A Poem Draft

 Hard to Be Inspired

It is hard to be inspired,
blinded by the light,
your brain in visions fired,
wandering in the night,
a traveler in unknown lands,
homeward never your way,
in a higher power's hands,
driven each hour of day.

It is hard to have great gift,
talent that bazes high,
gazing across a rift
at everyone until you die,
gadfly-infested in brain,
driven by unseen prod,
again and again re-slain
by command of a merciless god.

And at the end of endless pains,
what you have you then to show?
The whole world takes your gains
and your candle burns too low.

The Worst Argument in the World

 The novelist claims to be a realist; and he has as much right to defend realism as other novelists had to defend romanticism. But he is out by a thousand miles if he supposes that there has been a general progress from romanticism to realism; or, indeed, from anything to anything else. The great history of the great English novelists would alone be enough to show that the story was never a pure story of progress; but of rebellions and reactions; revolutions and counter-revolutions. When England began to escape from a Puritanism which forbade all romances, the great Richardson rejoiced in being able to pour out floods of tears and tenderness about the most delicate forms of love. When he had done it, the great Fielding rejoiced even more to pour out floods of derision, believing that his coarse candour and common sense was a part of enlightenment and liberty; though often concerned with less delicate forms of love.

 A generation later, the great Jane Austen confessed herself disgusted by the coarseness even of Addison, and created a restrained comedy of which half the humour is its deliberate decorum. Then we went on to Dickens and Thackeray, the latter especially dismissing as barbarism what Swift and Smollett had regarded as realism, and even as liberalism. Nothing is now important about these great English novelists except that they were all great. Nobody discusses whether they were all novel; yet each in turn believed himself to be novel. Any one who goes by dates may find himself defending brutality against Richardson or prudery against Fielding. The worst argument in the world is a date. For it is actually taking as fixed the one thing that we really know is fugitive and staking all upon to-day at the moment when it is turning into yesterday. The clock-worshipper has a heavy creed of predestination; and it is only as the tavern closes that its priest cries aloud upon his god; saying, like all the sad modern sages: “Time, gentlemen, time!”

G. K. Chesterton, "About Change" from As I Was Saying.

Habitude III

 To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that habitude is not a determinate species of quality, because, as was said, habitude, insofar as it is quality, is called the disposition according to which the disposed is disposed well or badly. But this happens according to any quality, for both according to figure something can happen to be well or badly disposed, and similarly according to hot and cold, and according to all suchlike things. Therefore habitude is not a determinate species of quality.

Further, the Philosopher in the Categories says that heat and coldness are dispositions or habitudes, just like illness and health. But hot and cold are in the third species of quality. Thus habitudes or disposition are not distinguished from other species of quality.

Further, being able to be changed with difficulty [difficile mobile] is not a differentia pertaining to the genus of quality, but pertains more to change or undergoings [passionem]. But no genus is determined to a species through the differentia of another genus; rather, differentiae must come to a genus through itself, as the Philosopher says in Metaph. VII. Therefore, because habitude is said to be the quality of the difficult to be changed [difficile mobile], it seems that it is not a determinate species of quality.

But contrariwise is what the Philosopher says in the Categories, that one species of quality is habitude and disposition.

I respond that it must be said that the Philosopher in the Categories puts disposition and habitude among the four species of quality. Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories assigns the differentiae of these species in this way, saying that some qualities are natural, which according to nature are within and always, but some are adventitious, which are effected from outside and can be lost. And those which are adventitious are habitudes and dispositions, differing according to being able to be lost with ease or with difficulty [facile et difficile amissibile]. But some of the natural qualities are according to that which something is potentially, and such are the second species of quality. Some, on the other hand, are according to what something is actually, and this either deeply or superficially. If deeply, such is the third species of quality; superficially, on the other hand, is the fourth species of quality, such as figure and the form that is the figure of what is animate. But this distinction of the species of quality seems inappropriate, for there are many figures and passible qualities that are not natural but adventitious, and many dispositions that are not adventitious but natural, such as health and beauty and suchlike. And, further, this is not appropriate to the order of the species, for always what is natural is prior. 

And therefore in another way this distinction of habitude and disposition from other qualities must be taken. For quality properly involves mode of substance. Now mode is, as Augustine says, Super Gen. ad Litt., is what measure prefixes; wherefore it involves a certain determination according to some measure. And therefore just as that which according to material potential is determined according to substantial being is called substantial quality, so also that which according to subject's potential is determined according to accidental being is called accidental quality, which is also a certain differentia, as is clear from the Aristotle in Metaph. V. Now mode, or the determination of the subject according to accidental being, is able to be taken either in an order to the very nature of the subject or according to action and passion, which follow from the principles of nature, which are matter and form, or according to quantity. But if mode or determination of subject is taken according to quantity, such is the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, according to its notion, is without change and without the notion of good and bad, it therefore does not pertain to the fourth species of quality that something is done well or badly, passing swiftly or slowly. But the mode or determination of subject according to action and passion is found in the second and third species of quality. And therefore in both it is considered that something is done with ease or with difficulty, or that it is passing swiftly or enduring; but there is not considered something pertaining to the notion of good or bad, because change and undergoings do not have the notion of an end, but good and bad are said with respect to the end. 

But the mode and determination of a subject in the order to the nature of a thing pertains to the first species of quality, which is habitude and disposition, as the Philosopher says in Phys. VII, saying of the habitudes of soul and body that they are a sort of disposition of the complete to the best; but I call the complete what is disposed according to nature. And because the same form and nature is end and cause for which something is done, as is said in Phys. II, in the first species good and bad are considered, and also what is able to be changed with easy or with difficulty [facile et difficile mobile], according as some nature is an end of generation and change. Wherefore in Metaph. V the Philosopher defines habitude as the disposition according to which something is disposed well or badly, and in Ethic. II he says that habitudes are that according to which we have ourselves well or badly toward passions; for when a mode is appropriate to the nature of a thing, then it has the the notion of good, and when it is not appropriate, then it has the notion of bad. And because nature is that which is first considered in a thing, habitude is put in the first species of quality.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that disposition involves a certain order, as was said; wherefore something is not said said to be disposed by quality, except in an order to something. And if well or badly is added, which pertains to the notion of a habitude, we must pay attention to the order to the nature which is the end. Thus according to figure, or according to hot and cold, someone is not said to be disposed well or badly, except according to an order to the nature of the thing, according to what is appropriate or inappropriate. Wherefore both figures themselves and passible qualities, according as they are considered appropriate or inappropriate to the nature of the thing, belong to habitudes or dispositions, for figure, insofar as it is appropriate to the nature of the thing, and color pertain to beauty, but hot and cold, according as they are appropriate to the nature of the thing, pertain to health. And in this way heat and coldness are put by the Philosopher in the first species of quality.

Wherefore the solution to the second is clear, although some solve it otherwise, as Simplicius says in the Commentary on the Categories.

To the third it must be said that this differentia, able to be changed with difficulty [difficile mobile], does not make habitude different from other species of quality, but from disposition.  For disposition is taken in two ways: in one way, according as it is a genus for habitude, for in Metaph. V disposition is put into the definition of habitude; in another way, according as it is something divided from habitude. And the disposition that is properly said to be condivisible from habitude can be understood in two ways: in one way, as complete and incomplete in the same species, as it is called disposition, retaining the common name, when it is incompletely in something so as to be easily lost, but habitude when it is completely in something and is not easily lost. And thus disposition is habitude just like boy is man. In another way, they can be distinguished as different species subalternate to one genus, so that dispositions are said to be those qualities of the first species to which it is appropriate according to their notion to be easy to be lost, because they have transformable [transmutabile] causes, such as illness and health, but habitudes are said to be those qualities that according to their nature have what is not easy to transform, because they have unchangeable causes, like kinds of knowledge and virtues. And according to this, disposition is not habitude. And this seems to harmonize more with Aristotle's intention; wherefore, to prove this distinction, he draws upon [inducit] the common convention for speaking, according to which qualities that according to their notion are able to be changed with ease [facile mobiles] are, if by some accident are rendered able to be changed with difficulty [difficile moblies], are said to be habitudes, and conversely with qualities that by their notion able to changed with difficulty; for if someone has knowledge incompletely, so that he is easily able to lose it, he is said to be disposed to knowledge rather than to have knowledge. For which it is clear that the word 'habitude' involves a certain durability, but not the word 'disposition'. Nor does this stand in the way of 'being able to be changed with ease' or 'with difficulty' [facile et difficile mobile] being specific differentiae on the ground that these pertain to undergoing and change and not the genus of quality. For these differentiae, although they seem to have themselves accidentally toward quality, nonetheless designate the proper and per se differentiae of qualities, just as in the genus of substance accidental differentiae are often taken in place of substantial ones, inasmuch as essential principles are designated by them.

[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.49.2. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation here.]

Aristotle divides the category of quality into four species:

(1) habitude and disposition
(2) natural capabilities and incapabilities
(3) passible qualities
(4) figure

His discussion strongly suggests that this is some immediate division of the category, but notoriously nobody knows quite what underlies the division. St. Thomas's (educated) guess is that the order is actually important, and this is a significant move, much more than it might seem. It's an important implication of this that there is a sense in which habitude and disposition is the kind of quality that has the strongest connection to what is natural to a thing. Virtue, knowledge, health, and beauty are all examples Aristotle uses of the first species of quality, and it's noteworthy that they can all be considered a sort of 'second nature' or a natural outgrowth of our original nature. It's also probably relevant, given the next two species (if, like Aquinas, we take the order to be significant), that habitude and disposition are easily the most active of the qualities; as we go down the list, it seems that we deal with things that depend more and more on the activity of something other than the quality, or for that matter the thing that has it, itself. 

