Habitude VII

The next questions all depend crucially on two things that have been established about habitudes:

(1) They specify possible actions out of multiple possible actions.

(2) They belong to something only insofar as it is potential in some way.

 Can the intellect have habitudes?

It is clear that there are habitudes associated with the intellect, and this is assumed by St. Thomas's argument, but the question is whether the intellect itself has habitudes. A significant position that St. Thomas wants consistently to argue against is the position that held that we all have one intellect; if you hold this position, it's obvious that intellect-associated habitudes like knowledge vary from person to person, so they would have to be in the sensitive powers. To this Aquinas responds:

But this position, first of all, is against the intention of Aristotle, for it is manifest that sensitive powers are not rational by essence but only by participation, as is said in Ethic. I. And the Philosopher puts intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, in that which is rational by essence. Thus they are not in sensible powers but in the intellect itself. He also explicitly says, in De Anima III, that the possible intellect when it it made singular, that is, when it is reduced into the act of singulars by intelligible species, then comes to be according to act in the same way that a knower is said to be actual, which indeed happens when someone is able to work through himself, to wit, by considering; and even then it is in some way potential, but not as it was before learning and discovering. Therefore the possible intellect itself is that in which there is a habitude of knowledge by which it can consider even when it does not consider.

And second, this position is against the truth of the thing. For just as the power belongs to that which the working does, so too the habitude belongs to that which the working does. But to understand and to consider is an act proper to the intellect. Therefore the habitude by which one considers is properly in the intellect itself. (ST 2-1.50.4)

A few points are worth noting here.

(1) The first argument, from the mind of Aristotle, especially occurring immediately after the discussion on sensitive powers, indicates that Aquinas does not intend his position on habitudes in the sensitive powers to be a substantive change from Aristotle.

(2) Both arguments here also establish that the intellect is a free power; that is, in and of itself, it is capable of multiple possibilities, since this is a requirement for having a habitude non-derivatively and in the most proper sense.

(3) They both, of course, also imply that the human intellect, contrary to Aquinas's opponents, is not shared but individual.

(4) It follows from this position that habitudes belong to the potential intellect (because it can in some way be potential) and not the agent intellect.

Can the will have habitudes?

I reply that it must be said that every power that can be in diverse ways ordered to acting needs a habitude by which it can be well disposed to its act. But the will, since it is a rational power, can be in diverse ways ordered to acting. And thus it is fitting to put in the will some habitude by which it is well disposed to its act. It is also apparent from the very notion of habitude that it is principally ordered to the will, in that habitude is something one uses when one wills, as said above. (ST 2-1.50.5)

As St. Thomas notes in a reply to an objection (ad 2), this is because the will is more like the potential intellect than the agent intellect, in being both mover and moved. That is to say, the will, while not active, is not a purely active power, but involves a sort of potentiality by its nature.

Can angels have habitudes?

Angels, of course, differ from us in not being physical, so asking whether angels can have habitudes is not mere curiosity about angels, but a way of asking the question of whether having habitudes, even in the intellect and will, depends on the body, or on being physical or material in some way. Do we have habitudes only because we have bodies, so that habitudes are primarily concerned with bodily life? Aquinas holds that what matters for habitudes is not materiality but potentiality, and since angels are not pure act like God, they can have habitudes. From this, of course, it follows that not all habitudes are concerned with corporeal life.

However, with respect to this habitude, angelic intellect has itself differently from human intellect. For human intellect, because it is lowest in the intellectual order, is potential with respect to all intelligibles, just as prime matter with respect to all sensible forms, and therefore it needs some habitude to all understanding. But angelic intellect does not have itself as pure potential in the genus of intelligibles, but as a sort of act, although not as pure act (which is God's alone) but with mixture of some potential, and having less of potentiality the higher it is. (ST 2-1.50.6)

Of the kinds of habitude, the angels do not need habitudes with respect to nature, because they are not material, although it seems that they can have them, but they can have habitudes with respect to operation, and indeed need such habitudes to be united with God (a way of acting well), "by which they are conformed to God." (It follows from this, of course, that it is in principle possible for us also to have such godly habitudes, which will play a significant role in Aquinas's theology of grace.)

The parts that are mutually disposed by angelic habitudes are not physical parts, of course, but intelligible objects and volitional ends.

More Mighty than the Hosts of Mortal Kings

 Beethoven
by Maurice Baring

More mighty than the hosts of mortal kings,
I hear the legions gathering to their goal;
The tramping millions drifting from one pole,
The march, the counter-march, the flank that swings.
I hear the beating of tremendous wings,
The shock of battle and the drums that roll;
And far away the solemn belfries toll,
And in the field the careless shepherd sings. 

