Thursday, February 14, 2008

What Would Socrates Do?

Mark Rowlands at "Secular Philosophy":

If Christians ask themselves ‘what would Jesus do?’ philosophers should, it seems, ask themselves, ‘What would Socrates do?’ It’s a long time since I read any of the Platonic dialogues, but if my memory is not deceiving me, Thrasymachus didn’t break down when Socrates cast doubt on his claim that ‘justice is the advantage of the stronger.’ But even if he had, I don’t think it would have stopped Socrates.

(HT: Philosophy, et cetera)

It's an interesting idea, and a good one, I think; but asking 'What Would Socrates Do?' is a heftier responsibility than it might seem. In my intro course I've just started teaching (for the ancient philosophy section of the course) Plato's Gorgias, which in its own way is precisely about what Socrates did, about what a Socrates does, in the face of people like Thrasymachus (except, of course, that it's Callicles rather than Thrasymachus). And the point is twofold: rather than merely chattering about justice, Socrates lived a just life and taught justice that way, and he did not shirk doing so even when they killed him for it. I think it's a great thing to ask the question, "What would Socrates do?" But as St. Justin Martyr hints in reflecting on Socrates, if you are really taking the question seriously you have to be willing to die for the answer, the whole answer, and not just the parts that are convenient. If justice is the better part, and you follow Socrates, it is in the most fundamental sense the better part even if by every ordinary standard it is the worse part; even if the absolute triumph of injustice is guaranteed. It is something to which you must stick even when the Sophists are clearly going to defeat you -- and sooner or later they always do. As Boethius muses in the Consolation, the victory of the partisans of Lady Philosophy is often one of "victorious death." You know you are a philosopher when your view of true victory makes you yourself completely expendable in the cause of truth and justice.

Wednesday, February 13, 2008

Straw Man and Weak Man

There is an article on straw man fallacy in the Scientific American (the authors are Yvonne Raley of Felician College and Robert Talisse of Vanderbilt). It is not, I think, a very strong essay even granted that it's not intended to be a rigorous one. The constant problem we face in handling informal fallacies is that they all have two aspects. As I've said before:

Any communicated argument will...involve both reasoning and rhetoric; but the two cannot be simply conflated. You can use the same tactic of reasoning with a very different tactic of rhetoric, and vice versa. So we need to distinguish the two.


Fallacies like ad hominem, ad misericordiam, etc. turn out to be various rhetorical formats of the one fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. But what is the rational fallacy in straw man? It would appear at first glance that it is also a form of ignoratio elenchi: it leaves the other person's position unrefuted by presenting a different position (a weaker one) than it. But if this is so, not every simplification, or even obvious oversimplification, of an opponent's arguments would be a straw man. It would only be those cases where the oversimplification has so changed the nature of the position that a refutation of that position can have no bearing on, is for all practical purposes irrelevant to, the original position. Thus to show that something is a straw man it is not enough to note that it oversimplifies, or even misrepresents through its oversimplification, the original position; it has to be shown that the misrepresentation is serious enough that knocking it down doesn't introduce anything that tells against the original position.

Thus it seems to me that Raley and Talisse keep confusing the rhetorical and the rational aspects of the informal fallacy in their essay; they identify a rhetorical tactic, simplification of the opposing position, but incorrectly assume that the tactic itself is fallacious. (A good example is the Bill Clinton example: no doubt this does simplify Dole's position, but the point would seem to be not refutation of Dole's position, but a proposed contrast of the general sort of position Clinton wished to support with what he saw, or wished people to see, as the general sort of position Dole wished to support.) In reality, since straw man fallacy is a fallacy of irrelevance, this rhetorical tactic isn't shown to be a straw man unless we have shown it to introduce irrelevance.

As for the "twist" on the straw man that they talk about, the "weak man fallacy," it is, as far as I can see, no fallacy at all: it is simply the argumentative strategy of attacking weak arguments. Raley and Talisse's examples do a fair enough job of showing why this is often a faulty argumentative strategy; but fallacy and bad or even misleading strategy are different things.

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

A Mix Tape for Lent

* Stacie Orrico, More to Life

* Tim Eriksen and Cassie Franklin, And Am I Born to Die?