It's perhaps a little unexpected to find habitude regarded as more natural than natural capability, but by the latter Aristotle means the sense in which someone might be a 'natural wrestler' or naturally healthy, and it does seem that this is at least more attenuated than actual skill or actual health. Passible qualities are things like sweetness and color; by figure Aristotle seems originally to mean something like the quality of a quantity, e.g., a mathematical object being three-dimensional or circular or square-ish, or a number being cubic or prime. Most commentators have, I think, taken it a little more physically than that; perhaps 'jagged' or 'smooth' would be good examples in English.

Links of Note

 * Elliot Polsky, Aquinas the Boethian: Interpreting Quod Est and Esse in Aquinas in Light of His Sources (PDF) -- an interesting argument that Aquinas is less Avicennian on the matter than usually thought; usually William of Auvergne is thought to be the closest predecessor to Aquinas on composition of essence and actual being, but Polsky argues that he's reacting against this line of thought and going back to Boethius.

* John Carlos Baez, The Inverse Cube Force Law, at "Azimuth"

* John Walsh, Kant on the Supposed Incapacity to Transgress the Moral Law Freely (PDF)

* Ben Burgis, What Marx's Comments on Aristotle and John Stuart Mill Reveal About His Critique of Political Economy, at "Philosophy for the People"

* Ruth Boeker & Evie Filea, Catharine Trotter Cockburn's and Anne Hepburn Arbuthnot's contributions to Scottish philosophy (PDF)

* Jody Azzouni, Use and mention with respect to "know", "believe", "evidence", "justification", "hypothesis", and so on: A hot mess (PDF)

* Speech Acts and Fictions I: Fiction as Pretended Illocution, at "Flame & Light", on John Searle's account of fiction.

* Mikel Aickin, The Failed Experiment that Failed to Fail (PDF), on the Michelson-Morley experiment

* Aravindh Rajan and Ian McKay, There has to be a better way to make titanium, at "Orca Notes"

* Vanessa A. Seifert, The many laws in the periodic table (PDF)

* Catharine Saint-Croix, Tabletop Philosophy, at "Blog of the APA"

* Marius Stan, Kant's third law of mechanics: The long shadow of Leibniz (PDF)

* James Chastek, Disputed question on created substance, at "Just Thomism"

* Jason Turner, Ultrafilters as Propositional Theories (PDF)

Habitude II

 After actions and passions, the principles of human acts must be considered, and first, intrinsic principles, second, extrinsic principles. Now, intrinsic principles are powers and habitudes, but because powers were discussed in the first part, now it remains to consider habitudes. And first, of course, in general, and second, virtues and vices and other habitudes of this sort, which are principles of human acts. Concerning the habitudes in general, four things are to be considered: first, the substance of the habitudes; second, their subject; third, the cause of their generation, growth, and corruption; fourth, their distinction. Regarding the first, there are four things to investigate: first, whether habitude is quality; second, whether it is a determinate species of quality; third, whether habitude involves order to act; fourth, the necessity of habitude.

The first is approached in this way. It seems that habitude is not quality, for Augustine says (LXXXIII Quaest. 73) that this name, habitude, is derived from the verb habere (to have). But to have does not pertain only to quality, but also to other genera, for we are said to have quantity, and money, and other things of this sort. Therefore habitude is not quality.

Further, habitude is placed in one category, as is clear from the book of Categories. But one category is not contained under another. Therefore habitude is not quality.

Further, every habitude is a disposition, as is said in the Categories. But disposition is an order of what has parts, as is said in Metaph. V.  But this pertains to the category of posture [situs]. Therefore habitude is not quality.

But contrariwise is what the Philosopher says in the Categories, that habitude is a quality of the difficult to change.

I respond that it must be said that this name, 'habitude' is taken from having, from which the name of habitude derives in two ways: [A] in one way, according as a man or some other thing is having something; [B] in another way, according as some thing is having itself in some way to itself or to something else. 

[A] But about the first, it must be considered that having, according as it is said to with respect to whatever is had, is common to different genera; thus the Philosopher puts it in the postpredicaments, which are, to wit, those following on different genera of things, just as are opposites, and prior and posterior, and such like things. But between things that are had, there seems to be this distinction, that (A1) there are some in which there is nothing mediating between haver and what is had, just as there is nothing mediating between subject and quantity or quality. (A2) Then there are those in which something mediates between them, but only a relativity, just as someone is said to have an associate or friend. (A3) And further there are some in which something mediates, not quite as action or passion, but something by way of action and passion, as, for instance, in one adorning and covering and another adorned and covered, and therefore these constitute a special genus of things, namely, the category of habit; thus the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that between having clothing and the clothing that is had is the mediation of habit.

[B] But if we take having in the way something is said to have itself in some way to itself or to something else, because this way of having itself is according to some quality, in this way habitude is a certain quality, of which the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that habitude is said to be a disposition according to which what is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either according to itself or to another, as health is a certain habitude. And thus is the habitude of which we speak now. Wherefore it is to be said that habitude is quality.

To the first therefore it must be said that that objection proceeds from having taken in general, so therefore it is common to many genera, as was said.

To the second it must be said that that reason proceeds from habit insofar as it is understood to be something mediating between having and what is had, so it is therefore a kind of category, as was said.

To the third it must be said that disposition always involves order of something having parts, but this happens three ways, as the Philosopher immediately adds, to wit, either according to place, or according to power, or according to species. In which, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Categories, he includes all dispositions, such as corporeal ones, in what he says according to place, and to this pertains the category of posture [situs], which is order of parts in place; but what he says according to power includes those dispositions that are preparatory and not perfectly suitable, such as inchoate knowledge and virtue; but what he says according to species includes perfect dispositions, which are called habitudes, such as complete knowledge and virtue.

[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.49.1, my translation. The Latin is here; the Dominican Fathers translation is here.]

Habitude I

 Introductory Note: By a very long tradition, philosophy is said to involve three things: physics (i.e., the philosophical study of natural order), logic (i.e., the philosophical study of rational order), and ethics (i.e., the philosophical study of human order). Each of these aspects of philosophy has a unifying principle or 'springboard', a concept that serves as a platform from which you can reach anything else. For physics, the springboard is change, for logic the springboard is sign, and for ethics the springboard is habitude. Habitude (Gk. hexis, Lat. habitus, often transliterated into Eng. as 'habit') is arguably understudied, so I thought I would here and there translate some texts of Aquinas on the topic.

Therefore he [Aristotle] says, first, that for investigating what is virtue, one must assume three things in the soul, namely, passions, powers, and habitudes, one of which it is necessary for virtue to be. Thus he said above that virtue is a principle of certain works in the soul; but nothing is in the soul as a principle of working unless it is one of these three. For it seems that man sometimes acts from passion, such as anger, sometimes from habitude, such as when he works from productive skill, sometimes from bare power, as when he first begins to work. And it is clear that under this division is not comprehended absolutely everything that is in the soul, because the essence of the soul is not any of these, nor is even intelligible working; rather, only those things are touched on that are principles of some action.

Then when he says, "But I call passions" &c., he explains [manifestat] the members of the previous division. And first he explains those that are passions, second those that are powers, at "And powers" &c., and third those that are habitudes, at "Habitudes according to which" &c....

Then, at "Habitudes according to which" &c., he explains those that are habitudes. And this is not done in general, but in moral matters through comparison to the passions. And he says that habitudes are called such according as we have passions well or badly. For a habitude is a kind of disposition determining a power through comparison to something, which determination, if it is appropriate to the nature of the thing, will be a good habitude disposing one to doing something well, and otherwise it will be a bad habitude so that according to it something will be done badly. And he gives the example [exemplificat] that according to some habitude we have it in us to be angry either badly, when this is done either vehemently or lackingly, that is according to excess or defect, or well, when this is done in the manner of the mean.

[Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, lecture 5, sections 290, 291, & 298, my translation. Even at the cost of some occasional awkwardness, I have attempted to clearly distinguish opere words for action from agere words for action, by using 'work'-related words for the former.]

Dashed Off XXVII

 mind as intelligibilizing intelligibility

"A perfect language would be like a garment of light, unfolding with clear transparency the life it was formed to invest and represent." John Williamson Nevin

While the sensible may be evident, it is always a mediated evidentness.

Faith proceeds from Christ through Christ to Christ.

Genesis 1 : natural headship of Adam :: Genesis 2 : federal headship of Adam

"According to the view we have of Christ, in the end, will be and must be our view also of the Church. We come to the true conception of the Church through a true and sound Christology (as in the Creed) and in no other way." Nevin

'make disciples' and ordination

cosmos: God creates the world, giving it active and passive powers (seminal reasons) that develop on their own, as permanent instrumental causes, toward an end (cosmic order) whose principles we articulate as 'laws of nature'; this natural order is itself a component and instrument of a larger rational/intelligible order.

"...exact prose abstracts from reality, symbol presents it." Farrer

There are perhaps more kinds of good reasoning possible than have ever been canvased.

