Since I had discussed the topic before, I thought I'd point out that a number of faculty have written a letter on the Cofnas controversy; although Alfano is a signatory, it is a far better and more professional response than Alfano's original mess. Indeed, the only problem with it is that Alfano should absolutely not have been a signatory to this. In the original controversy, he (1) violated basic norms of professional decency by demanding the humiliation of the editors of the journal from the get-go; (2) violated basic professional ethics by publicly threatening to destroy the career of the graduate student in question; (3) incompetently argued that the problem with the paper was that it didn't consider whether environmentally based rather than biologically based racism might be true, as I pointed out in my original post. His name on this inevitably raises the question of whether this is in fact a part of an ongoing unprofessional vendetta.
The authors of the letter are complaining that the editors refused to publish it. It was probably ill-advised not to do so, although I can't say I'm all that surprised; from the perspective of the editors it must read as if, having blatantly attempted to ruin their careers and failed, the same people are back trying to do it again more indirectly. Nonetheless, in terms of content, it's much closer to what should have been done in the first place; even the passive-aggressive insinuations scattered throughout are well within the bounds of everyday academic cattiness.
Monday, June 15, 2020
Sunday, June 14, 2020
The Three Grand Requisites
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England has a brief discussion of the nature of law; the theory of law that is used is a simplified natural law theory, although one that shares a number of features with more positivistic theories. In any case, he has an interesting discussion about law that take it to be closely tied to power, wisdom, and goodness. The account starts at the top, with God ordering the human world according to law. How do we fall under this law?
(1) We are dependent beings, and our dependency means our life is structured by rules determined by that on which we depend. However, our dependency is one of being created, which means it is in this sense a total dependency; we have free will, but this, too, is dependent on divine creation. Thus we fall under law because we fall within the scope of God's infinite power.
(2) God does not merely have infinite power; He is infinitely wise, as well. Considering only divine power, God could will any laws at all; but God's power over us is ordained or ordered power, governed by infinite wisdom. Thus, says Blackstone, "he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of juftice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept"; our minds have been made to be able to recognize these "eternal immutable laws of good and evil", at least to the extent that is necessary for human life.
(3) However, while reason can discover these immutable principles, this cannot be adequate of itself, because doing so requires some difficult thinking, far too much to cover all of our practical life. Thus God's infinite goodness comes into the picture. God has made us so that we have a natural impulse to do the right thing; in particular, our self-love or drive for happiness, carries us in the direction of what is right, because our happiness and justice are interwoven. Thus "pursue your own happiness" is in itself a kind of natural summary of what we must do to live well: "This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law."*
Power, wisdom, and goodness are not found only in natural law, of course; we have no reason to obey laws except so far as they can be traced to these three, even if they are positive laws:
We find a similar view -- that power, wisdom, and goodness are required for authority of government -- in Josiah Tucker's later anti-Lockean work, A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, Part II, Chapter III:
Tucker then uses this as a framework for assessing different forms of government. Absolute monarchy, requiring less coordination, most clearly exhibits power, but monarchs are also often deficient in wisdom and goodness. Hereditary aristocracy suffers from the same problems, and lacks the chief advantage of monarchy, "that Glare of Glory, which surrounds a Throne"; it is weak because of its division. It fares better than absolute monarchy with regard to wisdom; actual aristocrats tend to be actively involved in various aspects of the business and practical life of the realm, and so a large aristocracy is guaranteed to bring into their policies an extent and depth of experience far beyond what any absolute monarch could.** Further, aristocracy tends to do better than absolute monarchy in goodness; they tend to commit fewer abuses, except where they are driven by jealous protection of their privileges. Democracy -- real democracy, where everything is directly or indirectly put to the votes of the people themselves -- suffers even more completely the disadvantages that arise from division, and thus is a weak government indeed; and democracies do very poorly with regard to wisdom, since they are liable to mob injustices, and with regard to goodness, since their benevolence is unstable at best.
On the basis of this, Tucker makes the standard argument for the excellence of the British Constitution (as it stood in the eighteenth century): as a mixed government combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy in checks and balances with each other, it can minimize the dangers of each, even if it occasionally loses out on their strengths, and he argues that it does it better than "the Gothic Constitution", i.e., what we would call feudalism or manorialism, and better than the classicizing republics that the modern period introduces into Europe and America. He does, however, point out a number of ways in which he thinks it is defective and could be improved (he thinks in particular that it is thrown off balance by the possession of overseas colonies and that its democratic aspect has a number of problems and is in the way of becoming even more disordered under the influence of Locke's political philosophy).***
------------
* This is, of course, the idea behind the notion of the "pursuit of happiness" as a foundational right in the Declaration of Independence, although the idea is not exclusive to Blackstone and there is a scholarly dispute about whether Blackstone is the primary influence -- Jefferson had a somewhat mixed view of Blackstone, but did know him, and Blackstone's popularity as a compendium of law made him a natural source of vocabulary when you wanted to be widely understood. In any case, we could just as easily talk about the right to life, liberty, and virtue.
** We tend, on the basis of fiction, to think of aristocrats as lolling about doing nothing except attending parties and social events, but this is never true in practice except where the aristocracy has been deliberately neutered -- historically, aristocrats are busy managing estates, working as landlords, and organizing military units, until a centralizing power tries to limit their influence by pulling them to court, where one gets something like the decadence recognized in fiction.
*** I'll use this occasion for some rambling. I find Tucker particularly interesting because his conclusions, at least, are fairly similar to my own. Speaking abstractly and only of ideal government, I think parliamentary monarchy is probably the best form of government that we have discovered and that Britain (almost entirely accidentally) managed to stumble on the form of parliamentary monarchy that most closely approximated the ideal somewhere between the accession of Queen Anne and early Victoria, and that it failed to hold onto it in part because it was not merely a United Kingdom but an Empire. Imperial distortions of the power balance led to the overgrowth of the effective power of the Commons at the expense of Crown and Peerage until they reached their almost vestigial forms today, uselessly flapping around like tiny wings on the body of a turkey bred to be so large that it can barely waddle around.
Of course, 'ideal government' is ideal, not actual, and not always practical; the single most important desideratum for government is not that it approximate the ideal but that it grow organically in a way appropriate to the customs and lives of its actual people. I have a much higher respect for the American Republic than Tucker, and think it, despite its many flaws, still one of the best forms of actual government that has ever been developed; and, regardless, Americans have republican habits and would not know what to do with a Crown and Parliament, much as the British have political habits that (despite the wishful thinking of British republicans) would not stead them well at all in a republic.