* Alison Krauss, Down in the River to Pray

* Deborah Liv Johnson, What Wondrous Love Is This

* Kansas, Dust in the Wind

* Agnus Dei from Franz Schubert Mass no. 6 in E flat major

* Skillet, Rebirthing

* Kathryn Scott, When I Survey the Wondrous Cross (best for last)

Sabor de bien que es finito

Sabor de bien que es finito
Lo más que puede llegar
Es cansar el apetito
Y estragar el paladar.
Y así, por toda dulzura
Nunca yo me perderé,
Sino por un no sé qué
Que se halla por ventura.


From St. Juan de la Cruz, "Glosa a lo Divino". A rough, quick translation:

The taste of finite good:
the most it can give
is the tiring of the appetite
and the ruining of the palate.
And so even for all sweetness
I will never lose myself,
but for an I-know-not-what
that fortunately is found.

But "por ventura" as a poetic expression is somewhat tricky; it can mean fortunately, happily, by chance, as luck would have it, and so forth. "Fortunately" and "happily" with their association with chance (fortune in the one case and happenstance in the other) perhaps do the best.

Sunday, February 10, 2008

The Punctuation of Political Power

Section 8 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution begins:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;....


Browsing about, I came across an interesting passage about this in Noah Knowles Davis's Elements of Deductive Logic, speaking of ambiguity and punctuation:

After the word "excises" a semicolon is frequently printed, whereas in the original draft, and in the authorized edition of March 3, 1877, it is followed by a comma. Alexander Hamilton held that the items of the rest of the section are additional powers; Madison, that they are limitations. The semicolon enlarges federal authority; the comma favors state-rights. (p. 188)


That is, if we take the punctuation after "excises" to be a semi-stop, the above passage says:

Congress shall have the power
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
and
to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States (as long as all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States)

And then it goes to enumerate powers beyond these two. But if we take the punctuation after "excises" to be a pause, the above passage says:

Congress shall have the power
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, in order to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States (but all of these duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States).

This confines the Congressional power with regard to taxation to three purposes: paying debts, providing for common defense, and providing for general welfare; i.e., Congress can't tax unless it is explicitly for one of these purposes, and this is one power.

As Davis says, the comma is standard; but, of course, it's a different question whether it should be read literally or instead as a sort of colloquial semicolon. As things stand, we publish it as a comma but in practice we treat it as a semicolon, at least to the extent that we do not require Congress to make explicit the purpose of each tax, but allow it to raise taxes and then decide how it will be apportioned (and, again, do not require that Congress make clear in each and every case how this apportionment is related to the three purposes). This is a state of affairs somewhat uncomfortable for those of us who are partisans of the Comma Theory of Taxation.

Whewell Revived

I was interested in the following, seen at Bede's Journal:

In an excellent recent article for the New York Times, Steven Pinker outlined current research into the evolutionary origin of morality. He explains how researchers have shown that morality can been categorised into five universal headings: fairness, purity, authority, harm and community. Translated into language that we all understand, these five categories mean: do unto others as you would have done to you; do not commit adultery; honour your father and mother; do no murder; and do not covet your neighbour’s ox. Although there are huge variations in morals in different societies, Pinker is convincing that all fit into these categories.


One of the things that struck me was that this is actually fairly similar to Whewell's view of moral order. Whewell holds that all our moral tendencies and conceptions tend to converge on an 'ideal center', the character of the good man, which is characterized by what he calls the five cardinal virtues: benevolence, justice, truth, purity, and order. And there seems to be at least a rough correspondence between the moral universals described by Whewell and those described by Pinker as the result of recent research:

Fairness : Justice
Purity : Purity
Authority : Order
Harm(lessness) : Benevolence
Community : Truth

The last correspondence may not be immediately obvious, but it becomes more clear from Whewell's discussions of the Virtue of Truth, in which Truth is always a social and communal virtue, necessary because it makes community possible (it establishes a "Common Understanding" without which community relations are impossible) and allows the development of law and social interaction.

Mill on the Purpose of Universities

I came across this quotation of Mill while reading Alexander Campbell Fraser's Biographia Philosophica: A Retrospect (chapter VI), but I'm unable to find the source in Mill. Does anyone know it?

Text not available
 Biographia Philosophica: A Retrospect By Alexander Campbell Fraser

UPDATE: Miriam Burstein identifies the source in Dissertations and Discussions. It is, somewhat (although not wholly) unexpectedly, an early (very early -- 1835) defense of utilitarianism against one of its major critics, Adam Sedgwick, in his Discourse on the Studies of the University. The criticism apparently had no effect, since in the 1850 edition Sedgwick inserted a note saying that he did not change one sentence of his attack on the utilitarian theory of morals because his views on that subject had not changed.