Leibniz notes (NEHU) that unlike the second and third figures, the fourth figure cannot be derived from the first figure with only the principle of noncontradiction; it is the only one that *requires* conversion (or else the second & third figures).

Narrative theme has a teleology or bias tending toward what we might usually call the spiritual or mystical; this tendency might be called Chestertonian, being something that can be found if one begins to emphasize the thematic elements of even simple stories about trains running on time or pubs serving good beer.

In the modern world, we share civil interests only in the sense we share religious interests, i.e., rational interest in the socially good and true. Get much more specific than that, we already begin to diverge.

Liberalism always exaggerates how much is shared in an attempt to *make* a particular set of things shared.

There are no all-purpose means for the effective use of liberties; our means for effective use of liberties are a patchwork of locally useful things.

Good-willed, reasonable, and rational people will converge on principles of justice, over time, but only to the extent & in the way they are good-willed reasonable, and rational; but what is more, they will actively seek to find agreement with each other.

Liberalism is not based on what we all share; it makes things that it then tries to make to be shared.

To endorse rules and practices as just is not like adopting a set of attitudes; it may or may not be associated with any particular attitude; it may or may not be associated with sanctions or demand for enforcement; it may or may not involve any regard for costs and benefits, and indeed costs or benefits may not even be relevant.

'Public reason liberalism' is always gerrymandered-reason liberalism. This is because actual liberal societies do not descend from unified principle but are built out of many different solutions to many different problems, which arise out of applying many different principles with many different judgments. In building such societies, people use any reasons they have at hand that seem to be relevant for the purpose at hand.

Society as such does not need moral justification; it is just an integral part of human life, and forms its own subdomains of moral justification.

"An entire mythology is stored within our language." Wittgenstein

major doctrine (Scripture, liturgical prayer, conciliar definition, formal catechesis) & minor doctrine (homily, devotional, sacraments and sacramentals as pedagogical, &c.)

We argue from all the finite effects to the infinite cause.

civilization as a system of friendships

the aspirational communion of human nature
the sympathetic communion of human nature

The best teaching always involves a significant indirect element; this is not always easy to see, and thus is often difficult to imitate.

I wish I knew the path to take;
I cannot find the way;
and all the errors that I make
grow graver by the day.

"For the human mind takes in a great deal at a glance, and we hobble it when we try to make it halt at every step it takes and express everything that it is thinking." Leibniz

The spiritual presence that Reformed theologians ascribe to the Lord's Supper is in fact always available to the Church in faith; but it is true that the Eucharist is pledge and seal of this presence, and that while this particular & ecclesial spiritual presence is not contained in the Eucharist, it is exhibited in it.  The Church is always nourished spiritually by His body and blood, and the Eucharist shows this continual vivificity. But this ecclesial ubiquity is not an adequate account of the specifically Eucharistic presence of Christ, and the spiritual presence to faith is not sporadic and occasional.

Disrespect for the Creed is poisonous to Protestantism, for it implies the position that even the most well trod and rationally and prayerfully defended understanding of Scripture, enduring in faith and love and prayer for however long, may be overturned by any fool of a reader who may come along. If the Creed may be dismissed, Scripture may mean anything, and no one can ever be sure of having read it well.

Papal infallibility is not a power except insofar as it is a structure of service.

A philosopher must allow himself a little madness or he will never get far.

Free will is the capability for civilization.

God as the ultimate limit of context

general kinds of theistic arguments
(1) incoherence or God
(2) skepticism or God
(3) insoluble puzzle or God
(4) pointlessness or God

"The creation or non-creation of the world, and the end of creation, are God's absolute choice because they are prior to the world." Rosmini

self-sustaining rhetorical cycles

Probation precedes exaltation.

Any descriptive proposition may be used in the right context to express an attitude.

"A thing is said to be virtually contained in another when the thing can naturally terminate with its action in the other." Rosmini
"The human mind is as unlimited and universal as undetermined being, but undetermined being is not unlimited and universal in the sense that it manifests an infinite actuality. It is virtually unlimited and universal in so far as it admits unlimited, infinite terms and generally reveals its infinite capacity."

"...since these necessary truths are prior to the existence of contingent beings, they must be grounded in the existence of a necessary substance." Leibniz

Axioms connect regions of knowledge.

We are always loved more than we feel; the greatest loves cannot be felt.

Democratic politics is a politics of rumors, gossip, and guesses.

"The intuiting human being embraces all being, which informs him and communicates its own dignity to him as if he were stamped by a seal impressing itself on him and repeating itself in him." Rosmini

A juridically single border may be physically noncontiguous.

"God's presence makes a place frightening because he has power over life and death." Chrysostom

primary spectacle (integral to plot) and secondary spectacle (just for spectacle)

Fine art always occurs within a broader context of art.

rhetoric & 'ghost' reasoning (i.e., reasoning merely suggested by the manner of discourse)

Most conclusions of scientific inquiry are known by mediated knowing.

Being that is most perfectly being is intellectual being.

The divine ideas are acts of the free divine intellect, in which God reflects on God as able to cause.

"The Platonists posited ideas, saying that all things were made by their participation in an idea, for example, a human being or any other species. However, in place of these ideas, we have one thing, that is, the Son, the Word of God." Aquinas (In Col. 1.4)

Oppressors often force inclusions on the oppressed; it is a way to keep them under control.

Something is a part. Whatever is a part is a part of a whole. This whole can itself be part of a whole, and that whole a part of another whole. But this cannot proceed infinitely. Therefore there is a whole that is not part of another whole.

Christ calls us to go to all peoples and make them students; he doesn't say that we are to make them students except in politics, or except in philosophy, or except in social interaction.

the argument from stories to ethical categories

"A *cause* in the realm of things corresponds to a *reason* in the realm of truths, which is why causes themselves -- and especially final causes -- are often called 'reasons'." Leibniz

argumentum ad vertaginem (Leibniz): If this is not accepted, we have no way to attain certainty about the matter in question.

For any good, however good, you will find that men are often lax in pursuing it.

Sovereignty is not an unlimited right but a legal authority that covers what is needed for a complete society.

Rights are the source and font of the state, by which and for which and limited by which it exists.

the natural social ontology

What is changed is changed by another?
(1) Yes
---- (a) with respect to a first other
---- (b) without respect to any first other
---- ---- (1) finitely per accidens
---- ---- (2) infinite regress
(2) No
---- (a) because there is no change (change is not coherent)
---- (b) because some things strictly change themselves

Part of the expressiveness of music is its appropriateness for specific kinds of dance.

Yurei moji (ghost kanji) typically arise from misreadings, but a few may just be rare real kanji whose meanings aren't remembered and have survived purely by accident.

God as the sufficient reason for the principle of sufficient reason

In John 14, Jesus characterizes the Ascension as to the Father, he prepares a topon, a place, with the Father, and He Himself is the way to it.

A complicated knot of related errors has been built into the fabric of all modern nation-states: confusion of citizenship with subjecthood, of participation with allegiance, of the State and the Sovereign.

That there is a prior implies that there is a standard for something's being prior. In most situations we identify as that standard a beginning, so that to be prior is to be closer to an initial or original. In other situations, not knowing the beginning, we posit one and fine our posit confirmed. In yet others, not knowing the beginning, nor yet knowing a confirmation of the posit, we still posit it and use it to reason about the rest.

I think in doubting, therefore I am such that I have the potential to do so; therefore at least some things have potential. 

Given a choice between their dignity and their will, people often choose their will.

"The church is not to be viewed as a thing at once finished and perfect, but as a historical fact, as a human society, subject to the laws of history, to genesis, growth, development. Only the dead is done and stagnant." Philip Schaff

When we say that Christ's kingdom is not of this world, we do not mean that Caesar can overrule Him in this world.

What is 'of Caesar' is not anything in creation that Caesar wants but things like currency, that are themselves made directly or indirectly by Caesar's authority. Creation is God's, not Caesar's. Human life is God's, not Caesar's.

Political institutions are juridical entities that require some sort of system of rights for their setting.

No state has ever had an even in principle monopoly on the use of coercive force, except totalitarian states, and even these have always recognized some non-state force, for their own convenience (or, more properly, have connived at such use by those in powerful office).

Even very well developed civil societies have pre-civil aspects.

human rights that belong to humankind as a community (e.g., the right to exist)

disruption of another's rights
(1) rights pertaining to what is external to the ambit of a person
(2) rights pertaining to the ambit of a person
--- --- (a) disruption in contractual specifications with another person
--- --- (b) disruption not itself concerned with contract with the other person
--- --- --- --- (1) through failure to do what is reasonable to expect
--- --- --- --- (2) through doing what is reasonable not to expect
--- --- --- --- --- --- (a) so that it constitutes a standing threat of disruption
--- --- --- --- --- --- (b) so that it has actually disrupted

Truth, goodness, and beauty are the three unifiers of civil society.

erotetic evocation: beginning from nonquestions, can infer questions
erotetic implication: from a beginning with at least one question, can infer question
--> a difficulty in almost all discussions of both is a failure to recognize that these must be rototed in gaps of starting-points rather than starting-points themselves -- from a nonselection of a definite disjunct, we draw the question of which disjunct.

In the Ring, Sauron has treated himself as a mere means and a tool to use, alienating something as himself in order to gain greater mastery over his own person.

The understanding one has of liberty is always commensurate with one's understanding of goodness.

