Love and Kindness

I might, indeed, have learned, even from the poets, that Love is something more stern and splendid than mere kindness: that even the love between the sexes is, as in Dante, "a lord of terrible aspect." There is kindness in Love: but Love and kindness are not coterminous, and when kindness (in the sense given above) is separated from the other elements of Love, it involves a certain fundamental indifference to its object, and even something like contempt of it. Kindness consents very readily to the removal of its object--we have all met people whose kindness to animals is constantly leading them to kill animals lest they should suffer. Kindness, merely as such, cares not whether its object become good or bad, provided only that it escapes suffering.

C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, Collier (New York: 1962) pp. 40-41. The meaning of kindness as used here is glossed as "the desire to see others than the self happy; not happy in this way or in that, but just happy" (p. 40).

Rough Timeline of the Maccabean and Hasmonean Eras

All dates are BC; many dates are approximate.


323 Death of Alexander the Great. The empire is divided; Antigonus takes Greece, Ptolemy takes Egypt, and Seleucus takes Syria.

220 Simon the Righteous (Sirach 50:1-21) becomes High Priest.

218 Hannibal crosses the Alps in Italy.

217 Battle of Raphia (3 Macc. 1; Daniel 11:11?): Ptolemy IV Philopator defeats Antiochus III, ending the Fourth Syrian War between Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Syria.

211 Hannibal begins his march on Rome.

207 Rome manages to turn back Hannibal at Metaurus River.

202 End of Second Punic War when Scipio defeats Hannibal at Zama.

198 Judea becomes part of the Seleucid kingdom in the Fifth Syrian War. Onias III (2 Macc. 3:1-40), son of Simon the Righteous, becomes High Priest.

196 The city of Smyrna, threatened by Antiochus III, appeals to Rome for aid.

191 Rome and its allies defeat Antiochus III at Thermopylae and Corycus.

176 Antiochus IV Epiphanes ascends to the throne.

174 Jason, brother of Onias, attempts to become High Priest by bribing Antiochus (2 Macc. 4:1-7).

171 Menelaus offers a bigger bribe to Antiochus in order to become High Priest (2 Macc. 4:23-26); Jason flees.

170 Onias murdered through the machinations of Menelaus (2 Macc. 4:30-38). Antiochus IV initiates the Sixth Syrian War.

168 Antiochus IV is turned back in his invasion of Egypt by the ultimatum of Rome. A rumor spreads that he has died, and Jason attempts to overthrow Menelaus. Antiochus discovers this when returning and interprets it as a revolt (2 Macc. 5:11-14). He begins a crackdown on non-Hellenizing Jews (2 Macc. 6:1-12).

167 Abomination of Desolation (Daniel 11:31): Antiochus Epiphanes sets up an idol in the Temple. Jews begin to rally behind the family of Mattathias (1 Macc. 2:27ff.). The Maccabean revolt begins. Mithridates of Parthia takes advantage of the Seleucid confusion to seize the strategic city of Herat; Antiochus leaves the handling of the Maccabees to Lysias and goes to war against the Parthians himself.

164 Antiochus dies of illness while on (successful) campaign against Parthia. Rededication of the Temple under Judah Maccabee.

163 Lysias comes against the Maccabees with a vast army and elephants; Eleazar Maccabee dies in heroic attack (1 Macc. 6:42-46). Lysias lays siege to Jerusalem, but on hearing that one of his rivals is attempting to take advantage of Lysias's absence, Lysias offers Judah Maccabee peace terms: persecution of Jews for their faith and practice will end as long as they remain politically loyal to the Seleucids. Judah accepts. A split begins to develop between Hellenizing and Hebraic Jews, leading to civil war.

161 Antiochus V Eupator overthrown by Demetrius I Soter.

162 Alcimus is made High Priest by Demetrius I Soter.

160 Judah Maccabee killed in battle by combined forces of Hellenizing Jews and Selucid reinforcements sent by Demetrius I Soter. Hebraic remnant begins to rally around Jonathan Maccabee.

