Saturday, March 30, 2013

The Nature of Plagiarism

There is an excellent discussion of sloppy talk about plagiarism by Roy Peter Clark at Poynter.org. This is a topic that I have talked about on this blog almost since the beginning. Our usual ways of talking about plagiarism are fundamentally flawed, and as Clark notes, it seems to have grown worse even over the last few years.

We can see that plagiarism is a funny concept in part from the fact that what counts as plagiarism in one field will not necessarily count as plagiarism in another. A fairly straightforward example is in contract law: contract lawyers borrow language from each other all the time in ways that would certainly count as plagiarism in some other fields. But this, of course, is because nothing hangs on this in particular. In general, lawyer reputations are not made by designing completely original contracts; a society in which they were would certainly be contractually creative, but would also be quite bizarre, since such a society could not possibly have effectiveness of contracts as its central idea in contract law. If everyone's primary interest is simply contracts that do what they are supposed to do, copying contract language that works is obviously the way to go. We could imagine a system of contract law in which lawyers would be fined if they produced contracts using contract language whose source was not cited, but it's hard to see what this would accomplish beyond increasing the cost of hiring contract lawyers. We see this quite widely. Journalistic citation practices would not in general be kosher in academic contexts; there are entire fields in which books and speeches are ghostwritten and this is taken for granted (when was the last time that you heard about a politician plagiarizing his speechwriters by failure to cite them?), but ghostwriting is arguably the single most serious plagiaristic offense of which a student can be guilty; almost everyone allows 'common knowledge' exceptions to plagiarism rules, but what counts as common knowledge varies from field to field; and, perhaps most noteworthy of all (because often forgotten), virtually all academics, who are almost all intensely anti-plagiaristic in one way, regularly do things in the classroom that almost certainly would be regarded as plagiaristic elsewhere and sometimes even in their own fields ('common knowledge' is never so expansive as it is in the classroom).

Following Posner, Clark gives the following characterization of genuine plagiarism:

An act of plagiarism requires 1) the substantial copying without credit of one person’s language by another; 2) that this copying is done fraudulently, that is, to fool the reader into thinking that the work is original; 3) that the plagiarist acts with the clear intention to trick the reader; 4) that the act has potential negative consequences for the reader and the original author.

This conceives plagiarism along the lines of fraud: the plagiarist on this understanding presents themselves fraudulently to the detriment of others. (One might wonder why the distinction between (2) and (3); it's possible that this is an accidental splitting, but the two can be interpreted differently, with (2) identifying form and (3) identifying goal or end.) I think analogizing plagiarism to fraud is as problematic as analogizing it to theft, but the condition (4) is particularly important, I think, because (as I've argued before) something like it is the only thing that allows our practices with regard to plagiarism to make sense at all.

Plagiarism is a problem (one might equally say that copying is only plagiarism) only in fields where it distorts essential metrics in ways that are recognizably detrimental to the field. In practice there are three metrics whose distortions can be so detrimental: money, various kinds of reputation metrics, and grades (although grades can be considered a reputational metric themselves). Fields like academia and journalism put a focus on plagiarism because these fields are heavily reputation-dependent; fields like publishing need anti-plagiarism rules in place to protect income; and schools come down hard on plagiarism because they need to maintain the reputation of their degrees, certifications, and the like. There aren't many other situations in which copying would even be an issue, beyond those involving distortion of the field's ways of distributing profit and reputation.

Rather than thinking of plagiarism as a one-size-fits-all category, then, we need to think in terms of cost and protection of incentive in the field at large, whatever the field may be. This is the real reason for the variations in what counts as plagiarism. The money and reputations of folk singers don't depend on their being the only people who can sing a given song in the way it does in the standard music industry; a folk singer delivers performance rather than song, and thus folk singers generally are better off if they are able to share songs freely. When people listen to folk singers -- or any singers other than those who have a standard playlist, for that matter -- they don't do so in order to hear originality but in order to hear quality. Being the originator of a song can influence a folk singer's reputation, and hence money, positively, but it does so in a way that usually requires a wider diffusion of their song than they themselves can usually manage. (This is, to go on a brief only-partly-relevant tangent, the reason for a divide that is often not acknowledged in major music and print publishing industries, which is that while authors/songwriters who can guarantee wide distribution benefit from very strict copyright protections, authors/songwriters who cannot guarantee such wide distribution often benefit from their works being copied without the complications of permissions. The more people who copy such an originator, the greater the probability that monetary channels will start paying off, and the greater the probability that the work will endure a long time as a source of money and/or reputation. What these smaller authors and songwriters really require is not anti-copying rules but attribution rules -- they need to keep the connection to their name intact. Copyright laws, however, are generally imitation-focused rather than attribution-focused, because large-scale publishing concerns don't have to worry much about attribution, but about whether they have any competitors, whether it be another publishing house or someone with a copy machine or scanner. This is part of the reason why the public is constantly irritated by copyright laws: people take attribution to be far more important, and find it to be far more intuitive, than technical rules about what you can and can't copy with your own time and money.)