I often think of quangos: the British have entities that they call "quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations". Americans have something like them, too; we call them "independent government agencies". I think these completely opposed uses of the term 'government' capture more than a merely accidental difference between British and American English; they capture completely opposed habits of thinking about governance. There's a reason why American monarchists and British republicans seem increasingly kooky the more you talk to them; they are enamored of a scheme, and may even have excellent arguments for it, but their patterns of thought and political habits are all wrong for the scheme they are concocting. Every time I have talked with British republicans, it eventually becomes manifest that they have no idea how power works in a republic; they lack the weird instinctive mixture of paranoia of power, cunning hyperlegalism, casual magnanimity, and jealous protectiveness of what's yours (in an expansive sense of 'yours') that is found in a people born and bred to long-lived republican ideals. Any republic actually implemented by British republicans would become a third-world dictatorship within a matter of decades; they don't even know what to be suspicious of, and while some might turn out to be quick studies, most people can't shift that drastically. Americans have always been weak on understanding our own behavior, but we are nonetheless, even in these decadent times, excelled by no one when it comes to acting like we live in a republic, even (perhaps especially) when we aren't thinking about it; and we would continue doing so even if we became a monarchy, to chaos and confusion everywhere. But Americans are not particularly tempted to unsuitable monarchical schemes (our temptation when it comes to unsuitable and artificial kookery lies toward democratic utopianism), whereas I think the British are much more tempted by the thought that they could just become a republic tomorrow if they wanted. It's a dangerous error.
Which is not, of course, to say that these things are set in stone. Our republic-mindedness has been weakened by bread and circuses, or in modern terms, healthcare and Hollywood; that is to say, we have let ourselves give in to the temptation to allow consolidations of power we should not have allowed, on the excuse of a better life and more choices, and created dependencies that slowly eat away at our native suspicion of government in any form. And half the world is slowly being Americanized, willy-nilly, regardless of their own political customs. But a good fit between scheme of government and political habits of mind is far more important than the precise structure of the former.
(1) We are dependent beings, and our dependency means our life is structured by rules determined by that on which we depend. However, our dependency is one of being created, which means it is in this sense a total dependency; we have free will, but this, too, is dependent on divine creation. Thus we fall under law because we fall within the scope of God's infinite power.
(2) God does not merely have infinite power; He is infinitely wise, as well. Considering only divine power, God could will any laws at all; but God's power over us is ordained or ordered power, governed by infinite wisdom. Thus, says Blackstone, "he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of juftice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept"; our minds have been made to be able to recognize these "eternal immutable laws of good and evil", at least to the extent that is necessary for human life.
(3) However, while reason can discover these immutable principles, this cannot be adequate of itself, because doing so requires some difficult thinking, far too much to cover all of our practical life. Thus God's infinite goodness comes into the picture. God has made us so that we have a natural impulse to do the right thing; in particular, our self-love or drive for happiness, carries us in the direction of what is right, because our happiness and justice are interwoven. Thus "pursue your own happiness" is in itself a kind of natural summary of what we must do to live well: "This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law."*
Power, wisdom, and goodness are not found only in natural law, of course; we have no reason to obey laws except so far as they can be traced to these three, even if they are positive laws:
For when society is once formed, government results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order. Unless some superior were constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their several rights, and redress their several wrongs. But, as all the members of society are naturally equal, it may be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cases has occasioned one half of those mischiefs which are apt to proceed from misguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be reposed in such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which are among the attributes of him who is emphatically stiled the supreme being; the three grand requisites, I mean, of wisdom, of goodness, and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every well constituted frame of government.
We find a similar view -- that power, wisdom, and goodness are required for authority of government -- in Josiah Tucker's later anti-Lockean work, A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, Part II, Chapter III:
[T]here must be Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, subsisting in one Degree or other, in every Government worthy to be so called, let the exterior Form of it be whatever it may.
For Example, without Power the very Idea of Government is annihilated; and there are no Traces of it left.
Without Wisdom to conduct this Power towards some certain End, or Object, the Thing itself would not be Power, in a moral Sense, but blind Impulse, or mechanic Force.
And without Goodness to influence and incline the Operations both of Wisdom and Power towards some benevolent Uses, conducive to public Happiness, the Efforts of Wisdom would in effect be Knavery, Trick, and Cunning; and the Display of Power mere Tyranny and Oppression. There must therefore be a Coalition, or Co-operation of all three, in order to form a Government fit to rule over such a Creature as Man.
Tucker then uses this as a framework for assessing different forms of government. Absolute monarchy, requiring less coordination, most clearly exhibits power, but monarchs are also often deficient in wisdom and goodness. Hereditary aristocracy suffers from the same problems, and lacks the chief advantage of monarchy, "that Glare of Glory, which surrounds a Throne"; it is weak because of its division. It fares better than absolute monarchy with regard to wisdom; actual aristocrats tend to be actively involved in various aspects of the business and practical life of the realm, and so a large aristocracy is guaranteed to bring into their policies an extent and depth of experience far beyond what any absolute monarch could.** Further, aristocracy tends to do better than absolute monarchy in goodness; they tend to commit fewer abuses, except where they are driven by jealous protection of their privileges. Democracy -- real democracy, where everything is directly or indirectly put to the votes of the people themselves -- suffers even more completely the disadvantages that arise from division, and thus is a weak government indeed; and democracies do very poorly with regard to wisdom, since they are liable to mob injustices, and with regard to goodness, since their benevolence is unstable at best.
On the basis of this, Tucker makes the standard argument for the excellence of the British Constitution (as it stood in the eighteenth century): as a mixed government combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy in checks and balances with each other, it can minimize the dangers of each, even if it occasionally loses out on their strengths, and he argues that it does it better than "the Gothic Constitution", i.e., what we would call feudalism or manorialism, and better than the classicizing republics that the modern period introduces into Europe and America. He does, however, point out a number of ways in which he thinks it is defective and could be improved (he thinks in particular that it is thrown off balance by the possession of overseas colonies and that its democratic aspect has a number of problems and is in the way of becoming even more disordered under the influence of Locke's political philosophy).***
------------
* This is, of course, the idea behind the notion of the "pursuit of happiness" as a foundational right in the Declaration of Independence, although the idea is not exclusive to Blackstone and there is a scholarly dispute about whether Blackstone is the primary influence -- Jefferson had a somewhat mixed view of Blackstone, but did know him, and Blackstone's popularity as a compendium of law made him a natural source of vocabulary when you wanted to be widely understood. In any case, we could just as easily talk about the right to life, liberty, and virtue.
** We tend, on the basis of fiction, to think of aristocrats as lolling about doing nothing except attending parties and social events, but this is never true in practice except where the aristocracy has been deliberately neutered -- historically, aristocrats are busy managing estates, working as landlords, and organizing military units, until a centralizing power tries to limit their influence by pulling them to court, where one gets something like the decadence recognized in fiction.
