Ash Wednesday

 From the Hoosoyo (Prayer of Forgiveness) of the Maronite liturgy for the First Weekday Cycle of Lent (and thus celebrated on Ash Monday and, when liturgies are celebrated on Ash Wednesday in Maronite Churches, for Ash Wednesday as well): 

 O Christ, Lover of all people, you gave the Church the holy season of Lent as a shield of protection and a healing remedy. Your fasting and sacrifices taught us to fast, and to understand the purpose and essence of life, the meaning of the world and its existence, and the greatness of your love and compassion. Shower your mercy on all people that they may repent, and soften their hearts that they may return to you, know you, and love you.

'Physical' and 'Moral' Causality in Sacraments

 There has long been a dispute in Catholic sacramentology over whether the efficacy of the sacraments is 'physical' or 'moral'. The terms don't mean here what they usually mean; 'physical' means here only that the causality is by some quality, capacity, capability, impulse, or force provided to the sacrament (or sacramental effect, depending on the exact version) itself. 'Moral' means that the sacrament causes specifically by being a reason for God to cause an effect. In these senses, grace itself always works by physical causality, while petitionary prayer always works by moral causality, and so the question is whether the sacraments themselves are more like the former or the latter. Everybody recognizes that God acts in the sacraments as a 'physical' cause.

One of the things that has plagued this discussion is rampant equivocation. For instance, the Sacrae Theologiae Summae VI (which is all-in on moral causality) gives the following argument (tr. 1 ch. 3. art. 4 th. 10 sect. 89):

A sacrament is a moral composite, consisting of physical parts somewhat separated in time among themselves. Therefore the physical power of acting cannot be attributed to the composite as such, because it is not a physical entity. Therefore, to what should it be attributed? to the matter? to the form? to which part of the form? (p. 74)

But this equivocates on both 'moral' and 'physical'. Sacraments, which are artifacts, are indeed moral composites -- that means that they are put together by will rather than naturally being composed the way they are -- but this is irrelevant to the question of whether they are moral causes, which is about whether they cause grace instrumentally by being provided, by God, a capability qua instrument through which he acts, or whether they cause grace instrumentally by providing God a reason to cause grace because of them. The claim that a physical power of acting cannot be attributed to a moral composite is simply wrong, when we use the term 'physical' in the correct way; if this were true, a hammer (which is a moral composite) could not be given the force to hit a nail, and a series of dominos (which is also a moral composite, and one with physical parts somewhat separated in time among themselves) could not be set to induce a falling motion in each other that achieves some result at the end.

Since none of the sacraments seem to work exactly the same way, it is perhaps not surprising that which sacrament we are considering changes considerably the arguments we have to use to argue this question. Matrimony and Reconciliation both have features that put the moral causality view on very strong ground -- Matrimony is a covenant and Reconciliation a tribunal, which are both things we at least sometimes already associate with moral causality (in the sacramental sense, not necessarily other senses): contracts and courts often effect things by providing agents reasons for doing something. On the other hand, the Church Fathers talk about Baptism and Confirmation and Eucharist in terms that make it difficult to see how one could give a moral-causality interpretation of what they say (and, in fact, it's not uncommon for moral-causality theorists to make a special exception for the Eucharist due to the doctrine of Real Presence). It seems that the easiest path here is to be pluralist: take Matrimony and Reconciliation to work by moral causality and the rest to work by physical causality. This loses a nice unified account, but it would make some sense for the sacramental causality to work by both moral causality and physical causality.

Nonetheless, while it's certain that each sacrament has a moral causality (they can all be seen as a kind of prayer, for one thing. and beyond whatever they do themselves they each may also be offered up in prayer for further grace), I think physical-causality theorists should hold the line, and hold that all the seven sacraments properly work by physical causality. This does raise some questions, that have never adequately been answered, about Matrimony and Reconciliation/Penance. (Perhaps relatedly, Thomas Aquinas, who does very well in the Summa Theologiae in expounding a plausible version of what later came to be called the physical causality view, never completed his discussion of Penance and never got to Matrimony. What he does say about Penance suggests that he was thinking of the human beings involved as the sensible instruments, and thus God working inwardly in them gives the physical causality for grace to them. As far as I know, no one has ever really developed this.) 