Evening Note for Thursday, November 6

 Thought for the Evening: Tractatus Coislinianus

I am currently reading Walter Watson's The Lost Second Book of Aristotle's Poetics (I am only partway through, and don't agree with everything, but I highly recommend it), so I'm thinking about the Tractatus Coislinianus.

Aristotle's Poetics as we have it is known to be incomplete; it promises to discuss topics that it never gets around to discussing, and other references clearly attribute to the Poetics topics that we do not find in our extant version. The most obvious of these topics is comedy; almost the entire Poetics we have is about tragedy. Generally the best guess about why is that in Andronicus's standard ordering of the works of Aristotle, the Poetics is the last book, and likely the original source collection for all the versions that have survived had lost its tail end, possibly at a point in the manuscript that obscured the fact that something was missing. Be that as it may, in 1839, J. A. Cramer was researching in the De Coislin collection in the Bibliotheque National and came across three manuscript pages that summarized an account of comedy. The manuscript, Coislinianus 120, seems to have been a manuscript from the Great Lavra on Mount Athos, copied at some point in the tenth century; it entered into the collection of the seventeenth century's most remarkable book collector, Pierre Seguier de Coislin, and thence ended up in the Bibliotheque National. Cramer found the manuscript remarkable, and published it in his Anecdota Graeca series, suggesting that it was an abstract of the missing part of the Poetics.

Cramer's suggestion was not widely accepted; it was the nineteenth century, and scholars were on a tear to prove that things were inauthentic. Jacob Bernays discussed the manuscript in 1853 and argued that while some parts may derive from Aristotle, the work as it exists in the Tractatus is inconsistent with views Aristotle elsewhere gives. This became the standard view of the text -- that it was probably indirectly derived from the original Poetics, but garbled and mixed with non-Aristotelian elements, to such an extent that most of it was just not derived from Aristotle's Poetics. In 1980, Umberto Eco, writing The Name of the Rose, used it as the source for his reconstruction of the lost second book of the Poetics, but Eco, of course, was writing historical fiction, and therefore could evade any scholarly opprobrium over using it in this way.

All of this began to shift in 1984, when Richard Janko's Aristotle on Comedy argued that this entire scholarly tradition was wrong and at times poorly argued, claiming that the work was in fact what Cramer had thought it might be, an abstract of part of Aristotle's Poetics. He therefore used it, along with the various already extant references and a couple of works with content closely related to that of Tractatus Coislinianus to reconstruct Aristotle's account of comedy. As Janko was a scholar well reputed for his philological work, this had some weight, particularly when he refined and improved his work in his 1987 translation of the Poetics. Nonetheless, scholars still tend to resist the idea that the Tractatus is a genuine summary of the authenthic second book, although there does seem to be more acceptance of the possibility that it might at least go back to a post-Aristotle Peripatetic source, like Theophrastus. Many of the arguments don't really seem to bear on the issue; it's obvious that the Tractatus is a summary, for instance, not the original work, so it is pointless, as far as the question of connection to Aristotle goes, to give arguments that the summary itself is later than Aristotle.

In any case, Watson's translation of the Tractatus's definition of comedy (Walter Watson, The Lost Second Book of Aristotle's Poetics, The University of Chicago Press (Chicago: 2012), p. 179):

Comedy is an imitation of action laughable and with no share in magnitude, complete, in speech made pleasing by accessories whose forms are different in different parts, by acting and not by narration, through pleasure and laughter achieving a catharsis of such emotions.

Links of Interest

* Zack Savitsky, Carlo Ravelli's Radical Perspective on Reality, at "Quanta Magazine'

* Daniel D. De Haan, Aquinas on Perceiving, Thinking, Understanding, and Cognizing Individuals (PDF)

* Sagrada Familia recently became the world's tallest church, beating out Ulm Minster. (Take that, Lutherans! Although Catholics also built Ulm Minster before the Lutherans took it over, so really, we are the undisputed champions.) The spire on Sagrada Familia is not finished yet, so it still has some growing to do.

* Garrath Williams, Kant Incorporated (PDF)

* Larry Sanger, Grokipedia: A First Look

* Riin Sirkel, Aristotle on Demonstrative Knowledge: Particulars Included (PDF)

* Patrick Flynn, Real Natures, at "The Journal of Absolute Truth"

* Nabeel Hamid, Teleology and Causation in Clemens Tipler (PDF)

* Kieran Setiya discusses Alice Ambrose and her complicated relationship with Wittgenstein, at "Under the Net"

Currently Reading

In Book

J.-K. Huysmans, En Route
Walter Watson, The Lost Second Book of Aristotle's Poetics
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

In Audiobook

Lois McMaster Bujold, Brothers in Arms
Scott Lynch, Red Seas Under Red Skies
Agatha Christie, Twelve Radio Mysteries
Jim Butcher, Grave Peril

A Source of Puzzlement

  To the question "What is a human body?" I intend to propose seven preliminary answers: that it is an animal body with various powers of movement, some voluntary and directed; that it is a body whose movements afford expression to intentions and purposes that thereby possess a certain directedness; that, as an expressive body, it is interpretable by others and responsive to others; that, as an interpretable body, a variety of its characteristics are signs whose meanings others can understand; that its directedness has the unity of agency; that it cannot be adequately understood except in terms of the social contexts in which it engages with others and others with it; and that it is in certain respects enigmatic, a source of puzzlement, since alone among animal bodies it occasionally emits the question "What is a human body?" and directs its powers towards giving an answer to that question. 

[Alasdair MacIntyre, "What is a human body?", The Tasks of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (New York: 2006) p. 86.]

And I Have Many Miles on Foot to Fare

 Sonnet
by John Keats

Keen, fitful gusts are whisp'ring here and there
 Among the bushes half leafless, and dry;
 The stars look very cold about the sky,
 And I have many miles on foot to fare.
 Yet feel I little of the cool bleak air,
 Or of the dead leaves rustling drearily,
 Or of those silver lamps that burn on high,
 Or of the distance from home's pleasant lair:
 For I am brimfull of the friendliness
 That in a little cottage I have found;
 Of fair-hair'd Milton's eloquent distress,
 And all his love for gentle Lycid drown'd;
 Of lovely Laura in her light green dress,
 And faithful Petrarch gloriously crown'd.

Two Poem Drafts

 A Nightmare

Mammon and License,
the gods of America,
walk like ifrits
on the sands by the shore.
A fire is in them,
a darkness of fire,
a burning of fire
that burns where it strays.
Their shadows devour,
their flames unenlighten,
and by the far end
every good will be ash,
all bonds will be broken,
desires made sterile,
and all we have made
will be nothing at last.

A Shield Against Darkness

Arise, God!
Be broken,
His foes,
and flee,
His enemies,
before Him;
as smoke is routed,
be routed,
as wax is melted
by fire's face,
be lost,
O wicked,
before God's face.

But be glad,
O just!
Rejoice
before God's face;
rejoice gladly!
He rides
from all ages
the heavenly heavens;
He grants
His voice,
a mighty voice.

Arise, Lord God,
for Sabbath-rest;
You and the Ark,
the Ark of Your might!

Personal Identity and Transworld Identity

 The philosophical question of personal identity over time is, roughly, the topic of what is required for a person at one time to be the same person at another time; due to some complications with questions of personhood, this is sometimes generalized a bit to the question of what is required for something (perhaps a person) at one time to be the same something at another time. (Olson's characterization in his SEP article, I think, gets this backwards, taking the latter as the fundamental problem; this is not tenable as an account of the actual topic of personal identity in the actual history of philosophy.) However, topics of this form are not exclusive to personal identity (even if we stay with speaking about persons). Here are just a few others of similar kind:

what is required for a person at one place to be the same person at another place
what is required for a person in one possibility to be the same person in another possibility
what is required for a person in one society to be the same person in another society|
what is required for a person in one doxastic state to be the same person in another doxastic state
what is required for a person in one legal system to be the same person in another legal system
what is required for a person with respect to one set of duties to be the same person with respect to another set of duties

More could be added. All of these, including times, can be modeled as possible worlds in one way or another, so all of these are in fact just different variations of what is known as transworld identity. Transworld identity is usually discussed in talking about some version of the second topic in the above list: what is required for a person in one possibility to be a person in another possibility. It has tended to be dominated by discussions of David Lewis's particular view of possible worlds, interpreted only as complete possibilities and literally as worlds, but as I've noted before neither of these interpretations are strongly motivated. You can perfectly well interpret 'possible worlds' as times or places or any number of other things, and occasionally we do.

Most attempts to give an account of personal identity over time focus on things particularly relevant to time -- persistence of a psychologically continuous stream over time, persistence of a material body over time -- but in reality, given that personal identity over time is really just a much more general problem applied specifically to the domain of times, any account of this should be something that is also generalizable, in one of two senses:

(1) the account for personal identity over times, or at least a generalized form of it, can be directly applied as an account in these other transworld identity topics;

(2) the account for personal identity over times is analogous to the accounts for these other transworld identity topics, in such a way that, while they have to be adapted to the different domains, the account for one can be used as a model for how to develop an account for another.

(In fact, the kinds of domains are diverse enough that I suspect that you will have (1) for some and (2) for others.)

When we try this out, most accounts of personal identity over time simply don't do very well. First, as noted before, they tend to be very time-focused, but it's not always clear what the analogue for the time-focused element would be in another domain. What is the analogue of psychological or physical continuity over time when we are talking about different possibilities or places or doxastic states? And what's more, even when you can find something that might be an analogue, it's often not clear that the analogue could even do the work it would need to do in the analogue domain to solve analogous problems. 