In short, what we should be doing in talking about plagiarism is talking about why the activity in question distorts measures that are important for monetary or reputational reasons. Indeed, I'm often attracted to the view that we should stop talking about plagiarism at all, and instead just talk about the problems different activities cause for the field. Another alternative would be the one Clark takes, which is to identify a particular problematic activity as plagiarism in the proper sense, or as the key kind of plagiarism, and sort out every other kind of activity according to its relation to this key one. Regardless, we do need to think critically about what we say when discussing plagiarism.

Friday, March 29, 2013

Dashed Off

three fundamental elements of common good
(1) human rights
(2) development of specific spiritual and temporal goods
(3) active peace

path dependency in philosophical reasoning

Aquinas's definition of natural desire: "inclination belonging to things by the disposition of the First Mover" (In Nec Eth sect 21) -->This is why it cannot be in vain

"Rhetoric deals with political matter where a variety of views occurs." Aquinas In NE 36

quality as disposition of substance, quantity as measure of substance, relation as proportion of substance

We honor things insofar as they are principles of good.

(1) Sense and reference are determined by logical function and do not pre-exist it.
(2) Words may a priori be given any meaning, with any logical function, but are a posteriori constrained by contexts of communication.
(3) Whether the sense of a word in use is literal or figurative is external to word, use, and sense, being the relation of the word to common and expected uses of such a word.

troping of a word by resemblance (similarity), by contiguity (proximate association), and by contrariety (inversion)

Close attention to conversations shows that people will sometimes use facial expressions and physical movements not merely in addition to words but in place of words, substituting them for nouns and verbs.

Sense and reference, being logical functions, can be found for metaphorical, ironic, etc. uses of language.

Devotion to virtue requires deference to the virtuous.

Man being a rational and therefore social animal, constancy or steadfastness in virtue requires loyalty to a community devoted to virtue, even if only abstractly conceived.

the recuperative character of loyalty

When we try to say what a term means taken literally, we soon find that there is no end to things we may mention; thus we cut our description off according to some standard of relevance.

Literal statements in context suggest possible games of make-believe.

conceptual unblending

Both homonyms and words with lots of possible meanings show that the same sentence can have very different literal interpretations in different contexts.

Potentiality is not the reason for our ability to choose among options but the reason why our choice is so limited; the more potential a thing is, the more factors on which it necessarily depends.

Miracles are simultaneously wonders, signs, and acts of power. (cf. Jn 2:11)

infinitely overdetermined truths

The repentance of the penitent can be moral of itself, but something more is required to make it holy.

snow-cadence, snow-surgence

markets as discovery engines

worthiness to learn as a characteristic of charity

teaching : intellectual virtue :: custom : moral virtue

virtue and vice as the principles for evaluating good and bad constitutions

There is a perpetual danger in medical legislation and regulation of making doctors, nurses, etc., mere means, as if they were not persons themselves.

Human feeling is banished by perception of monotony.

Consent is important in medicine not merely for reasons of autonomy or dignity but also because of something subtly different: the need for medicine to be a cooperative venture by its very nature. Patients cannot merely be patients, even where they cannot be perfect agents, or require representation, or proxy agency. This cooperative character is linked to, but distinct from, the issue of dignity.

moral luck as a reason for compassion and forgiveness

Madame Bovary as a study of the usurious life (across the range of human concern)

Greek tragedy is far more capable of depicting the fantastic than other dramatic forms precisely because of the Greek convention of keeping the most fantastic elements offstage (it is in this sense that, despite brilliant literary use of it in Euripides, deus ex machina is a degeneration of the tragic art).

Every kind of literacy is a set of critical thinking skills for a relevant set of genres, vocabularies, and texts.

Government expenditure for symbolic gestures is expenditure for something with an extraordinary rate of inflation.

A mistake in interpreting Aquinas that is made even by Thomists is not recognizing that Thomas's account of act & potency, etc., is not Aristotle's but a generalized version of Aristotle's account.

a Humean-association mathematics of shapes, etc.
(1) resemblance-functions
(2) contiguity-functions

the Eucharist as seal of solidarity
sacraments as emblems that transfigure

the galley effect & a Humean theory of diagrammatic reasoning

burdens of refraining from proof -- it's clear that they seem rare, but as sometimes proof is a non-issue, suspense of the attempt to prove will be possible as an obligation of discourse

metaphors as microarguments
summation of argument by metaphor

The natural mode of holiness in a depraved world is repentance.