There is an end unto the longest day.
The echoes of the fighting die away.
The evening breathes a benediction mild.
The sunset fades. There is no need to weep,
For night has come, and with the night is sleep,
And now the fiercest foes are reconciled.

Habitude VI

 Habitude is qualitative ordering of the nature of some subject either well or badly to some act out of several possibles, through mutually disposing several things. As a quality, it requires a subject, and therefore Aquinas considers a number of questions concerned with the kind of subject for which habitude is an appropriate quality; since accidents are defined in relation to the substances that can have them, doing this clarifies several aspects of the definition. Rather than translate the whole question, as I did for the defining questions, I will make some comments with a few translations of select passages.

Can bodies have habitudes?

Aquinas argues that it depends. Habitudes dispose either to form or to operation. Habitudes always need to distinguish out some act out of several possibilities; bodies on their own are only determined to one operation, so bodies on their own develop no habitudes toward operations. However, habitudes to operation in the soul can be in a body secondarily, "inasmuch as the body is disposed and enabled to devote itself readily to the workings of the soul" (ST 2-1.50.1).

If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, then habitual disposition can be in body. And in this way health and beauty, and suchlike, are called habitual dispositions. But they do not completely have the notion of habitudes, because their causes are by their nature easily transformable.

In the reply to the second objection he further clarifies this by suggesting that health and beauty are habitudes comparatively -- they are 'difficult to change' relative to most things we consider dispositions -- but habitudes in the soul, like knowledge and virtue, are 'difficult to change' simply. I take it that the point is that bodily habitudes have a greater measure of dependency on things other than themselves than habitudes of the soul; that is, the difficult-to-change and the easy-to-change is a measure of relative independence.

In what way do souls have habitudes?

The soul does not naturally have a habitude to nature, because that would require something to which it is further disposed; this contrasts with the body, which has a habitude-to-nature with respect to the soul.  However, importantly, this also means that under the right conditions, the soul can have a habitude to a higher nature than itself; this can occur by divine grace, for instance, which gives us a habitude to the divine nature. In this way, the habitude takes as its subject the essence of the soul.

The usual way the soul has habitudes is by having habitudes to operations, which are themselves based on powers or capabilities. In this way, the habitude takes as its subject the powers of the soul.

Whether nutritive or sensitive powers of the soul can have habitudes?

Nutritive and sensitive powers are not in and of themselves capable of multiple possibilities because they "work from natural stimulation" (ST 2-1.50.3), ex instinctu naturae. Therefore, simply considered in themselves they do not have habitudes. However, rational powers are capable of multiple possibilities, so we can have habitudes in other powers of the soul insofar as they "work from command of reason".

On the basis of this, Aquinas concludes (ST 2-1.50.3 ad 1) that nutritive powers, which do not obey the command of reason, have no habitudes, but sensitive powers can obey the command of reason, and therefore can have habitudes. This is certainly true of human senstive powers, which are ordered naturally to rational powers; but what about the sensitive powers of animals other than human beings?

To the second it must be said that sensitive powers in brute animals do not work from the command of reason, but if brute animals are left to themselves, they work from natural stimulation, and thus in brute animals there are not any habitudes ordered to workings. There are nevertheless some dispositions in them ordered to nature, such as health and beauty. But because brute animals are through a sort of custom disposed by human reason to some working or another, in this way in brute animals habitude can in a certain way be put; thus Augustine says in the book of eighty-three questions, that we see the most savage beasts being restrained from that in which they have the greatest pleasures by fear of pain, and when this turns into custom for them, we call them tamed and gentled. However, the notion of habitude is incomplete as to voluntary use, because they do not have lordship of using or non-using, which it seems pertains to the notion of habitude. And therefore, properly speaking, in them there cannot be habitudes. (ST 2-1.50.3 ad 2)

'Use' is a technical term for St. Thomas; it is a particular act of will, the application of a thing to an operation; we are doing it when we apply a horse to riding or a stick to hitting by deliberately selecting this end for it. In doing this, our will is acting as a prime mover. In ST 2-1.16.2, he had concluded (also in agreement with Augustine in the Eighty-Three Questions) that it is an act exclusive to rational animals. At no point so far has he actually connected habitude and volitional acts of use; it comes out of left field here, but I think his idea is that properly speaking the brute animal gets the quasi-habitude, or habitude in a loose sense, that we call 'tameness', through use by a human will, and therefore the selection out of multiple possibilities is actually extrinsic to the disposition here.