*** I'll use this occasion for some rambling. I find Tucker particularly interesting because his conclusions, at least, are fairly similar to my own. Speaking abstractly and only of ideal government, I think parliamentary monarchy is probably the best form of government that we have discovered and that Britain (almost entirely accidentally) managed to stumble on the form of parliamentary monarchy that most closely approximated the ideal somewhere between the accession of Queen Anne and early Victoria, and that it failed to hold onto it in part because it was not merely a United Kingdom but an Empire. Imperial distortions of the power balance led to the overgrowth of the effective power of the Commons at the expense of Crown and Peerage until they reached their almost vestigial forms today, uselessly flapping around like tiny wings on the body of a turkey bred to be so large that it can barely waddle around.
Of course, 'ideal government' is ideal, not actual, and not always practical; the single most important desideratum for government is not that it approximate the ideal but that it grow organically in a way appropriate to the customs and lives of its actual people. I have a much higher respect for the American Republic than Tucker, and think it, despite its many flaws, still one of the best forms of actual government that has ever been developed; and, regardless, Americans have republican habits and would not know what to do with a Crown and Parliament, much as the British have political habits that (despite the wishful thinking of British republicans) would not stead them well at all in a republic.
I often think of quangos: the British have entities that they call "quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations". Americans have something like them, too; we call them "independent government agencies". I think these completely opposed uses of the term 'government' capture more than a merely accidental difference between British and American English; they capture completely opposed habits of thinking about governance. There's a reason why American monarchists and British republicans seem increasingly kooky the more you talk to them; they are enamored of a scheme, and may even have excellent arguments for it, but their patterns of thought and political habits are all wrong for the scheme they are concocting. Every time I have talked with British republicans, it eventually becomes manifest that they have no idea how power works in a republic; they lack the weird instinctive mixture of paranoia of power, cunning hyperlegalism, casual magnanimity, and jealous protectiveness of what's yours (in an expansive sense of 'yours') that is found in a people born and bred to long-lived republican ideals. Any republic actually implemented by British republicans would become a third-world dictatorship within a matter of decades; they don't even know what to be suspicious of, and while some might turn out to be quick studies, most people can't shift that drastically. Americans have always been weak on understanding our own behavior, but we are nonetheless, even in these decadent times, excelled by no one when it comes to acting like we live in a republic, even (perhaps especially) when we aren't thinking about it; and we would continue doing so even if we became a monarchy, to chaos and confusion everywhere. But Americans are not particularly tempted to unsuitable monarchical schemes (our temptation when it comes to unsuitable and artificial kookery lies toward democratic utopianism), whereas I think the British are much more tempted by the thought that they could just become a republic tomorrow if they wanted. It's a dangerous error.
Which is not, of course, to say that these things are set in stone. Our republic-mindedness has been weakened by bread and circuses, or in modern terms, healthcare and Hollywood; that is to say, we have let ourselves give in to the temptation to allow consolidations of power we should not have allowed, on the excuse of a better life and more choices, and created dependencies that slowly eat away at our native suspicion of government in any form. And half the world is slowly being Americanized, willy-nilly, regardless of their own political customs. But a good fit between scheme of government and political habits of mind is far more important than the precise structure of the former.
Suppose a Change o' Cases
This poem has been with the blog almost since the beginning, and it never ceases to be relevant.
Address to the Unco Guid, Or the Rigidly Righteous
by Robert Burns
My Son, these maxims make a rule,
An' lump them aye thegither;
The Rigid Righteous is a fool,
The Rigid Wise anither:
The cleanest corn that ere was dight
May hae some pyles o' caff in;
So ne'er a fellow-creature slight
For random fits o' daffin.
Solomon.-Eccles. ch. vii. verse 16.
O ye wha are sae guid yoursel',
Sae pious and sae holy,
Ye've nought to do but mark and tell
Your neibours' fauts and folly!
Whase life is like a weel-gaun mill,
Supplied wi' store o' water;
The heaped happer's ebbing still,
An' still the clap plays clatter.
Hear me, ye venerable core,
As counsel for poor mortals
That frequent pass douce Wisdom's door
For glaikit Folly's portals:
I, for their thoughtless, careless sakes,
Would here propone defences-
Their donsie tricks, their black mistakes,
Their failings and mischances.
Ye see your state wi' theirs compared,
And shudder at the niffer;
But cast a moment's fair regard,
What maks the mighty differ;
Discount what scant occasion gave,
That purity ye pride in;
And (what's aft mair than a' the lave),
Your better art o' hidin.
Think, when your castigated pulse
Gies now and then a wallop!
What ragings must his veins convulse,
That still eternal gallop!
Wi' wind and tide fair i' your tail,
Right on ye scud your sea-way;
But in the teeth o' baith to sail,
It maks an unco lee-way.
See Social Life and Glee sit down,
All joyous and unthinking,
Till, quite transmugrified, they're grown
Debauchery and Drinking:
O would they stay to calculate
Th' eternal consequences;
Or your more dreaded hell to state,
Damnation of expenses!
Ye high, exalted, virtuous dames,
Tied up in godly laces,
Before ye gie poor Frailty names,
Suppose a change o' cases;
A dear-lov'd lad, convenience snug,
A treach'rous inclination-
But let me whisper i' your lug,
Ye're aiblins nae temptation.
Then gently scan your brother man,
Still gentler sister woman;
Tho' they may gang a kennin wrang,
To step aside is human:
One point must still be greatly dark, -
The moving Why they do it;
And just as lamely can ye mark,
How far perhaps they rue it.
Who made the heart, 'tis He alone
Decidedly can try us;
He knows each chord, its various tone,
Each spring, its various bias:
Then at the balance let's be mute,
We never can adjust it;
What's done we partly may compute,
But know not what's resisted.
Saturday, June 13, 2020
Doctor Evangelicus
Today is the feast of St. Anthony of Padua, Doctor of the Church. Born Fernando Martins de Bulhões in Lisbon in the 1190s, he joined the Franciscans and became renowned as a preacher.
The above painting, attributed to Francisco de Herrera the Elder, depicts St. Anthony and the Fish, one of the most famous stories about him. According to the legend, St. Anthony went to Rimini to preach, and the people there treated him very, very poorly, so he went to where the Marecchia River meets the sea and started preaching. As he preached, a large number of fish began to gather around, lifting their heads out of the water until he blessed and dismissed them. As the Little Flowers puts it,
The story is the inspiration for a very important early South American sermon, Fr. António Vieira's Sermão de Santo António aos Peixes, preached in São Luís, Brazil, on the St. Anthony's Day in 1654 -- which in that year was also June 13, since the day has been very stable through different calendar changes. In it Vieira, who had preached before on the importance of treating the indios well, but found his sermons falling on deaf ears, addressed his sermon to various kinds of fish, comparing them to the colonists in their various virtues and vices. (São Luís is on an island, so no doubt his congregation was already quite acquainted with fish.) Among other things, he compares the colonial treatment of the natives to big fish eating little fish alive. It's quite a tour de force; Vieira was perhaps the greatest Portuguese preacher of his day, and it shows. Shortly after the sermon, Vieira sailed back to Portugal and convinced King John IV to issue several decrees in the attempt to shield the natives from mistreatment. He made a lot of enemies over it, probably not helped by the fact that he was, for all of his good qualities, a rather arrogant and self-aggrandizing man. But flawed vessels sometimes hold good wine, and his St. Anthony sermon is a gem in the tradition of St. Anthony himself, both in style and in content.
