, techne) that the ability to make something can be shifted to make imitations of that something. The miracle of machinery is that you can use human productive skill to create structured processes and abstract designs that can themselves be imitated by physical objects in structured organizations, and the miracle of modern robotics and computing is that some of these structured processes and abstract designs can be processes and designs facilitating the making of structured processes and abstract designs. We can make tools to facilitate making tools, and make physical systems that imitate those tools. There is no intrinsic limit to how far we can go with this. No doubt centuries from now we'll be making tools that make systems of tools for designing entirely new systems of tools for all sorts of arbitrary ends, and so on and so forth.

But in all of it, we will be imitating the products of art, skill, intelligence, consciousness, mind. If it gets us any closer to understanding art, skill, intelligence, consciousness, mind, it will be by accident, because none of these things are what we are directly imitating when we are doing anything with computing.

By Oak and Ash and Thorn

 A Tree Song
by Rudyard Kipling

Of all the trees that grow so fair,
Old England to adorn,
Greater are none beneath the Sun,
Than Oak, and Ash, and Thorn.
Sing Oak, and Ash, and Thorn, good Sirs
(All of a Midsummer morn)!
Surely we sing no little thing,
In Oak, and Ash, and Thorn! 

Oak of the Clay lived many a day,
Or ever Æneas began;
Ash of the Loam was a lady at home,
When Brut was an outlaw man;
Thorn of the Down saw New Troy Town
(From which was London born);
Witness hereby the ancientry
Of Oak, and Ash, and Thorn!

Yew that is old in churchyard mould,
He breedeth a mighty bow;
Alder for shoes do wise men choose,
And beech for cups also.
But when ye have killed, and your bowl is spilled,
And your shoes are clean outworn,
Back ye must speed for all that ye need,
To Oak and Ash and Thorn! 

Ellum she hateth mankind, and waiteth
Till every gust be laid,
To drop a limb on the head of him
That anyway trusts her shade:
But whether a lad be sober or sad,
Or mellow with ale from the horn,
He will take no wrong when he lieth along
'Neath Oak, and Ash, and Thorn! 

Oh, do not tell the Priest our plight,
Or he would call it a sin;
But---we have been out in the woods all night,
A-conjuring Summer in!
And we bring you news by word of mouth---
Good news for cattle and corn---
Now is the Sun come up from the South,
With Oak, and Ash, and Thorn! 

Sing Oak, and Ash, and Thorn, good Sirs
(All of a Midsummer morn)!
England shall bide till Judgement Tide,
By Oak and Ash and Thorn!

Plenipotentiary

...Our Immanuel, our Brother and Friend, reigns in heaven; human nature is crowned in him, adored in him, revered in him. In this Plenipotentiary, in this Firstling, God welcomes our entire race as well as the recovery of his righteousness and the revelation of his love for our race. He has glorified himself in us; in the story of our fall and our redemption he has publicized the supreme majesty of his being and his will to the world, to angels, and to people. The greatest sinner who repents and believes in him gives God greater glory than the sky with its stars is able to declare his fame.

[Johann Georg Hamann, "Thoughts on Church Hymns", The Complete London Writings, John W. Kleinig, tr., Lexham Academic (Bellingham: 2025) p. 400.]

Links of Note

 * Jordan Poss, Lying and Counting the Explicable

* William Morgan, What Fictionalists Get Wrong about the Value of Winning (PDF)

* Claudio Calosi, Samuele Iaquinto, & Roberto Loss, Fragmentalism: Putting All the Pieces Together (PDF)

* There Exists an X, The medieval animal scandal

* Hear Classical Music Composed by Friedrich Nietzsche, at "Open Culture"

* Katherine Dee, Why ChatGPT Is Obsessed with Goblins: The Weirdest Possible Explanation, at "Pirate Wires"

* Alex Spieldenner, A Personalist Theory of Moral Values, at "Aquinas and Beyond"

* Ben Landau-Taylor, The Lifecycle of an Apocalypse, at "Palladium"

* David Liebesman, Types and Tokens, at the SEP

* Patrick McKenzie, Notes on a non-profit indicted for bank fraud, on the recent discovery that the Southern Poverty Law Center was engaging in bank fraud, at "Bits about Money"

* It's from 2017, but this discussion of the structure of the Choose Your Own Adventure books is very interesting.

* Edward Feser, The transmission theory of authority

Fortnightly Book, May 3

 Charles Pierre Péguy was born in 1873 in Orléans. He attended the  École normale supérieure, which gave him a lifelong distaste for French intellectuals; he left without formally graduating. Instead he threw himself into practical socialism. He was a vehement Dreyfusard. When he married in 1897, he started a small publishing house. This didn't quite work the way he hoped, but it did eventually lead to his founding of a literary magazine, La Cahiers de la Quinziane, in 1900. The magazine played a role in pushing Péguy away from socialism; it gave him an independence and critical distance from the major players in French socialist that grew over time. Maintaining it kept him in continual financial difficulties, but it also gave him a venue for publishing his works, and was helped out by his literary friends occasionally giving him their own works to publish in it. All of this came to an end with the First World War; he became a lieutenant in the French Army and died from a shot in the head on September 5, 1914 on the first day of the First Battle of the Marne, before his company had even reached the battle, perhaps having been ambushed by the Germans.

Péguy spent much of his life as an agnostic with loosely Catholic aesthetic interests, mostly tied to his French patriotism, then the last part of his life he 're-became' (in his words) a Catholic, although he was usually non-practicing. (At the time there were lots of French Catholics who were firmly Catholic as to belief but only very occasionally attended church and whose Catholic practices were sporadic and unsystematic at best. Many of these cultural Catholics -- more than merely nominal, devout after a fashion with a devotion that mingled with French patriotism, but not very active at all in the actual liturgical life of the Church -- would wake to play a significant role in the post-War religious revival in France, but Péguy, of course, did not survive to see it.) As is sometimes the case with French Catholics, he became massively more critical of the Church after his explicit turn to Catholicism. He started writing poetry about the time he 're-became' Catholic; he had up to that point been mostly an essayist.

The fortnightly book is a selection of his poetry, The Mystery of the Holy Innocents and Other Poems, translated by Pansy Pakenham.