Further, the answers often just push back any puzzles. If personal identity is a matter of a persisting material body, then we just have turned any questions of personal identity over time into questions of the identity of material bodies over time. This is not necessarily a bad thing in itself (presumably some of these transworld identity topics are in fact reducible to more basic transworld identity topics, in the sense that the interpretations of possible worlds may be more and less fundamental), but it's noticeable that the actual point in question -- identity over time -- is still on the board as a point in question. In fact, I think it becomes clear that most modern accounts of personal identity over time simply don't go deeply enough actually to give an adequate account of the topic. (In this way they are somewhat analogous to attempts to attempts to give an account of transworld identity that reduce it to some form of transtemporal identity. OK, but transtemporal identity is just transworld identity where the possible worlds are interpreted as times.)

All Saints

Who may ascend the mountain of the Lord? Who may stand in his holy place? The one who has clean hands and a pure heart, who does not trust in an idol or swear by a false god. They will receive blessing from the Lord and vindication from God their Savior. [Psalm 24:3-5 NIV]

Edith of Wilton

St. Edith was the daughter of King Edgar the Peaceable and Queen Wilfrida. At the age of two, she began her course of education at Wilton Abbey, and effectively remained a part of that community her entire life. It is unclear whether she ever actually became a nun but it is much more likely that she participated as a secular member and royal patron, retaining her royal privileges and luxuries, but freely putting them at the service of the abbey. When her half-brother, King Edward the Martyr died, she was one of the possible candidates for the throne of England, but refused to have anything to do with it, and instead continued her life at Wilton, where she ministered to the sick and poor and helped to maintain and expand the abbey. Not long after she had paid for and completed a new chapel, which was consecrated by St. Dunstan, she suddenly died, in about 984, at the age of twenty-three. She might well have just been remembered as a wealthy but pious woman, but there were a few scattered stories of miracles, and both King Aethelred II, who was her brother, and King Cnut at various times had political reasons for keeping her memory public and supporting any tendency to her veneration. St. Dunstan seems also to have supported her cultus. Her feast day is September 16.

Pier Giorgio Frassati

Born in Turin, Italy, in 1901, Pier Giorgio Frassati's father was Alfredo Frassati, a newspaper owner active in liberal politics, and his mother was Adélaïde Ametis, an internationally recognized painter. As a young man, he began actively to engage in charitable activities, mostly, although not exclusively, through Catholic organizations, and when he began attending college for engineering he became active in social protest, as well. In 1922 he became a Third Order Dominican. When he completed his studies, his father offered him a car or an equivalent amount of money in a fund; he chose the fund and began using it for his charitable work. He was very physically active, enthusiastic particularly about mountaineering but enjoying a wide variety of activities. In 1925, while boating with friends, he began to experience severe pain and fever; he was eventually diagnosed as having polio. On July 4, he received last rites and died. A short life, but an unusually large number of people, most of whom had been personally helped by Frassati at one point or another, attended his funeral, and many of them went on to petition the Archbishop of Turin to open a cause for canonization for him. His younger sister, Luciana Frassati Gawronska, would eventually become famous for using her status as an Italian citizen to assist the Polish Resistance in World War II, and she would actively support the canonization cause, writing a biography of her brother. He was beatified by St. John Paul II in 1990, and canonized by Leo XIV in 2025. His feast day is July 4.

Ingrid of Skänninge

Born in the early thirteenth century to a noble family from  Östergötland in Sweden, Ingrid lived most of her life quite normally as a Swedish noblewoman, but after the death of her husband sometime around 1270, she became actively involved with a group of women who were attempting to further their devotion through prayer and ascetic practice under the guidance of a Dominican named Petrus of Dacia, a friend and correspondent of Bl. Christina von Stommeln. The women founded a Dominican convent with Ingrid as prioress, Skänninge Abbey, with Ingrid donating the land and buildings. It was formally recognized in 1281, and she died the following year. He feast day is September 2.

Xi Guizi

Born in the early 1880s in Hebei, China, in Dechao, Xi Guizi (also known in English as Chi Zhuze) became a Catholic catechumen. However, it was a hard time to be Catholic, as the Boxer Rebellion led to intense animosity against Catholics, Catholicism being seen as a foreign intrusion. During an anti-Western riot on June 1, 1900, he was recognized as a Catholic catechumen and dragged into the town square and killed.  He was beatified by Pius XII in 1955 and canonized by St. John Paul II in 2000. His feast day is July 20.

Pedro Claver y Corberó

Peter Claver was born in Verdú, Spain in 1580. After studying at the University of Barcelona, he joined the Society of Jesus and continued his studies in Mallorca, where he met St. Alphonsus Rodriguez, who told him that he should go into service in the Spanish colonies in the Americas. He followed this advice, and ended up in the New Kingdom of Granada, mostly in modern-day Colombia. While studying and working there, he found himself extremely disturbed by the practices of the Spanish slave trade; Cartagena was a major hub for it, and thus the nature, consequences, and sheer extent of it were far more visible than they had been in Spain. One of Claver's predecessors in Cartagena was Alonso de Sandoval, who had begun what he called el ministerio de los morenos, devoted to alleviating the condition of African slaves and providing religious instruction for those who were baptized; he began to train Claver for the work, and when Claver finished his studies, he signed his final profession with the words, aethiopum semper servus, forever servant (or slave) of the Africans. Feeling that there was a need for more active service than anyone had previously done, Claver began meeting slave ships, bringing food and medicine and learning supplies to teach the slaves the language. In the off season for the slave trade, he traveled the countryside, seeking out slaves on plantations, treating them as equals and sleeping in the slave quarters. He baptized and catechized vast numbers of people and preached against slavery in church, where he welcomed them as brothers. All of this was done under sometimes severe criticism; Church officials often held that he was being tactless and creating more problems than he was solving, local government officials were often reluctant to work with him, and wealthy families often avoided his churches. But he never stopped for almost four decades of ministry. As he grew older, he grew quite infirm, and suffered greatly, because he was largely neglected and perhaps occasionally abused by the servant the Society hired to tend to him.He died on September 8, 1564. He was canonized in 1888 by Leo XIII, and his feast is September 9.

Matilda of Ringelheim

Born to a count and countess in the Ducy of Saxony in the 890s, she studied at Herford Abbey more or less until she was married to the Duke of Saxony, Henry the Fowler, in 909. Henry was in a dispute with King Conrad I of Francia over various lands, and headed a rebellion against him for a number of years, which ended in a settlement; but when Conrad was nearing his death in 918, he recommended that Henry as his successor, having become convinced that Henry was the only one competent enough to be likely to hold off the increasing encroachments of the Magyar. When Henry became King of Francia in 919, Matilda as queen was put in a position to do extensive good for others, but the major opportunity came in 929, when Henry gave her her dower. The dower (not the same as a dowry) was a provision in marriage contracts in which the bride is guaranteed a support in case of widowhood; anything set aside as a dower (unlike a dowry) could not be spent by the husband. Henry's position had changed so considerably, however, that it made sense to rework the original provision, and the arrangement that was decided was for Henry to hand over completely to Matilda a very large amount of land. She would use this this to build monasteries and convents, the most important of which was perhaps that of Quedlinburg Abbey, which she had built in 939, the year of Henry's death, and where she became the first abbess. Matilda's son, Otto the Great, who became Holy Roman Emperor, eventually became displeased with some of his mother's decisions with regard to her property, and attempted to seize it; Matilda had to flee, and was only allowed to return when she swore off all her wealth. She grew sick and died in 968. Her feast day is March 14.

Germaine Cousin of Pibrac

St. Germaine, or Germana, was born in 1579 in Pibrac, near Toulouse, France. She was born with a deformed hand, and suffered from scrofula from an early age; because of this, she is said to have been mistreated by her stepmother. In order to keep her away from other children (due to the scrofula), she spent much of her childhood as a shepherdess, tending flocks in the countryside each day, punctuated mostly just by attending Mass each day. The local villagers over time shifted from avoiding her or mocking her to respecting her piety and her willingness to help others. She died in her sleep in 1601. In 1644, when the family grave was opened for another internment, her body was found incorrupt, which began a local movement toward her veneration, and over time she became associated with a large number of cures and healings. She was beatified by Bl. Pius IX in 1854 and canonized by him in 1867. She is a patron saint of the disabled and abandoned, and her feast day is June 15.