_-_attributed_to_Francisco_de_Herrera_the_Elder_(Detroit_Institute_of_Arts).png)
The above painting, attributed to Francisco de Herrera the Elder, depicts St. Anthony and the Fish, one of the most famous stories about him. According to the legend, St. Anthony went to Rimini to preach, and the people there treated him very, very poorly, so he went to where the Marecchia River meets the sea and started preaching. As he preached, a large number of fish began to gather around, lifting their heads out of the water until he blessed and dismissed them. As the Little Flowers puts it,
St Anthony, seeing the reverence of the fish towards their Creator, rejoiced greatly in spirit, and said with a loud voice: "Blessed be the eternal God; for the fishes of the sea honour him more than men without faith, and animals without reason listen to his word with greater attention than sinful heretics."
And whilst St Anthony was preaching, the number of fishes increased, and none of them left the place that he had chosen. And the people of the city hearing of the miracle, made haste to go and witness it.
The story is the inspiration for a very important early South American sermon, Fr. António Vieira's Sermão de Santo António aos Peixes, preached in São Luís, Brazil, on the St. Anthony's Day in 1654 -- which in that year was also June 13, since the day has been very stable through different calendar changes. In it Vieira, who had preached before on the importance of treating the indios well, but found his sermons falling on deaf ears, addressed his sermon to various kinds of fish, comparing them to the colonists in their various virtues and vices. (São Luís is on an island, so no doubt his congregation was already quite acquainted with fish.) Among other things, he compares the colonial treatment of the natives to big fish eating little fish alive. It's quite a tour de force; Vieira was perhaps the greatest Portuguese preacher of his day, and it shows. Shortly after the sermon, Vieira sailed back to Portugal and convinced King John IV to issue several decrees in the attempt to shield the natives from mistreatment. He made a lot of enemies over it, probably not helped by the fact that he was, for all of his good qualities, a rather arrogant and self-aggrandizing man. But flawed vessels sometimes hold good wine, and his St. Anthony sermon is a gem in the tradition of St. Anthony himself, both in style and in content.
Friday, June 12, 2020
Dashed Off XII
melka (holy leaven) and the charism of the East
- holy leaven doesn't actually leaven; it is a residue, a material tradition; the Church of the East takes it as essential to the consecration (Eucharist without it is treated as invalid)
- earliest attestation seems to be to Catholicos Yohannan V bar Abgare (900-905); his canonical decrees require two leavenings, one consecrated and one unconsecrated
- the Assyrian theologians parallel the leaven with the Holy Oil of the Apostles used for baptism & only for baptism
Pohle & Preuss object to the sacramentalia hexameter, 'orans, tinctus, edeus, confessus, dans, benedicens' that orans, confessus, and dans are not properly sacramentals, but surely this is to miss the point, which is that there are sacramentals properly dependent on and associated with (And thus traced back or reduced to) these three.
Note that Datta takes the Western tradition of philosophy to be in general a two-pramana tradition.
mind as known by perception, as known by inference, as known by testimony, as known by arthapatta (circumstantial supposition)
What is accredited to us as morally good must be ours, but reason is social, and nothing can be ours without the aid of others.
A service of the heart must be expressed in signs; a service of the heart to God must be expressed in signs as God reveals to be appropriate.
Prayer is not a merely internal ritual, nor is church-going a merely external one.
We may indeed anticipate God's giving of grace because our existence, and that of the whole world, is already a work of grace.
The Notion of Sacrament in General
A. The Need for Something Like Sacrament
--- 1. Fruition and Use
--- 2. Original and Actual Sin
--- 3. The Definition of a Sacrament
B. General Sacrament
--- 1. Christ
--- 2. Church
C. Sacrament Under Natural Law
D. Sacrament Under Old Covenant
E. Sacrament Under New Covenant
F. Major Sacraments
--- 1. Number
--- 2. Institution
G. Minor Sacraments
right-in-some-respect reasons (constitutive) vs. suggestive-of-something-right reasons
Adequacy of propositions to what they are about generally depends on more adequate propositions, which series converges on real definitions.
Philosophical interestingness is always relative to problems within a context of inquiry.
occasional → eclectic → systematic
Materials are sometimes ripe for classification. This 'ripeness for classification' is an important concept for philosophy of classification.
condign and congruous rights
to honor victory with revel
Provocation and outrage are pushed in order to force opinions; in an opinion nation, not having an opinion is itself regarded as resistance.
the danger of confusing apathy and restraint in opining
the modernist confusion of identity with kinship-feeling (connected with its confusion of identity and self-identification)
Every sacrament has aesthetic, ethical, metaphysical, and salvation-historical levels, and at each level it functions as sign and thing.
the ascetic discipline of suspension of judgment
sacraments as rituals of unity
It follows from Russell's account of names and descriptions that the distinction is not one of language used (despite how it is often presented even by Russell) but of the use to which the language is put.
History becomes relevant to causation only by way of some sort of aptitude or memory or stored trace.
dainty & dumpy as aesthetic terms
Even small-t traditions in the Church, if long-term, deserve some respect as the inherited experience of many generations.
rites: (1) background contrast; (2) machinery of rite; (3) acts; (4) standards of acceptability; (5) style of performance
pre-evangelization
"We must, however, distinguish accurately between three things which are different in this sacrament, namely, the visible form, the truth of the body, and the spiritual power. The form is of the bread and wine; the truth, of the flesh and blood; the power, of unity and charity. The first is the sacramentum et non res, the second the sacramentum et res, the third the res et non sacramentum. The first is sacrament of a twofold res; the second, however, is sacrament of one and res of another; but the third is the res of a twofold sacrament." Innocent III Cum Marthae circa (D 415)
Are occult heretics included in the church?
Yes: Bellarmine (De eccl. mil. 3 ch. 10)
--- Tanquerey (Synopsis Th. Dog. Vol 1. n. 903)
No: Suarez (De fide d9s1nn5.13.18)
--- Molina (Concordia p3q14a13d46n18)
--- Franzelin (Theses de Ecc. Chr. th. 23)
Are manifest material heretics in the church?
Yes: Franzelin (Theses, th. 23)
No: Various
Are manifest formal heretics in the church?