'Desire' is said in many ways.

Taylor is surely right that the argument religious experience turns chiefly on the question not of distinctive experiences so much as grounds of interpretation. This then makes a link with the theory of taste, which concerns itself with good interpretations based on experiential data and refinable through experience and reflection.

a system of parables as tautegorical: the natural way to explicate parable is by parable

Dispositio proceeds from inventio; elocutio proceeds from inventio through dispositio.

The modern world has a nasty habit of trying to collapse deliberative (civic) oratory into forensic oratory, thus shifting from dehortation and inexpediency to accusation and injustice whenever it can.

Homiletics is a branch of epideictic rather than either forensic or deliberative oratory because its purpose is neither to persuade nor to judge, but to show; at least qua homiletics.

A little truth can satisfy multitudes of minds and still be overflowing and abundant in its fruits.

Rationalization is checkable conjecture.

circle as quasi-point

Mission follows procession; manifestation is the reverse.

specifying contrastives vs restricting contrastives

( ( ( ( ( x = focal ritual ) ) ) )
diffuse
rituals
referring
to focal
-----------------------------------
focal ritual administration arises
as authority over focal ritual
but indirectly extends over diffuse ritual
-> All three, focal ritual, diffuse ritual, and ritual administration, contribute to cooperative interaction (cooperative interaction is broader than cooperation in the sense of particular cooperative projects)

"The very nature of a true philosophy relatively to other systems is to be polemical, eclectic, unitive." Newman

mythology as "nature elevated into the spiritual realm through an enhancing refractions" (Schelling)

the ethical need for refreshment from evil

What is most desirable is most properly said to be.

Utilitarianism of the hedonic type would be more plausible and powerful if it concerned itself with the pleasurable rather than with pleasures.

Contrary to common assumptions, intensity of pleasure is not a reliable measure of how pleasurable something is.

Kant's idea of time as idea of rhythm; idea of space as idea of dwelling

Hume T 1.2.4.1
(1) The capacity of the mind is not infinite. (premise)
(2) No idea of extension or duration consists of infinite parts. (from 1)
(3) Every idea of extension or duration consists of a finite number of simple, indivisible parts. (from 1/2)
(4) It is possible for space and time to exist such that they consist of a finite number of simple, indivisible parts. (from 2/3)
(5) Infinite divisibility is impossible.
(6) Space and time must exist in this way. (4/5)
-> Note that Malebranche accepts (1) but denies (2) in a relevant sense.

If we translate Kant into Aristotelian terms, we can turn the Formula of Ends into something like, "Never act in a way inconsistent with friendship of excellence." This is right, properly understood is self-evidence, and can reasonably be said to be categorical.

Euclid as 'one diagram, one argument' because stipulation is only allowed within the context of one diagram

Mary is blessed not for the mere physical fact of being the mother of Christ but for the fact that she was so because she heard the Word of God and did it. (Lk 11:27-28; cf also Lk 1:39ff).

The Church does not merely pray to be blessed; it prays to be blessed through the Virgin and the saints.

(1) the need for a theory of practical rationality
(1a) relevance of rationality to practice
(1b) the general nature of practical reasoning
(2) practical rationality of obligations
(2a) law in general (obligation)
(2b) natural law in particular (fundamental moral obligation)
(2c) practical application of natural law
(3) practical rationality of appropriateness
(3a) taste in general
(3b) good taste in general
(3c) prudence
(3d) art/skill

The desire for freedom is deep within us, but freedom itself must be learned.

Synaxis is inherently Eucharistic in character.

The secular, properly understood, is simply the realm in which the primary obligations are those of ordinary conscience of institutional requirements.

In the Assumption, God lifts up the lowly as a sign that Christ has subjected all things beneath his feet.

Mary & the place prepared by God for Israel

the Assumption as the Gospel Acclamation of salvation history

Bede mostly appeals to posthumous miracles as evidence of the devotion of the saint in question. (cf. his comment on King Oswald at Hist 3.12)

It would be valuable to look at Bede's use of testimony chains when he talks of miracles.

"Only good where evil was, is evil dead." MacDonald

Realism in any field of art is really appearance-ism.

People often substitute for rational thought glowing visions of themselves being, as they think, rational.

The hieratic features of inquiry are not completely eliminable, due to the nature of truth itself.