Ignatius Shoukrallah Maloyan

Shoukrallah Maloyan was born in 1869 to an Eastern Catholic family in Mardin (in modern-day Turkey) in the Ottoman Empire. An Armenian Catholic, he went to study at the Armenian Catholic Cathedral in Bzoummar, Lebanon, where he became a priest and took the religious name, Ignatius. He worked for some time in the Armenian Catholic Eparchy of Alexandria, based in Cairo, and then in 1904 moved to Constantinople (modern Istanbul) to serve with the Armenian Catholic Catholicos, Paul Petros XII Sabbaghian, as a member of the ICPB (Patriarchal Congregation of Bzoummar), a religious order specifically devoted to assisting the Catholicos in his patriarchal duties. In 1908, the Young Turks began to create a large number of problems for Armenian Catholics, with increasing talk of the extermination of all Christians, all Armenians, all Assyrians, and the like, and Paul Petros XII stepped down to avoid controversy over what was seen as his non-handling of it; he was replaced by Paul Petros XIII Terzian. To help stabilize the Armenian Catholic Church during the increasingly troubled time, Rome agreed to appoint a number of additional bishops to Armenian Catholic eparchies, and Ignatius Maloyan was made the Archbishop of Mardin in 1911 at the Armenian Catholic Synod of Rome. The Ottoman Empire, taking this as a sign that Armenian Catholics were attempting to build a space for independence from Ottoman oversight, retaliated by forcibly deposing Paul Petros XII and appointing their own preferred candidate for Catholicos instead, which Rome inevitably declared illicit. Nonetheless, papal reach into the Ottoman Empire was quite limited, so when Maloyan finally arrived in his see, he found plenty of trouble, as the Armenian Catholic Church found itself in a superposition of public puppet-church ruled by the Ottomans and underground-church in communion with Rome. It became worse when the 1913 coup put the Three Pashas government into power, and worse still with the beginning of World War I. Armenian Catholics were regularly harassed and occasionally murdered; things seemed likely to improve with the arrival in Mardin of Mustarrif Hilmi Bey, but rumors circulated in March 1915 that the Three Pashas government issued the order to exterminate all Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and on Palm Sunday, Turkish soldiers went throughout the churches of Maloyan to arrest Christians, ostensibly on charges of desertion; 'ostensibly' because they consistently just arrested the most important members of the Christian community. This continued throughout the Holy Week celebrations. Archbishop Maloyan publicly affirmed the loyalty of Armenian Catholics to the Ottoman Empire, and he was awarded a medal by the Sultan Mehmed V, which was no doubt the Sultan's attempt to provide the Catholics what protection he could against the anti-Christian and anti-Armenian factions that dominated his government, but the Sultan was by this point effectively a figurehead -- he claimed that some of his public orders were literally done at gunpoint -- and on May 25, 1915, Hilmi Bey was ordered to arrest all the Christian leaders in Mardin. To his great credit, he refused, on the grounds that he had no actual reason to do so, but in June a scheme was implemented to make it necessary for him to be away and allow the arrest of Christians while he was gone. Maloyan was arrested on June 3 or 4, accused of being a rebel supplying Armenian nationalists with guns, and given the option of being Muslim or being executed. He was tortured over a period of time. Hilmi Bey had meanwhile returned and made efforts to free the Christians who had been arrested, but this just gave the government material to remove him and replace him with someone more amenable to genocide. The Christians, including Archbishop Maloyan, were force-marched into the desert on the night of June 10 and shot. Ignatius Maloyan was beatified by St. John Paul II in 2001 and canonized by Pope Leo XIV in 2025. His feast day is June 11.

Galdino della Sala

Born in Milan near the end of the eleventh century, Galdino della Sala, or Galdinus, seems to have led a relatively quiet life, mostly known for his charitable work for those who were sick or in debt, until the death of Pope Adrian IV in 1159. The College of Cardinals split into pro-Imperial and anti-Imperial factions. The anti-Imperial faction, which had a slight majority at the time, elected Rolando Bandinelli, who took the name, Alexander III. The pro-Imperial faction regarded him as unacceptable and elected Octaviano Monticelli, who took the name, Victor IV. It is unclear whether this was done under the instigation of the Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa; he would certainly not have been happy at Bandinelli's election, but he can't actually have been much happier about a papal schism, and instead of trying to push the matter himself at the beginning, he called a synod at Pavia to determine which candidate should be considered the pope. However, when Pope Alexander III refused to attend, Barbarrossa backed Victor IV. Alexander excommunicated the Emperor; the Emperor attempted to install Victor IV, and found that it was much harder than he had expected. In 1164, Victor died, and the pro-Imperial cardinals around Victor elected Guido di Crema, who became Paschal III. Paschal III was succeeded by Callixtus III in 1168. Frederick Barbaross suffered a major defeat at Legagno in 1176, which made it politically necessary for him to support Alexander III, and Callixtus III himself formally submitted to Alexander III in 1178. Officially the schism was ended, although the stubborn holdouts tried electing a fourth antipope, Innocent III, whom Pope Alexander was able to capture and imprison, ending the schism de facto as well as de jure. All this time, there was a huge back-and-forth over whether Alexander or his rivals had the upper hand. Milan, however, favored Alexander, and Galdino, who was an archdeacon when the schism began, was vehemently in support of him. The Emperor was not amused; he besieged Milan, and supporters of Alexander had to flee. Alexander, barred from Rome at the time, was in Genoa, and Galdino went to support him there, following Alexander through the various locations Alexander visited in an attempt to stay out of the clutches of the Emperor: southern France, Sicily, and finally Rome again in 1165. Desperately in need of support, Alexander on his return to Rome made Galdino a cardinal and named him Archbishop of Milan and apostolic legate for Lombardy. He was eventually able to return to Milan, and continued actively supporting Pope Alexander, but he never saw the end of the schism. Having just finished a homily on April 18, 1176, he collapsed and died. He was canonized by Pope Alexander III at some time before the latter's death in 1181. His feast day is April 18.

Charles-Joseph-Eugène de Mazenod

Eugène de Mazenod was born in 1782 to an extremely wealthy family associated with the royal court. When the French Revolution began, his family was forced to flee. They wandered for some time in Italy, growing increasingly poor. Eugène's mother and sister eventually returned to France, his mother getting a formal divorce so that she could get part of their property back. Eugène eventually ended up in Palermo, where he was given protection by the Duke of Cannizaro, and as companion of their two sons began to live again the life of a wealthy noble; in his early twenties he returned to France to live with his mother, who was doing reasonably well, and he indulged himself as a rich young man. But it all seemed hollow, and only more so over time, and eventually he began to be restless in his lifestyle, and started doing more charitable work. On Good Friday, 1807, he saw a crucifix and had a religious experience in which it seemed to him that all of his life was one of sin, and he began to study for the priesthood, being ordained in 1811. In 1816, he felt compelled to live a life of total oblation to God and service to the poor and needy of Provence, and invited several other priests to join with him in this endeavor in a group that eventually became known as the Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate, who would send missionaries all over the world. In 1837, Eugène was made Bishop of Marseilles, where he died in 1861. He was beatified by Paul VI and canonized by St. John Paul II; his feast day is May 21.

Caesarius of Arles and Caesaria the Elder

Caesarius was born near modern-day Chalon-sur-Saône; officially it was in the Holy Roman Empire, although in practice the Burgundians were mostly self-governing. Caesarius did not get along with his family, except for Caesaria, his sister, and at the age of seventeen he left home to become a monk at Lérins. He was a bright young man, and impressed by him as a student, the abbot made him cellarer of the monastery. Caesarius immediately started making enemies in this position when he refused to give monks food if he thought their discipline was not ascetic enough. The abbot removed him from the position, but then Caesarius, feeling that he needed to lead the way by example, started starving himself to death with fasting. The abbot then sent him to Arles for medical care, but probably also just to make him someone else's responsibility. The bishop of Arles turned out, to his surprise, to be a distant kinsman, who encouraged the young man to seek holiness along more normal lines and ordained him a priest. Caesarius was consecrated bishop of Arles in 502. He fulfilled the office with all the zeal that had been typical of him so far; his sheer energetic activity made him one of the most important bishops in the empire, although he also kept finding himself in controversies. For instance, when he ransomed captives, he ransomed everyone regardless of their backgrounds. His tendency to do things without much regard for how other people would see them, also led him several times to be denounced to the authorities for political reasons, but in the end he was judged innocent in each case. In 512, he helped his sister, Caesaria, found a religious community for women, writing the Rule for their community; the Rule would be a significant influence on the concept of cloistered communities. Caesaria seemed to organize the community very well; not much is known about her, but her community flourished greatly during her tenure as abbess. Under the influence of a priest from North Africa named Julianus Pomerius, Caesarius became an enthusiastic reader of St. Augustine, and became a major conduit for St. Augustine's influence on European churches in the sixth century. The culmination of this was his calling of the Council of Orange in 529 which became one of the most theologically important councils of the early Middle Ages. St. Caesarius died in 542; his feast day is August 27. It's unclear when St. Caesaria died, but her feast day is January 12.