Yes: Franzelin (Theses, th 22)
--- Tanquerey (Synopsis vol 1 n903-904)
No: ?
[Cp. Fr. Salaverri, Sacrae Theologiae Summa]
Reconciliation as tribunal of mercy
(1) contrition, confession, satisfaction
(2) keys
(3) seal
(4) jurisdiction
laws of nature // world-soul
"Everything is full of signs, and the one who understands one thing on the basis of another is a wise man of sorts." Plotinus (Enneads 2.3.7)
Receiving the heresies of those who suckle at her breast, the Church produces the antibodies, the countervailing factors, to protect those who receive her teaching.
Political reasoning always outruns proof.
Political speech tends to hyperbole, because political speech strives for, and sometimes strains for, an actual effect.
numbing vs. painful distress
"It is impossible to be potentially nothing." Plotinus (Enneads 2.5.1)
"People are generally better persuaded by reasons which they have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the mind of others." Pascal (Pensees 10)
executive power as substantive vs. executive power as management envelope
tripartite powers: ST Supp.32.6
efficacy of sacraments
Baptism: Eph 5:26
Confirmation: Acts 8:17
Eucharist: Jn 6:57ff
Penance: Jn 20:22ff
Unction: Jas 5:14
Orders: II Tim 1:6
Pohle & Preuss argue that sacraments have no physical causality because physical causality
(1) is unprovable: all the grounds for it merely show efficacy, for which moral causality suffices.
--But note that they have to characterize some of the characterizations as 'exaggerations'
--and their surprise and mystery argument (esp. for baptismal water) misses the point: it is not the mysteriousness bu the directness and strength of patristic claims that is relevant.
(2) is unintelligible, because (a) the whole sacramental sign never exists simultaneously
-- this would tell as directly against moral causality
(b) reviviscentia sacramentorum
-- the same argument would tell against moral causality
----- The problem is that Pohle & Preuss assume moral causality is immune to the need for principles required to have any causality at all (action presupposes being, presence, etc.).
patience : unction :: repentance : penance
the sacramental economy springing from each sacrament as having the structure of the Temple
Universalism is a prediction that God will work a moral miracle.
Leo XIII on Scriptural inspiration (Providentissimus Deus)
(1) God inflames the will.
(2) God illumines the intellect.
(3) God supervises the work.
the power of the parent to act vicariously for the child
three works of oil of healing (Testament of Our Lord 1:25)
(1) set free those who suffer
(2) heal those who are sick
(3) sanctify those who return
To treat rituals are primarily expressive of experience is to treat them as epiphenomenal, or at least as passive -- merely done, and not themselves doing. But rituals are experience-forming, experience-guiding, and experience-transforming.
Morality is a condition for consistent cooperation (note that this is not to say that it is consistent cooperation, nor is consistent cooperation the only form of cooperation).
Every story aims at some good.
The genus of the appropriate method for a domain is implicit in the domain itself, but to determine the best in that genus is a matter of difficulty.
Positivisms are always the ghosts of dead metaphysics.
The distinction between 'being' and 'cat' is not merely a distinction between more and less general.
Mill's liberalism depends crucially on a form of skepticism that takes us never to be in a position to judge with certainty.
active violation, encroachment, posture of encroachment
anointing of the sick & non-dread, non-angst
Argument Equivalence and Implication
e.g., [Every dog is a mammal, therefore some dog is a mammal] is equivalent to [Every dog is a mammal, therefore some mammal is a dog]
immaculate conception → immaculate heart → queenship
immaculate conception → perpetual virginity → assumption
(1) the need for tribunals as remedies under law
(2) anticipative vs corrective tribunal
(3) conscience as anticipative tribunal
(4) two kinds of corrective tribunal: tribunal of justice, tribunal of mercy
(5) sacramental tribunal of mercy
(6) tribunal of Christ as both of justice and of mercy
(7) the final judgment
Physical well-being is not a single thing, but more like a vast and ever-changing market of complex trade-offs.
Your liberty does not really extend beyond the bounds of your authority.
socialims & the -ism mistake
the pastward and the futureward faces of the present
thing
as sign of divine ) as sign of higher things ) as formally structure ) as materially found ) as appearing
grace as subsidium (unction), as educative (matrimony), as vocative (confirmation), as consummative (eucharist), as productive of occasions of grace (orders)
It would be more accurate to say that we are 'browned-to appearingly' than 'appeared-to brownly'.
There are, in fact, phenomenal differences between dreaming and waking experiences -- a great many. It's judgment that is different between the two so as to make them hard to take into account.
(1) Consequentialism is inconsistent with strict naturalism.
(2) Consequentialism requires at least a moderately robust conception of abstract objects.
(3) Consequentialism is secularized divine providence.
(4) Consequentialism requires at least a minimal rationalism.
(5) Consequentialism requires a temporally privileged present.
-- 'required' in some of these cases may be practical rather than logical
Without a priori knowledge, we could not assess what would actually be for the *greatest* happiness of the greatest number. The best you could do would be to increase things that we've previously found associated with happiness in the past -- all attempt at *maximization* would be an exercise in stupidity.
Criminal justice reforms tend to overemphasize law reform and underemphasize enforcement reform, which is ultimately self-defeating.
Mammon rules by pretending to serve.
Pantheism confuses sign and signified; because of this, it confuses effect and cause.
It's remarkable how often 'hardcore materialists' treat laws of nature as if they were immaterial agents.
independent oversight, uniform regulation (that there are rules), general incentive (that they are enforced)
Liturgy is an imitation (mimesis) of heavenly prayer.
the eucatastrophe of the altar
Augustine -- baptism of desire - De bapt contr. Don. 4.22
On average, Mercury is the closest planet to every planet.
kinds of nonessential component for a sacrament
(1) means of facilitation
(2) safeguards against abuse
(3) chance incidentals
Mutual regard is the illumination of conversations.
"The most beautiful verses are not the ones with which one is busy all the time. They are the ones that have come all by themselves." Peguy
"nothing that is not first can be simple" Plotinus
probability // degree of overlap
Taj Mahal etc. as common beauty
-- the moral obligation to protect common beauty as part of common good
-- the possibility of sharing in 'being pleased'
The rogue too has his role in the city. (Enneads 3.2)
All temptations are sweet when they are temptations. More than a few are bitter when they are deeds.
mastery of passions as sign of immateriality of the soul (Pascal Pensees 349)
the aleatory aspect of reasoning itself (Pensees 370)
the skeptical ploy: to argue that, because some are extravagant, all might as well be considered so
"networks of counsel and aid" (Andrew Jones)
symbolic logic : philosophy :: rules of perspective : painting
geometric decomposition : drawing :: analysis : philosophy
- holy leaven doesn't actually leaven; it is a residue, a material tradition; the Church of the East takes it as essential to the consecration (Eucharist without it is treated as invalid)
- earliest attestation seems to be to Catholicos Yohannan V bar Abgare (900-905); his canonical decrees require two leavenings, one consecrated and one unconsecrated
- the Assyrian theologians parallel the leaven with the Holy Oil of the Apostles used for baptism & only for baptism
Pohle & Preuss object to the sacramentalia hexameter, 'orans, tinctus, edeus, confessus, dans, benedicens' that orans, confessus, and dans are not properly sacramentals, but surely this is to miss the point, which is that there are sacramentals properly dependent on and associated with (And thus traced back or reduced to) these three.