This is a point on which St. Thomas seems very much to be deviating from Aristotle; but, Aristotle's remarks being somewhat scattered, it's difficult to say how far. I think one can argue that he is not so much differing as to substance as making a terminological adjustment, so that habitude in a strict sense is more closely connected to intellect and will; trained animals have habitudes in an extended sense by their connection to intellect and will, which in their case is outside the actual disposition. This raises a few questions that are not an issue in Aristotle's somewhat looser terminology, such as those with tool-use in other animals. I suspect St. Thomas would give the same answer to such questions that he gave in 2-1.16.2 about beasts using their members, that they do this from natural stimulation (or instinct; the Latin instinctus is not as narrow as the English 'instinct'), and thus not from use in the proper sense. It is very clear that we need to distinguish rational habitudes from other kinds; rational habitudes on every point of the definition of habitude fit the definition more 'tightly' than other habitudes do. But it's at least arguable that we should see Aristotle's looser sense of habitude as a sort of genus, in which they can differ in precisely how the multiple possibilities are involved, and Aquinas as concerned with the primary species of that genus, those that have volitional use as part of how we understand the multiple possibilities. 

While Aquinas flatly denies habitude in nutritive powers, the allowance of a habitude-in-a-broad-sense in the case of tame animals also raises the question of whether there might not be possible something similar in nutritive powers in plants (through horticulture) or in animals (through veterinary medicine).

These sorts of questions arise, I think, from the fact that St. Thomas does not give extensive explanations for some of his reasons, so there are unstated gaps. My guess is also that St. Thomas that, since in context he is building up to a discussion of virtues, the most proper habitudes, that he is really just thinking about virtue in these discussions, and thus not fully following through on the lesser questions of how this relates to the various roles dispositional qualities take in explaining animal behavior.

Intellect and will are in any case the primary and most proper subjects for habitudes, and thus should be kept for their own discussions.

A New Poem Draft

 Holy

the womb
and the tomb
is holy

and holy
the battle-field
of sorrow

the one alone
on the throne
is holy

and holy
rising sun
in the morrow

our deepest fear
drawing near
is holy

and holy
is the hope
beyond merit

the church-light
at midnight
is holy

and holy
the heaven
we inherit

Links of Note

 * Matt Whiteley, His Reason is Love, on Julian of Norwich, at "This Isle is Full of Noises"

* Daniel D. De Haan, Freeing the Will from Neurophilosophy: Voluntary Action in Thomas Aquians and Libet-Style Experiments (PDF)

* The Medieval Purse, at "Medieval Histories"

* Dean Zimmerman, The Metaphysics of Divine Presence and the Appropriateness of Worship (PDF)

* Kitten, College kids can't do math, either, at "Adorable and Harmless"

* Aaron Wells, Arguments for the Continuity of Matter in Kant and Du Chatelet (PDF)

* Amelia McKee, Albert the Great in a Gothic Painting: Teacher, Preacher, and Saint, at "Art for the Liturgical Year"

* Jordan MacKenzie, Just humour me: humour, humourlessness, and mutual recognition (PDF)

* Flame & Light, Speech Acts and Fictions II: The Fictive Use of Language, on Richard Gale's speech act theory of fiction

* Giulia Piredda, What is an affective artifact? A further development in situated affectivity (PDF)

* Gregory B. Sadler, Five States of Nature in Hobbes' Leviathan

* Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Easy Social Ontology (PDF)

Morning and Evening

 Now the commemoration of the passion that takes place daily on the altar in the offering of this sacrifice is signified by the perpetual sacrifice that was made at morning and evening. In the morning for the grace of strength, since in this life we require it in the morning that we may merit, but in the evening in dangerous weakness, since then we need the sacrament for viaticum. Both of these are spoken of in Psalm 141.2, "Let my prayer be directed as" -- supply "morning" -- "incense in your sight; the lifting up of my hand" -- supply "in the commendation of [my] soul" -- "as the evening sacrifice." [Eccl 11.6] "In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening let not your hand cease; for you know not which may rather spring up, this or that: and if both together, it shall be better."

[Albert the Great, On the Body of the Lord, Surmanski, tr., The Catholic University of America Press (Washington, DC: 2017.]

Habitude V

 To the fourth one proceeds thus.  It seems that it is not necessary that there be habitudes. For habitude is that by which something is disposed well or badly to something, as was said. But something is disposed well or badly by its form, for something is good according to its form, as also being. Therefore it is not a necessity that there is habitude.