************

2024 All Saints Post
Meinrad of Einsiedeln, Joaquima de Vedruna Vidal de Mas, Vibiana, Anne-Marie Rivier, Helier, Peter Ou, Gontrand, Theobald of Marly, Siméon-François Berneux, Marie-Nicolas-Antoine Daveluy, Lucas Hwang Sŏk-tu, Lorcán Ua Tuathail

2023 All Saints Post
Gaius Sollius Modestius Sidonius Apollinaris, Hesychius I, Alcimus Ecdicius Avitus, Apollinaris, Juvenal of Jerusalem, Wilfrid of Northumbria, Peter of Athos, Mildburh, Mildrith, Mildgytha, Jean-Gabriel Perboyre, Margaret of Città di Castello, Germanus I of Constantinople, Hemma von Gurk

2022 All Saints Post
Gildas the Wise, Clelia Barbieri, Marguerite Bourgeoys, Charles Eugene de Foucauld de Pontbriand, Lazaros the Iconographer, Arialdo and Erembaldo, Devashayam Pillai, Gerard Majella, David Uribe-Velasco, Inácio de Azevedo and the Martyrs of Tazacorte, Angelus of Jerusalem, Laura of St. Catherine of Siena, Jean-Baptiste de la Salle, Damien of Molokai

2021 All Saints Post
Niklaus von Flue, Contardo of Este, Peter of Verona, Virginia Centurione Bracelli, Fulrad, Ivan of Rila, Austregisilus, Sulpitius the Pious, Desiderius, Amandus, Remaclus, Theodard, Lambert, The Martyrs of Shanxi, Tôma Khuông, Maria Teresa Goretti, Lidwina of Schiedam, Oliver Plunkett, Mariam Baouardy, Marinus, Nunzio Sulprizio

2020 All Saints Post
André de Soveral, Domingos Carvalho, and the Martyrs of Cunhau, Henry of Uppsala and Eric IX the Holy, Adelaide of Burgundy, Junípero Serra y Ferrer, Maria Restituta Kafka, Venantius Fortunatus, Radegund, Junian of Maire, and Gregory of Tours, Magdalene of Nagasaki, Jeanne-Antide Thouret, Louis IX, Peter Nolasco, Tarasios of Constantinople, Albert Chmielowski

2019 All Saints Post, Part III
Mariam Thresia Chiramel Mankidiyan, Gregory II and Gregory III, Katarina Ulfsdotter, Marko Stjepan Krizin, István Pongrácz, Melchior Grodziecki, Amandus and Bavo of Ghent, Zhang Huailu, Colette of Corbie, Alphonsus Rodriguez, Marie-Margeuerite d'Youville, Anthony of the Caves, Teresa of Calcutta

2019 All Saints Post, Part II
Bartolomeu dos Mártires, Manuel Moralez, Apollonius the Apologist, Henry II the Exuberant and Cunigunde of Luxembourg, Ramon Nonat, Francis Xavier Cabrini, Juliana of Liège, Aelia Pulcheria, John Henry Newman, Anna Schäffer, Ivo of Chartres, Paul I of Constantinople

2019 All Saints Post, Part I
Matteo Correa Magallanes, Nicholas Owen, Knud IV and Knud Lavard, Mariana de Jesús de Paredes, Joseph Vaz, Zdislava Berka, Caterina Fieschi Adorno, Pietro I Orseolo, Ðaminh Hà Trọng Mậu, Jeanne-Françoise Frémiot de Chantal, Stephen Min Kŭk-ka, Rabanus Maurus Magnentius

2018 All Saints Post
Gianna Beretta Molla, Margaret of Scotland, Yu Tae-chol Peter, Justa and Rufina of Seville, Giuseppe Moscati, Kazimierz Jagiellończyk, Marie-Alphonsine Danil Ghaţţas, Salomone Leclerq, Arnulf of Metz, Óscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez, Frumentius of Tyre, Jeanne Jugan, Joseph Zhang Dapeng, Maroun and Abraham of Harran, Magnus Erlendsson, Callixtus I, Hippolytus, Urban I, Pontian, Anterus, Fabian, Jean de Brébeuf

2017 All Saints Post
John Ogilvie, Leo IV, Andrew Stratelates and the 2593 Martyrs, Theodore the Studite, The Martyrs of Gorkum, Margaret Ward and John Roche, Mesrop Mashtots, José María Robles Hurtado, Genevieve of Paris, Pedro Calungsod, Isaac of Nineveh, George Preca, Denis Ssebuggwawo Wasswa, Anthony of Padua

2016 All Saints Post
Theodore of Tarsus, Nilus the Younger, Anne Line, Mark Ji Tianxiang, Maria Elisabetta Hesselbad, Sergius of Radonezh, Anna Pak Agi, Jeanne de Valois, Vigilius of Trent, Claudian, Magorian, Sisinnius, Martyrius, Alexander, Euphrasia Eluvathingal, José Sanchez del Rio, Andrew Kaggwa, Roberto Bellarmino

2015 All Saints Post
Margaret Clitherow, Kaleb Elasbaan of Axum, Louis Martin and Marie-Azélie Guérin Martin, Gertrude of Nivelles, Pius V, Clare and Agnes of Assisi, Kuriakose Elias Chavara, Scholastica, Vinh Sơn Phạm Hiếu Liêm, Thorlak Thorhallson, John Damascene

2014 All Saints Post
Marie Guyart, Alphonsa Muttathupadathu, John Neumann, Hildegard von Bingen, Pedro de San José Betancurt, Benedict the Moor

2013 All Saints Post
María Guadalupe García Zavala, Antonio Primaldi, Nimatullah Kassab Al-Hardini, Gabriel-Taurin Dufresse and Augustine Zhao Rong, Josephine Margaret Bakhita, John Chrysostom

2012 All Saints Post
Jadwiga of Poland, Kateri Tekakwitha, André Bessette, Rafqa Pietra Choboq Ar-Rayès, Alberto Hurtado Cruchaga

2011 All Saints Post
Bonifacia Rodríguez de Castro, Celestine V, Olga of Kiev, Cyril of Jerusalem, Joseph Mukasa and Charles Lwanga

2010 All Saints Post
Moses the Black of Ethiopia, Micae Hồ Đình Hy, Katherine Mary Drexel, Robert Southwell, Lojze Grozde, Andrew Kim Tae Gon

Dashed Off XXVI

 Phenomena have to be made into objects of inquiry by language, classification, argument, method, and the like.

"Is the Christian inspired? Yes, he is indeed. Just as inspired as he is Christian, and just as Christian as he is inspired." Farrer
"Prayer and dogma are inseparable. They alone can explain each other. Either without the other is meaningless and dead."
"Every true prayer is a prayer of the Churh, every true prayer has repercussions in the Church, and every true prayer is, ultimately, prayed by the Church, since it is the Church's indwelling Holy Spirit that prays within each individual 'with sighs too deep for words' (Rm 8:26)."
"Holiness is a form of the soul  that has to emerge from the inmost core, from a level inaccessible both to external influences and to the efforts of the will."
"The evidence of light is that it illuminates; and if by the light of faith we do not see more colours in the world, more exactly in their proper being and truth, than eyes can perceive which lack supernatural illumination, then surely we stand self-condemned."

Hardware does not implement software simpliciter; it implements it approximately and under conditions determined by physical constraints.

"Justice is strenuous, except for those who love." Bede

Farming is a matter of continually improvising adjustments to plans.

Translation requires a commonality, or at least an analogy, o fexperience between author and translator, to coordinate meanings.

The author creates a text by final causes, and as a final cause.

John Wild, "An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs"
"A sign is not something *physically* present, exercising efficient causation. It is something *noetically* present, leading the interpreter *noetically* to take account of something other than itself."
"The natural sign, which leads the mind to an *individual* designation is *not* the linguistic sign of a *universal* signification."
-- Behavioralism for signs confuses 'similarity of response' and 'sameness of signification'.
"A sign is something to be understood, not merely responded to."
"No sign as such exercises any kind of *efficient* causation. But a sign is that which leads the knowing faculty to apprehend something other than itself, in virute of a real relation between the two."
"The reminder functions only by acting on us to make us think of something else. It either reminds us in functioning this way, or it does not. But a sign really signifies its signatum irrespective of its effect on us. Hence we can *misconstrue* or *misinterpret* signs. But ther eis no such thing as being *misreminded* by a reminder. It either reminds us or it does not."
"A sign is anything capable of noetically specifying (not causing, except in the sense of an *extrinsic formal cause*) the noetic faculty to apprehend something other than itself, in virtue of some real relation to this signatum."
"Anything that leads the knowing faculty to something other than itself is a sign. The more inconspicuously and vicariously a thing is, the more it is a sign. The most perfect sign is a concept which is literally *nothing but* a sign and which almost entirely vanishes in exercising its signifying function."

An inertial reference frame is a system of zeros for measuring locomotion, such that the locomotions measured are described by Newton's First Law.

The 'world' in 'world-building' is a system of classifications with a system of accounting.

A church history is an implicit ecclesiology.

What Scripture suggests in prayer is essential to its overall interpretation.

Fear is underestimated as a poetical passion, but joy is more poetical and sorrow more poetical still.

In ordinary times, men fear most the powers they themselves make.

Much of poetry consists in using images to do concept-work.

Anamnesis is not what the Eucharist is but how it is to be done. Christ tells us what it is: the Body, given for us, and the new covenant in Blood, poured out for us.

It is insufficiently considered what meaning 'do this in remembrance of me' would have for the disciples then while they were with him physically; it is always assumed tha tit is a command for the future, but nothing in the text strictly requires this -- in fact, teh association of anamnesis and diatheke, memorial and convenant, which go together theologically and in the history of Israel, suggests that the primary point is present, not future (although, of course, this doens't rule out the imperative also covering future actions when they become present).

the importance of practices that are not directly concerned with human persons but structured to express the value of teh human person

Many of the fundamental problems of physics are related to the question of how to reconcile the impartiality of the mathematics used in physical theory with the partiality found in the experiments that anchor the theory.

Quantum mechanical 'interpretations' are in fact predictions of the ultimate fate, the ultimate classification, of the wave equation.

moral sentiments as bailiffs of the tribunal of conscience

Many actions in which we engage are actions we do in a role, and disregard for the requirements of the role introduces rational incoherence into the action.

"For this reason has God established the rich and mighty over the poorer folk, that they should provide not for their own private ends, but rather for the common good." Antonino

"The gravitational equations could only be found by a purely formal principle (general covariance), that is, by trusting in the largest imaginable logical simplicity of the natural laws." Einstein (to de Broglie)

The outer ministers to the inner, the lower to the higher, and is thereby transfigured.