Note that Datta takes the Western tradition of philosophy to be in general a two-pramana tradition.
mind as known by perception, as known by inference, as known by testimony, as known by arthapatta (circumstantial supposition)
What is accredited to us as morally good must be ours, but reason is social, and nothing can be ours without the aid of others.
A service of the heart must be expressed in signs; a service of the heart to God must be expressed in signs as God reveals to be appropriate.
Prayer is not a merely internal ritual, nor is church-going a merely external one.
We may indeed anticipate God's giving of grace because our existence, and that of the whole world, is already a work of grace.
The Notion of Sacrament in General
A. The Need for Something Like Sacrament
--- 1. Fruition and Use
--- 2. Original and Actual Sin
--- 3. The Definition of a Sacrament
B. General Sacrament
--- 1. Christ
--- 2. Church
C. Sacrament Under Natural Law
D. Sacrament Under Old Covenant
E. Sacrament Under New Covenant
F. Major Sacraments
--- 1. Number
--- 2. Institution
G. Minor Sacraments
right-in-some-respect reasons (constitutive) vs. suggestive-of-something-right reasons
Adequacy of propositions to what they are about generally depends on more adequate propositions, which series converges on real definitions.
Philosophical interestingness is always relative to problems within a context of inquiry.
occasional → eclectic → systematic
Materials are sometimes ripe for classification. This 'ripeness for classification' is an important concept for philosophy of classification.
condign and congruous rights
to honor victory with revel
Provocation and outrage are pushed in order to force opinions; in an opinion nation, not having an opinion is itself regarded as resistance.
the danger of confusing apathy and restraint in opining
the modernist confusion of identity with kinship-feeling (connected with its confusion of identity and self-identification)
Every sacrament has aesthetic, ethical, metaphysical, and salvation-historical levels, and at each level it functions as sign and thing.
the ascetic discipline of suspension of judgment
sacraments as rituals of unity
It follows from Russell's account of names and descriptions that the distinction is not one of language used (despite how it is often presented even by Russell) but of the use to which the language is put.
History becomes relevant to causation only by way of some sort of aptitude or memory or stored trace.
dainty & dumpy as aesthetic terms
Even small-t traditions in the Church, if long-term, deserve some respect as the inherited experience of many generations.
rites: (1) background contrast; (2) machinery of rite; (3) acts; (4) standards of acceptability; (5) style of performance
pre-evangelization
"We must, however, distinguish accurately between three things which are different in this sacrament, namely, the visible form, the truth of the body, and the spiritual power. The form is of the bread and wine; the truth, of the flesh and blood; the power, of unity and charity. The first is the sacramentum et non res, the second the sacramentum et res, the third the res et non sacramentum. The first is sacrament of a twofold res; the second, however, is sacrament of one and res of another; but the third is the res of a twofold sacrament." Innocent III Cum Marthae circa (D 415)
Are occult heretics included in the church?
Yes: Bellarmine (De eccl. mil. 3 ch. 10)
--- Tanquerey (Synopsis Th. Dog. Vol 1. n. 903)
No: Suarez (De fide d9s1nn5.13.18)
--- Molina (Concordia p3q14a13d46n18)
--- Franzelin (Theses de Ecc. Chr. th. 23)
Are manifest material heretics in the church?
Yes: Franzelin (Theses, th. 23)
No: Various
Are manifest formal heretics in the church?
Yes: Franzelin (Theses, th 22)
--- Tanquerey (Synopsis vol 1 n903-904)
No: ?
[Cp. Fr. Salaverri, Sacrae Theologiae Summa]
Reconciliation as tribunal of mercy
(1) contrition, confession, satisfaction
(2) keys
(3) seal
(4) jurisdiction
laws of nature // world-soul
"Everything is full of signs, and the one who understands one thing on the basis of another is a wise man of sorts." Plotinus (Enneads 2.3.7)
Receiving the heresies of those who suckle at her breast, the Church produces the antibodies, the countervailing factors, to protect those who receive her teaching.
Political reasoning always outruns proof.
Political speech tends to hyperbole, because political speech strives for, and sometimes strains for, an actual effect.
numbing vs. painful distress
"It is impossible to be potentially nothing." Plotinus (Enneads 2.5.1)
"People are generally better persuaded by reasons which they have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the mind of others." Pascal (Pensees 10)
executive power as substantive vs. executive power as management envelope
tripartite powers: ST Supp.32.6
efficacy of sacraments
Baptism: Eph 5:26
Confirmation: Acts 8:17
Eucharist: Jn 6:57ff
Penance: Jn 20:22ff
Unction: Jas 5:14
Orders: II Tim 1:6
Pohle & Preuss argue that sacraments have no physical causality because physical causality
(1) is unprovable: all the grounds for it merely show efficacy, for which moral causality suffices.
--But note that they have to characterize some of the characterizations as 'exaggerations'
--and their surprise and mystery argument (esp. for baptismal water) misses the point: it is not the mysteriousness bu the directness and strength of patristic claims that is relevant.
(2) is unintelligible, because (a) the whole sacramental sign never exists simultaneously
-- this would tell as directly against moral causality
(b) reviviscentia sacramentorum
-- the same argument would tell against moral causality
----- The problem is that Pohle & Preuss assume moral causality is immune to the need for principles required to have any causality at all (action presupposes being, presence, etc.).
patience : unction :: repentance : penance
the sacramental economy springing from each sacrament as having the structure of the Temple
Universalism is a prediction that God will work a moral miracle.
Leo XIII on Scriptural inspiration (Providentissimus Deus)
(1) God inflames the will.
(2) God illumines the intellect.
(3) God supervises the work.
the power of the parent to act vicariously for the child
three works of oil of healing (Testament of Our Lord 1:25)
(1) set free those who suffer
(2) heal those who are sick
(3) sanctify those who return
To treat rituals are primarily expressive of experience is to treat them as epiphenomenal, or at least as passive -- merely done, and not themselves doing. But rituals are experience-forming, experience-guiding, and experience-transforming.
Morality is a condition for consistent cooperation (note that this is not to say that it is consistent cooperation, nor is consistent cooperation the only form of cooperation).
Every story aims at some good.