There are some very solid reasons for being a physical-causality theorist. The Tridentine formula for sacramental causality is that the sacraments contain and confer grace, and while moral causality theorists give us at least a roundabout sense of 'confer', they tend to go quite squishy and difficult to pin down when they talk about the 'contain'. Melchior Cano claims that the sacraments contain grace 'morally' -- which seems to equivocate on 'morally' again -- in the way that a purse filled with gold contains the price of a ransom. It's very difficult to figure out what this means, although this is not wholly Cano's fault -- he seems to have the idea that grace is contained in the sacrament by way of a sort of designated status of some kind (a purse holds the price of a ransom purely because the gold inside is designated to fulfill an already existing function of paying a ransom), and social ontology is a philosophically tangled field. But in the purse example, the price of ransom is contained in the purse only because the gold designated for the price is already, and independently, literally contained in the purse; there isn't obviously anything like this in Matrimony or Confirmation. (Cano claims that the thing contained is the blood of Christ, which is unilluminating when you want to know how.) Louis Billot tried a different route, holding that a sacrament is a title for the right to grace; but it's equally unclear what it means to say a title 'contains' that to which it gives right, since we don't normally talk about (say) the deed of a house 'containing' the house, and if we did it would almost certainly be a metaphor for something else. Moral causality externalizes the actual causal work of the sacraments, since moral causes only induce a physical cause to act, which makes it hard for moral causality theorists to say how the grace could possibly be said to be contained in the sacrament, since it is in some sense caused outside of the sacrament. Physical-causality theorists have no problems with this at all. And nothing prevents a physical-causality theorist from also recognizing that the sacraments have a designated status and are capable of being juridical titles within the broader covenantal framework, beyond their causality for their proper effects.

Inside and Outside

 The dual existence of form is the heart and core of Thomistic noetics; it is another vitally important application of the real distinction between essence and existence. The same form exists in knowledge, and it simultaneously exists outside of knowledge. In its existence in knowledge it is called specieslikeness, similitude of the thing. In its existence outside of knowledge it is called form, inner cause of determination, perfection. Because of the fundamental dualism of existence, the same form can be immanent and transcendent, in thought and outside of thought. The act of knowing can take place in the innermost depths of the intellect and nevertheless attain things which are outside of thought, fo rthat which determines the thing determines the thought of the thing.

[John Frederick Peifer, The Concept of Thomism, Chrzastek, ed. Cluny Press (Providence, RI: 2026), p. 199.]

Links of Note

 * David W. Wood, The 'Mathematical' Wissenschaftslehre: On a Late Fichtean Reflection of Novalis (PDF)

* Gregory B. Sadler, Virtue Epistemology and the Moral Conditions of Knowledge: Contributions from Phenomenology

* Owen Cyclops has illustrated the Summa Theologia

* Andrew Higgins, Exploring Invented Languages, discusses Virgilius Maro, at "Elvish Musings"

* Disintegration Sensation, at the Lyceum Institute

* Jonathan Bate, Aristotle and the so-called Tragic Flaw, at "Jonathan Bate's Literary Remains"

* Joanna Chavez, A Day in the Life of Mr. Bennett

* Bernard Mees, The first Scottish mention of King Arthur, at "The Age of Arthur"

* Marco Costantini, Changes in Kant's Moral Thought Between 1762 and 1763 (PDF)

* Kevin Dorst, Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy, at "Stranger Apologies"

* What It's Like to Be a Worm, at "Asimov Press"

* Tiago Faleiro, Iris Murdoch's Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals

* Ramya Yandava, Stop adapting only half of Wuthering Heights, at "Soul-Making"

Music on My Mind

 

Rich Mullins, "Sometimes by Step".

Habitude XXV

 To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that prudence is not another virtue from craft, for craft is right reason for some works. But different kinds of works do not make it so that something lacks the notion of craft, since there are different crafts about works that are widely different. Since prudence therefore is also a sort of right reason for works, it seems that it too ought to be called craft.

Further, prudence converges more with craft than reflective habitudes, for they are both about contingents having themselves [se habere] otherwise, as is said in Ethic. VI. But some reflective habitudes are called crafts. therefore much more prudence ought to be called craft.

Further, it pertains to prudence to take counsel well, as is said in Ethic. VI. But it also happens that one takes counsel in some crafts, as is said in Ethic. III, as in the military, governing, and medicinal crafts. Therefore prudence is not distinguished from craft.

But contrariwise the Philosopher distinguishes prudence from craft in Ethic. VI.