Most discussions of pleasure fail to distinguish between pleasantness and pleasure.

A philosopher may assent to the immortality of the soul, but a Christian may live it.

"No reform can be effected without sacrifice, and sacrifice comes not from selfishness." Brownson

A reasonable person must be figurative-minded.

The notion of the infinite is implicit in the intelligibility of being.

literal text as a sort of limit of figurative text

As rational norms are just the ethics of inquiry, people who do not accept the possibility of an objective morality are committed to there being no objective rational standards.

Music for Holy Week: English



Fernando Ortega, "When I Survey the Wondrous Cross". Difficulty to beat Isaac Watts.

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Links for Noting

* Zac Alstin reviews Ian Ker's biography of Chesterton.

* Lisa Herzog has an article on Markets at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

* Tristan Haze on the truth-functional account of indicative conditionals

* David Bressan on Newton's Alchemy and Early Geochemistry

* An inventor in Malawi; quite awesome -- this is the spirit that makes one proud to be human.

* Pakistanis still remember Shahbaz Bhatti.

* Skholiast on quality, relation, sign.

* Juan Gomez on the relation between Joseph Butler's Analogy and experimental philosophy.

* A Sinner had two interesting posts a while back on papal succession:

Notes on the Count of Popes

Regnal Numbers

* A good theological discussion on the knowledge of Christ

* I meant to comment on T. J. Logan's discussion of Johann Georg Hamann, but never had the time to get around to it. Hamann, the Magus of the North, as he is sometimes called, is an interesting philosopher who deserves to be more broadly discussed. He's also the only fideist I've ever come across who is really worth taking seriously.

* Ayn Rand's marginalia on C. S. Lewis's Abolition of Man. What strikes me most about it is that she actually read the whole book through.

Lent XXXVIII

Think then, what position can be more brilliant than that of the holy Apostles? or what more attractive of attention than their friendship with God? A man who is of little account in life would not be likely to experience this passion: for it always avoids one who possesses nothing that others can envy and nothing that is inaccessible to those whose lot is of no consequence in the world; for how could such a one possibly exhibit vainglory on any subject whatever? But pride is a feeling dear to a man when he is in an enviable position, and when for this reason he thinks himself better than his neighbour; foolishly supposing that he differs very greatly from the rest of mankind, as having achieved some special and surpassing degree of excellence, or as having followed a path of policy unfamiliar to and untrodden by the rest of the world. Since therefore it has come to be regularly characteristic of all who hold brilliant positions to be liable to attacks of the infirmity of pride, it was surely needful for the holy Apostles to find in Christ a Pattern of a modest temper; so that, having the Lord of all as their model and standard, they themselves also might mould their own hearts according to the Divine will. In no other way therefore (as it seems) could He rid them from the infirmity, except by teaching them clearly that each one should regard himself as inferior in honour to the rest, even so far as to feel bound to undertake the part of a servant, without shrinking from discharging even the lowest of menial offices; [and this He taught them] by both washing the feet of the brethren and girding on a towel in order to perform the act. For consider what utterly menial behaviour it is, I mean according to the world's way of thinking and outward practice. Therefore Christ has become a Pattern of a modest and unassuming temper to all living men, for we must not suppose the teaching was meant for the disciples alone. Accordingly the inspired Paul also, taking Christ as a standard, exhorts to this end, saying: Let each one of you have this mind in himself, which was also in Christ Jesus. And again: In lowliness of mind each counting other better than himself. For in a lowly temper there is established a settled habit of love and of yielding to the will of others.

St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on the Gospel of John, Book IX

Music for Holy Week: Cajun French



Les Amies Louisianaises, "La Grace du Ciel".

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Cardinal Virtues

It has been a crazy-busy week! In my intro course am currently teaching medieval accounts of goodness, virtue, law, and happiness (mostly focusing on Aquinas), before moving on to early modern philosophy, so I've been thinking a lot recently of the cardinal virtues. They're found in Plato, they're found in Aristotle, and they're also found here, a source that's often forgotten, but that has been an important influence on accounts of them for centuries:

NAB: If riches are desirable in life, what is richer than Wisdom, who produces all things? And if prudence is at work, who in the world is a better artisan than she? Or if one loves righteousness, whose works are virtues, She teaches moderation and prudence, righteousness and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful than these.

KJV: If riches be a possession to be desired in this life; what is richer than wisdom, that worketh all things? And if prudence work; who of all that are is a more cunning workman than she? And if a man love righteousness her labours are virtues: for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude: which are such things, as men can have nothing more profitable in their life.