The genus of the appropriate method for a domain is implicit in the domain itself, but to determine the best in that genus is a matter of difficulty.
Positivisms are always the ghosts of dead metaphysics.
The distinction between 'being' and 'cat' is not merely a distinction between more and less general.
Mill's liberalism depends crucially on a form of skepticism that takes us never to be in a position to judge with certainty.
active violation, encroachment, posture of encroachment
anointing of the sick & non-dread, non-angst
Argument Equivalence and Implication
e.g., [Every dog is a mammal, therefore some dog is a mammal] is equivalent to [Every dog is a mammal, therefore some mammal is a dog]
immaculate conception → immaculate heart → queenship
immaculate conception → perpetual virginity → assumption
(1) the need for tribunals as remedies under law
(2) anticipative vs corrective tribunal
(3) conscience as anticipative tribunal
(4) two kinds of corrective tribunal: tribunal of justice, tribunal of mercy
(5) sacramental tribunal of mercy
(6) tribunal of Christ as both of justice and of mercy
(7) the final judgment
Physical well-being is not a single thing, but more like a vast and ever-changing market of complex trade-offs.
Your liberty does not really extend beyond the bounds of your authority.
socialims & the -ism mistake
the pastward and the futureward faces of the present
thing
as sign of divine ) as sign of higher things ) as formally structure ) as materially found ) as appearing
grace as subsidium (unction), as educative (matrimony), as vocative (confirmation), as consummative (eucharist), as productive of occasions of grace (orders)
It would be more accurate to say that we are 'browned-to appearingly' than 'appeared-to brownly'.
There are, in fact, phenomenal differences between dreaming and waking experiences -- a great many. It's judgment that is different between the two so as to make them hard to take into account.
(1) Consequentialism is inconsistent with strict naturalism.
(2) Consequentialism requires at least a moderately robust conception of abstract objects.
(3) Consequentialism is secularized divine providence.
(4) Consequentialism requires at least a minimal rationalism.
(5) Consequentialism requires a temporally privileged present.
-- 'required' in some of these cases may be practical rather than logical
Without a priori knowledge, we could not assess what would actually be for the *greatest* happiness of the greatest number. The best you could do would be to increase things that we've previously found associated with happiness in the past -- all attempt at *maximization* would be an exercise in stupidity.
Criminal justice reforms tend to overemphasize law reform and underemphasize enforcement reform, which is ultimately self-defeating.
Mammon rules by pretending to serve.
Pantheism confuses sign and signified; because of this, it confuses effect and cause.
It's remarkable how often 'hardcore materialists' treat laws of nature as if they were immaterial agents.
independent oversight, uniform regulation (that there are rules), general incentive (that they are enforced)
Liturgy is an imitation (mimesis) of heavenly prayer.
the eucatastrophe of the altar
Augustine -- baptism of desire - De bapt contr. Don. 4.22
On average, Mercury is the closest planet to every planet.
kinds of nonessential component for a sacrament
(1) means of facilitation
(2) safeguards against abuse
(3) chance incidentals
Mutual regard is the illumination of conversations.
"The most beautiful verses are not the ones with which one is busy all the time. They are the ones that have come all by themselves." Peguy
"nothing that is not first can be simple" Plotinus
probability // degree of overlap
Taj Mahal etc. as common beauty
-- the moral obligation to protect common beauty as part of common good
-- the possibility of sharing in 'being pleased'
The rogue too has his role in the city. (Enneads 3.2)
All temptations are sweet when they are temptations. More than a few are bitter when they are deeds.
mastery of passions as sign of immateriality of the soul (Pascal Pensees 349)
the aleatory aspect of reasoning itself (Pensees 370)
the skeptical ploy: to argue that, because some are extravagant, all might as well be considered so
"networks of counsel and aid" (Andrew Jones)
symbolic logic : philosophy :: rules of perspective : painting
geometric decomposition : drawing :: analysis : philosophy
Dharmyam Yuddham
A very interesting discussion of the ethics of war, partly explicit (i.e., expressly stated) and partly implicit (i.e., in context in the Mahabharata), found in the Bhagavad Gita:
Shyam Ranganathan, "Just War and the Indian Tradition: Arguments from the Battlefield"
The lesson of the Mahābhārata generalizes; conventional morality places constraints on people who are conventionally moral, and this enables the maleficence of those who act to undermine conventional morality by undermining those who bind themselves with it. Call the latter, who use conventional morality as a weapon against the conventionally moral, moral parasites (Kauravas) and the former, who are happy to be bound by conventional morality, moral conventionalists (Pāṇḍavas). The moral parasite is someone who, for instance, wishes you to be honest and to abide by conventions of transparency so they can steal from you. The moral parasite is someone who, for instance, wishes for you to behave in a manner that is courteous, kind, and accommodating so they can assault you, without resistance. The only way to end this relationship of parasitism is for the conventionally moral to give up on conventional morality and engage moral parasites in war. This would be a just war—dharmyaṃ yuddham—and the essence of a just war because the cause would be to rid the world of moral parasites. Yet, from the perspective of conventional morality, which encourages mutually accommodating behavior, this departure is wrong and bad. Indeed, relying purely on conventional standards that encourage social interaction for the promise of a good, an argument for pacifism is more easily constructed than an argument for war.
Shyam Ranganathan, "Just War and the Indian Tradition: Arguments from the Battlefield"
Thursday, June 11, 2020
Three Poem Re-Drafts
Kalaratri in the Starlight
Come now, come now, said her smile
as she leaned on the wooden fence;
come now, come now: a woman's voice
that coaxes and never relents.
She looked me over with sparkling eye
blushed and smiled once more,
flirted at me with glancing look,
with form that held good things in store.
My love is another's, I quietly said.
Though your deep eyes are bright,
Though you rise up with willow-tree grace,
My love's for another by right.
She smiled again, with softest of purrs
replied that true love left no choice:
when true lovers meet beneath a full moon
fate speaks in inexorable voice
of destiny laid from the first of the world
that cannot be turned or undone.
When she loved a man, that loving was sure,
and she loved, and I was the one.
But a bright, lovely girl awaits me, I know,
hopes to see me in clear morning light.
How can a man seek honor and truth
who dallies with strangers at night?
Ah, said the lady (as she drew near
with a brush of the warmth of her breath),
these frail mundane loves pass us like sighs;
I speak true, or my name is not Death.
Then she trickled her finger down the bridge of my nose,
took my face up with her hands;
she smiled at me beneath the cold stars
and we kissed, and I fell to the sand.
Udayana
Mighty of mind was great Udayana,
mighty in reason's ways;
his thought searched out the higher things
like hound that leaps and bays.
From lowest thing to holy God
in breadth and width and height,
he walked on reason's highways,
his reasons ever right.
Never wrong was great Udayana.