Further, habitude involves order to act. But power sufficiently involves principle of act, for even natural powers without habitudes are principles for act. Therefore it is not necessary that there be habitude.

Further, just as power has itself toward good and bad, so also habitude, and just as power does not always act, so neither does habitude. Powers existing, therefore, it is superfluous that there be habitude.

But contrariwise is that habitudes are sorts of completions, as is said in Phys. VII, but completion is maximally necessary for a thing, because it has the notion of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there be habitude.

I reply that it must be said that, just as it was said above, that habitude involves a sort of disposition in order to the nature of a thing, and to its operation or end, according to which something is disposed well or badly to it. But to this, that something needs to be disposed to another, three things are required. 

(1) First, that what is disposed be other than that to which it is disposed, and thus that it have itself to it as potential to actual. Thus if there is something whose nature is not composed of potential and actual, and whose substance is its working, so that it is for itself, then habitude or disposition has no place, as is clear with God. 

(2) Second, it is required that what is potential to another is determined in many ways and to diverse things. Thus if something is potential to another, but in such a way that it is not potential except to the same thing, then disposition and habitude have no place, because such subject from its nature has due having [habitudinem] to such act. Thus if heavenly body is composed from matter and form, then because that matter is not potential to another form, as was said in the first place, then disposition or habitude to form, or even to working, has no place there, because the nature of heavenly body is not potential except to one determinate change. 

(3) Third, it is required that several things, which are able to be commensurated in diverse ways, concur to disposing the subject to one of the things to which it is disposed, so that it is disposed well or badly to form or to working. Thus the simple qualities of the elements, which concur [conveniunt] in one determinate way to the natures of the elements, we do not call dispositions or habitudes, but simple qualities; but we call dispositions or habitudes health, or beauty, or suchlike, which involve a sort of commensuration of several things that can be commensurated in diverse ways. Because of this, the Philosopher says in Metaphys. V, that habitude is disposition, and disposition is order of what has parts either according to place or according to power or according to species; as was said above. 

Therefore because there are many beings to whose natures and workings it is necessary for several things to concur that can be commensurated in diverse ways, it is therefore necessary that there be habitudes.

Therefore to the first it must be said that the nature of a thing is completed by form, but it is necessary that in order to the form the subject be disposed by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordered to working, which is either an end or a way to an end. And if a form has only one determinate such working, no other disposition is required for the working, beyond the form itself. But if it is a form of such kind that it can work in diverse ways, as is a soul, it must be disposed to its workings by some habitudes.

To the second it must be said that power sometimes has itself toward many things, and then it must be determined by something other; but if there is some power that does not have itself toward many things, it does not need a determining habitude, as was said. And because of this natural forces do not enact their workings by way of some habitudes, because according to themselves they are determinate to one.

To the third it must be said that it is not the same habitude that has itself toward good and bad, as will be clear below, but the same power has itself toward good and bad. And therefore habitudes are necessary so that the powers may be determined to good.

[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.49.4, my translation. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here.]

Thus the definition of habitude that we have at this point is something like, Habitude is an acquired quality ordering the nature of some subject (either directly or by way of some power) either well or badly to some specific act (either form or operation) by mutually disposing several things to one out of several possibilities. In this definition, accidental quality involving order to act, seems to be the primarily formal cause; the act seems the final cause; the quasi-material cause seems to be the several things disposed; and the quasi-efficient cause the subject (as the principle of the accidental quality). But there are several ambiguities and thus parts that are still unclear. Note for instance, that this argument tells us that the following things don't need habitudes:

(a) simple things, like God
(b) things determinate to one action, like celestial bodies
(c) things where action does not arise from several mutually adjustable things, like natural forces or simple elemental qualities

But it's not clear that this is exhaustive, and there are several other questions Aquinas will have to answer to clarify the matter. Angels, for instance, are simple, but are they simple enough? (Aquinas will argue that they are not; angels also require habitudes, although in a different way than we do.) Beasts and plants can be classed as 'determinate to one' or not 'determinate to one', depending on how strictly we take that. Do they have habitudes? (This is a more complicated question; very briefly, Aquinas will say that plants don't, and beasts only incompletely sometimes, if we are talking about habitude in strict sense.) And what about cases, like the intellect, the will, or, for that matter, angels again, in which we don't have parts in the ordinary sense? (Aquinas will argue that integral parts are not necessary; potential parts are sufficient.)