I reply that it must be said that, where a different notion of virtue is found, there virtues should be distinguished. And it was said above that some habitudes have the notion of virtue from making an aptness [facultatem] for good work, while others from making not only the aptness for good work, but also the use. Now craft makes only the aptness for good work, because it does not regard striving [appetitum]. But prudence not only makes the aptness for good work, but also the use, for it regards striving, as presupposing rightness of striving. The reason for which is that craft is right reason for makeables, but prudence is right reason for doables. But to make and to do differ because, as is said in Metaphys. IX, making is act passing into external material, such as building, cutting, and the like, but acting is act enduring in the doer, as seeing, willing, and the like. 

So therefore in this way prudence has itself toward such human acts, which are uses of powers and habitudes, just as craft has itself toward external makings, because both are complete reason with respect to that to which they are compared. But completeness and rightness of reason in reflective matters [speculativi] depend on sources from which reason deduces, as it was said that knowledge depends on and presupposes intellection, which is habitude of sources. But human acts have themselves to ends, as sources in reflective matters, as is said in Ethic. VII. And therefore for prudence, which is right reason for doables, it is required that the human being be well disposed about ends, which is through right striving, and therefore for prudence, moral virtue is required, through which striving is made right. But good for the crafted is not good for human striving, but good for the crafted works themselves, and therefore craft does not presuppose right striving. And thus it is that a craftsman is more praised who fails [peccat] willingly than who fails unwillingly, but it is more contrary to prudence to fail willingly than to fail unwillingly, because rightness of will belongs to the notion of prudence, but not to the notion of craft. So therefore it is obvious that prudence is a virtue distinct from craft.

To the first it therefore must be said that all different kinds of crafted things are outside the human being, and so the notion of virtue is not differentiated. But prudence is right reason of human acts themselves. Wherefore it differentiates the notion of virtue, as was said.

To the second it must be said that prudence converges more with craft than with reflective habitudes in subject and material, for they are both in the opinionative part of the soul, and about contingents having themselves otherwise. But craft converges more with reflective habitude than with prudence in the notion of virtue, as is obvious from what was said.

To the third it must be said that prudence is taking counsel well about what pertains to the whole of human life and to the ultimate end of human life. But in some crafts there is counsel taken that pertains to the ends proper to that craft. Wherefore some, insofar as they are taking counsel well in matters of warfare or seamanship, are said to be prudent generals or navigators, but not simply prudent, for this is only those who take counsel well about what refers to the whole of life.

[St. Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.57.4, my translation. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here. The word for 'fail' here, of course, also means to sin: to sin, to fail, to miss, to err, are all correct translations of it.]

Cognition as Coordination of Relations

 We have a tendency to think of understanding or knowing as involving a single binary relation to something, but there are others of thinking, In a well-known passage in De Potentia 8, Aquinas argues that in understanding a person is involved in four distinct relations:

(1) We are related to the thing understood (res intellecta). 

(2) We are related to the intelligible species.

(3) We are related to our own intellectual action.

(4) We are related to our intellectual conception.

All of these have to be distinct. The res intellecta cannot, as such, be the other three, because unlike them it is sometimes (interdum) outside the intellect. The intelligible species, which is how things experienced and imagined and remembered appear to the intellect, activates the intellect, and therefore is the beginning of the intellectual action, distinguishing it from the conception, which is the end-result. The intelligible species can't be the intellectual action itself because it has to pre-exist it; we receive the intelligible species simply by experiencing things as intellectual beings, and therefore our intellectual actions presuppose it. Since the conception is the result of the intellectual action, and formed by it for intellectual ends, the action and the conception are not the same.

In reality, of course, this is simplified, because, at least for human beings, between the thing understood and the intelligible species we find relations of sensation and sensory processing, and in being related to the intelligible species, intellectual action, and intellectual conception, the intellect has to be related to the phantasm and the thing sensed or imagined. Moreover, if we consider what happens beyond the intellectual conception, we find that it does not stop -- we link, distinguish, compare, contrast, modify intellectual conceptions in light of other intellectual conceptions, and thus judge and reason, both of which we do in part so that we might understand more.

The temptation in epistemology is to treat 'knowledge' or 'cognition' as a single monolithic thing. But one of the most obvious facts of our experience as sensers and imaginers and knowers and understanders is the coordination of distinct relations into a unified harmony. We coordinate sight and hearing, we coordinate sensing and imagining, we coordinate imagining and understanding, and in each of these we are relating ourselves to more than one thing. We cannot have a good account of thought of any kind without considering the variety of relations we are integrating into a whole whenever we do any kind of thinking at all.