His inference was sure
and traveled straight like arrow-flight
and always would endure.
He was a great debater;
he could bring the point to close,
and the God-denying Buddhists
he held his foes of foes.
Before the king of Mithila
he debated a Buddhist long.
His words were clear. His subtleties
and arguments were strong,
and at the end the Buddhist,
though for debate renowned,
in defeat ran to the cliff
and cast his body down:
ashamed of having been so wrong,
ashamed of his guilt and pride,
ashamed of having doubted God,
he leaped from the cliff and died.
Repenting, the great Udayana
went down to the temple-place
and before the God whom he had proved
he knelt and bowed his face.
The God gave not a whisper.
The silence was cool and cold,
and, anguished, great Udayana
spoke out in anger bold.
"My life has been a service,"
he said, "to lead all minds to you,
and to the God-deniers
I showed that you were true.
Why, then, are you so silent?
My existence comes from yours,
but by my proof and reasons
your name with men endures."
Then a dream came to Udayana.
The God spoke the word, "Unclean,"
and a storm rose through the temple
and shook the temple-screen.
"You may argue, O Udayana,
and your arguments are sure,
but this is also true of God:
the God is wholly pure.
Let us take a proof, Udayana;
I will give it in a tale,
and by my proof know that proof,
if impure, comes to fail.
A philosopher like Udayana
when Brahman and Buddhist fought
led them to the mountain
and gave them the proof they sought.
Down he threw the Brahman.
'There is a God,' the Brahman said,
and set down like a downy feather,
unscratched in limb and head.
Again he threw the Buddhist,
who said to the wind that sighed,
'There is no God, all things must end,'
and, ending, the Buddhist died.
It was a certain proving,
in a way that none could hide,
with only one objection:
that the Buddhist monk had died.
And from the sun of heaven
the fire of judgment fell,
casting impure philosopher
to deepest pits of hell.
God is most pure, Udayana,
the greatest eminence of holy life,
and shuns the bloody-handed
and the stirrer-up of strife.
Unfit are you, Udayana,
though the truth may crown your head,
for though you spoke the truth of God,
by you man's blood is shed.
You have argued with godlike splendor
and your fellow men have awed;
your word of truth was light to man,
but darkness to the God."
Morning Walk
As dawn approaches, sky transforms its purple into blue
though moon still rides on summit high, a sliver yet to view;
under clouds is tinged with gold the edge of heaven's hem
and soon the sun will process in with glory's diadem.
A little coolness intertwines my limbs with gentle sighs
and moves the clouds in flock and herd across the clearing skies.
Your face is to my inward eye brought slowly into sight,
recalling how you once did smile with sudden, dawning light.
I walk alone. In memories I may still walk with you,
but memory is just one form of being lonely, too.
Come now, come now, said her smile
as she leaned on the wooden fence;
come now, come now: a woman's voice
that coaxes and never relents.
She looked me over with sparkling eye
blushed and smiled once more,
flirted at me with glancing look,
with form that held good things in store.
My love is another's, I quietly said.
Though your deep eyes are bright,
Though you rise up with willow-tree grace,
My love's for another by right.
She smiled again, with softest of purrs
replied that true love left no choice:
when true lovers meet beneath a full moon
fate speaks in inexorable voice
of destiny laid from the first of the world
that cannot be turned or undone.
When she loved a man, that loving was sure,
and she loved, and I was the one.
But a bright, lovely girl awaits me, I know,
hopes to see me in clear morning light.
How can a man seek honor and truth
who dallies with strangers at night?
Ah, said the lady (as she drew near
with a brush of the warmth of her breath),
these frail mundane loves pass us like sighs;
I speak true, or my name is not Death.
Then she trickled her finger down the bridge of my nose,
took my face up with her hands;
she smiled at me beneath the cold stars
and we kissed, and I fell to the sand.
Udayana
Mighty of mind was great Udayana,
mighty in reason's ways;
his thought searched out the higher things
like hound that leaps and bays.
From lowest thing to holy God
in breadth and width and height,
he walked on reason's highways,
his reasons ever right.
Never wrong was great Udayana.
His inference was sure
and traveled straight like arrow-flight
and always would endure.
He was a great debater;
he could bring the point to close,
and the God-denying Buddhists
he held his foes of foes.
Before the king of Mithila
he debated a Buddhist long.
His words were clear. His subtleties
and arguments were strong,
and at the end the Buddhist,
though for debate renowned,
in defeat ran to the cliff
and cast his body down:
ashamed of having been so wrong,
ashamed of his guilt and pride,
ashamed of having doubted God,
he leaped from the cliff and died.
Repenting, the great Udayana
went down to the temple-place
and before the God whom he had proved
he knelt and bowed his face.
The God gave not a whisper.
The silence was cool and cold,
and, anguished, great Udayana
spoke out in anger bold.
"My life has been a service,"
he said, "to lead all minds to you,
and to the God-deniers
I showed that you were true.
Why, then, are you so silent?
My existence comes from yours,
but by my proof and reasons
your name with men endures."
Then a dream came to Udayana.
The God spoke the word, "Unclean,"
and a storm rose through the temple
and shook the temple-screen.
"You may argue, O Udayana,
and your arguments are sure,
but this is also true of God:
the God is wholly pure.
Let us take a proof, Udayana;
I will give it in a tale,
and by my proof know that proof,
if impure, comes to fail.
A philosopher like Udayana
when Brahman and Buddhist fought
led them to the mountain
and gave them the proof they sought.
Down he threw the Brahman.
'There is a God,' the Brahman said,
and set down like a downy feather,
unscratched in limb and head.
Again he threw the Buddhist,
who said to the wind that sighed,
'There is no God, all things must end,'
and, ending, the Buddhist died.
It was a certain proving,
in a way that none could hide,
with only one objection:
that the Buddhist monk had died.
And from the sun of heaven
the fire of judgment fell,
casting impure philosopher
to deepest pits of hell.
God is most pure, Udayana,
the greatest eminence of holy life,
and shuns the bloody-handed
and the stirrer-up of strife.
Unfit are you, Udayana,
though the truth may crown your head,
for though you spoke the truth of God,
by you man's blood is shed.
You have argued with godlike splendor
and your fellow men have awed;
your word of truth was light to man,
but darkness to the God."
Morning Walk
As dawn approaches, sky transforms its purple into blue
though moon still rides on summit high, a sliver yet to view;
under clouds is tinged with gold the edge of heaven's hem
and soon the sun will process in with glory's diadem.
A little coolness intertwines my limbs with gentle sighs
and moves the clouds in flock and herd across the clearing skies.
Your face is to my inward eye brought slowly into sight,
recalling how you once did smile with sudden, dawning light.
I walk alone. In memories I may still walk with you,
but memory is just one form of being lonely, too.
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