The saints on the calendar exhibit what might be called moral powers, and it is these moral powers mroe than their particular actions that we are to imitate. For instance, saints like Rose of Lima who did extraordinary mortifications exhibit in doing these things a spiritual nonattachment to worldly things and capacity for self-discipline, which we also should have, although in our case we should generally exercise these moral powers in ways other than extraordinary mortifications.

All humans slowly become more like what they revere.

Love creates the world, and Love will end it.

Greco-Roman culture as Peter's mother-in-law

On Farrer's account of Mark, the miracles of Jesus fall primarily into three groups:
(1) exorcism
(2) catharsis (e.g., lepers)
(3) apocatastasis (e.g., raising from dead)
-- (2) can be seen as 'miracles of water' and (3) as 'miracles of spirit'.
-- It is perhaps worth noting that the Church's interpretation of baptism reflects all three of these, baptism being a repudiation of evil in being cleased of sin and raised to new life. (Farrer takes it to be more immediately the Corss and Easter; the Resurrection is the fourteenth and culminating healing.)

the country neighborliness of Tom Bombadil (he treats even corrupt trees and barrow-wights more as bad neighbors than enemies)

Castles and fortresses work offensively primarily as logistics-disrupters.

feeding of the five thousand : Jews :: feeding of the four thousand : Gentiles -- (Farrer)

charters and contracts as social entities for constructing social entities

the tradition of the external world

If I am eaten by lions, the lions impose upon me the function of feeding and nourishing lions.

elemental properties (Llull)
(1) ignis: dispersivus et dispersibilis
(2) aqua: restrictiva et restringibilis
(3) aer: impetivus ideo repletivus
(4) terra: evacuabilis

"Nearly everything well done looks easy to do, especially if you have never tried it yourself." CS Lewis

formal wave as local travel of disposition to change things in a specific measurable way

sacramentals of first degree: directly represent Christ in liturgical contexts, e.g., the Gospels, the Cross, the Church Edifice, icons, relics, altar
sacramentals of second degree: means of reverential prayer in liturgical contexts, e.g., paten and chalice, candles, etc.
sacramentals of third degree: means of reverential prayer in contexts outside public liturgy

the Ark of the Covenant as a type of the sacraments

condign vs congruous value of gift

The faith of the one who receives the sacraments is a seal, title-deed, and pledge of grace.

Irenaeus's association of the gospels and the living creatures make them into a sort of symbolic throne for Christ.

Wit, like gemstones, gets tis value from not being common.

The true theology is a divine science of divine things.

What belongs to one is imputed to another based on something they share.

the transradication of humanity

Hell is no doubt filled with people who think God is guilty.

Study is more than attention, even attention aimed at learning.

"Languages do not have terms which are specific enough to distinguish neighbouring notions." Leibniz
"We often reason in words, with the object itself virtually absent from our mind. But this sort of knowledge cannot influence us -- something livelier is needed if we are to be moved."

each sacrament as a sign of an aspect of heaven -- e.g., baptism of immersion in Spirit, confirmation of strengthening in holiness, ordination of participation in heavenly liturgy, penance of divine imputation and acclamation of righteousness, unction of overflow of grace, matrimony of the Bride of the Lamb and holy union; eucharist of the Body of Christ (covenant and incorporation)

"If someone acquired a taste for poisons which would kill him or make him wrteched, it would be absurd to say that we ought not to argue with him about his tastes." Leibniz

Skepticism is often an excuse for selective dogmatism.

Memory preservation plays a large role in the building of personal relationships.

The world is more like magic than the magicless imagination conceives, and less like magic than the magicful imagination assumes.

The moral life is one of managing risks, but it is not one of eliminating risks; those who try to live without any moral risk act against both prudence and charity.

There is always a simplicity that cuts through every cleverness.

the Church as salvific engine

'Speed of thought' is often speed of stupidity.

In every society, politics and religion are the primary vehicle for diffusion of philosophy.

Every self-evident, evident, and proven principle is normative for at least a certain domain of thought, and every genuinely normative principle is true in at least a certain respect.

descriptive : normative :: form : end

A unified people over time creates an aesthetic world suitable to its cultural life.

the 'synaesthesia' of cultural development: making intelligible sensible form, matching and mixing arts of different modalities, expressing emotions in different artistic ways

Links of Note

 * Yili Zhou and Rhys Borchert, The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument, on moral realism

* Ian Campbell, Power, Getting What You Want, and Happiness: Gorgias 566A4-472D7 (PDF)

* Jeremy Wyatt, Primitivist Theories of Truth, at the SEP

* Roberto Granieri, Plotinus on the Firmest Principle (PDF)

* The Dark Herald reviews Miyazaki's Spirited Away.

* Awais Aftab, You aren't in the DSM, at "Asterisk"

* Daniel D. De Haan, Moral perception and the function of the Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions (PDF)

* Daniel D. De Haan, Beauty and Aesthetic Perception in Thomas Aquinas (PDF)

* Matthew Minerd, Thomistic Research Project: Toward a Fuller Appreciation of the Role of the Agent Intellect in Cognition, at "To Be a Thomist"

* Thomas D. Howes, The New Hero of Tribalists, at "Law & Liberty"

* Jani Hakkarainen, The Adventures of "Ontology" (PDF)

* Michael Baxter, What MacIntyre Meant, at "Notre Dame Magazine"

* Alex Watson, The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha's Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Ātman and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments

* Eli Benjamin Israel, On Moral Perfection: An Atemporal Reading of Kant's Postulate of Immortality (PDF)

* Richard G. DeClue, Jr., Eucharistic Ecclesiology, at "Encyclopedia of Catholic Theology"

* Edward Feser, The Catholic Fight over Immigration, at "Unherd"

October Night

  October Night

I stood at dusk and looked around the garden small and dim;
the fountain dry was cracked, with dust and vines around the rim.
The roses dead were long and spare, the weeds were rising high;
then ghosts from ancient worlds arose and said that I would die.
In long and spectral robes they swept along the garden ways
and sang the songs no longer sung, the songs of distant days.
A Templar march I thought I heard, a troubadour's sad plea,
a hymn of love to loves long gone, a shanty rasped at sea.
Like breezes drifting, softly sped those tunes, like secret sigh.
And 'midst it all a whisper sang; it sang that I would die.
The darkness fell, it drifted down, a-float like falling shawl;
it settled over roses dead and draped across the wall.
I strained my ears to hear again that gently whispered word,
but silence through the darkness fell, so nothing then was heard,
and nothing felt by rising hairs, and nothing met my eye,
until at midnight down the way I heard that I would die.
A maiden walked like water's wave along the crumbling wall
and here and there an elegy from out her lips would fall.
A hint, a clue, a fragile thread, the song would drift my way
with meaning barely out of reach and sense just out of play,
but here and there it rose to reach the keen of sobbing cry,
and then no doubt remained at all: it said that I would die.

The moon was silver on the road, but stars were hid by clouds
that, dark and thunder-mutter-thick, were gathered up in crowds
like ghosts in endless number in some graveyard in the sky,
and somehow in the thunder's tones I heard that I would die.
On far and distant hills the wolves began to raise a howl
and down the moonlit road I saw a figure in a cowl
as black as night in color so that scarce could seeing see
where ended figure and the night; it clearly came for me,
and in its hand a scythe was held, that swept through air with ease,
and at its heels a hound did walk, as pale as death's disease.
The crows in murder raised their wings, all croaking out a cry,
and clear I heard it in their noise: they said that I would die.
The wind was blowing in the leaves and rustled roses dead
and mingled with the panic that was buzzing in my head,
till time itself with nausea was turned upon its ear
and death itself was manifest to brain enmeshed in fear.
I sought to turn, like trembling bird in pit I sought to fly,
but dizzy chills sped up my spine that said that I would die.
A hand was clamped upon my mouth; I could not scream or cry;
a voice was snarling in my ear and told me I would die.

And Brood with the Shades Unblest

 Hallowe’en in a Suburb
by H. P. Lovecraft 

 The steeples are white in the wild moonlight,
 And the trees have a silver glare;
Past the chimneys high see the vampires fly,
 And the harpies of upper air,
 That flutter and laugh and stare. 

 For the village dead to the moon outspread
 Never shone in the sunset’s gleam,
But grew out of the deep that the dead years keep
 Where the rivers of madness stream
 Down the gulfs to a pit of dream. 

 A chill wind weaves thro’ the rows of sheaves
 In the meadows that shimmer pale,
And comes to twine where the headstones shine
 And the ghouls of the churchyard wail
 For harvests that fly and fail. 

 Not a breath of the strange grey gods of change
 That tore from the past its own
Can quicken this hour, when a spectral pow’r
 Spreads sleep o’er the cosmic throne
 And looses the vast unknown. 

 So here again stretch the vale and plain
 That moons long-forgotten saw,
And the dead leap gay in the pallid ray,
 Sprung out of the tomb’s black maw
 To shake all the world with awe. 

 And all that the morn shall greet forlorn,
 The ugliness and the pest
Of rows where thick rise the stones and brick,
 Shall some day be with the rest,
 And brood with the shades unblest. 

 Then wild in the dark let the lemurs bark,
 And the leprous spires ascend;
For new and old alike in the fold
 Of horror and death are penn’d,
 For the hounds of Time to rend.