152 Civil war develops in the Seleucid kingdom between Demetrius II and Alexander Balas (later Alexander Epiphanes). Both sides seek an ally in Jonathan Maccabee; Jonathan temporizes, developing relations with both sides. Jonathan Maccabee appointed High Priest by Alexander Epiphanes (1 Macc. 10:15-20).

146 Rome destroys Carthage.

143 Jonathan Maccabee seized by the Seleucids. Simon Maccabee takes control of the rebel factions and the rebel army and the Seleucid army set to face off. A snowstorm intervenes, forcing the Seleucids to retreat; they execute Jonathan.

142 Civil war breaks out in the Seleucid kingdom again; both sides again attempt to get the help of the Jewish rebels. Simon Maccabee negotiates the independence of the Jewish people and the Hasmonean realm of Judea begins (1 Macc. 14:41).

135 Simon Maccabee is murdered through the machinations of his son-in-law; his son John Hyrcanus becomes High Priest and ruler of the Hasmonean realm, but only by cutting deals with the Seleucid kingdom that effectively make the Hasmonean realm a puppet state.

128 Antiochus VII dies, and the Hasmonean realm again achieves independence. As it consolidates and expands, we see also the rise of the Pharisees.

104 Aristobulus, son of John Hyrcanus, begins to call himself king. Tensions between the Hasmonean Dynasty and the Pharisees begin to mount.

103 Alexander Jannaeus becomes king.

100 Julius Caesar born.

94 Alexander Jannaeus, in contempt of the Pharisees, pours a water offering to himself rather than God; observers begin to riot, leading to their massacre. The Hasmonean Kingdom undergoes civil war between supporters of the Pharisees and supporters of the Sadducees. The Pharisees win and, believing they have made their point, let Alexander take the throne again. He throws a banquet in honor of the Pharisees; 800 come. When they are drunk, he seizes them and crucifies them, killing their families as well.

76 Alexander Jannaeus dies. His pro-Pharisee wife, Salome Alexandra, becomes queen.

67 Salome Alexandra dies. Her sons, Hyrcanus II (with the support of the Pharisees) and Aristobulus II (with the support of the Sadducees) both claim the throne. Aristobulus II manages by good luck to surprise Hyrcanus II in a way that forces him to concede. Hostilities between the two soon break out again, however.

63 Rome gets involved. Pompey rules in favor of Hyrcanus II. When Aristobulus II refuses to concede, the combined forces of Hyrcanus II and Rome overwhelm him. Despite intensive fighting, Rome wins; Judea becomes a province of Rome, Hyrcanus II is made High Priest, and his ally Antipater (father of Herod the Great) is put in charge of the province.

57 Antigonus son of Aristobulus escapes from Rome and returns to Judea.

40 Antigonus declared king by Parthia. Herod appeals to Rome, and is recognized as king of Judea by the Roman Senate.

37 With the help of Rome, Herod recaptures Jerusalem and executes Antigonus. The Hasmonean Dynasty ends, the Herodian Dynasty begins.

Unworthy of Man

I must, however, be of opinion, that the sentiments of those, who are inclined to think favourably of mankind, are more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a mean opinion of our nature. When a man is prepossessed with a high notion of his rank and character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will scorn to do a base or vicious action, which might sink him below that figure which he makes in his own imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our polite and fashionable moralists insist upon this topic, and endeavour to represent vice as unworthy of man, as well as odious in itself.

David Hume, Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature.

Music on My Mind

Larry Sparks, "Bitterweeds". Unfortunately only an excerpt. But you can hear the original version of the whole song sung by Barbara Wilkinson at SongSpace. I think Wilkinson's song is likely to become a classic: a clear, easy to sing, and memorable story.

Rosmini on Causes and Happenings

'Every happening has a cause that produces it.' This proposition means exactly the same as the following: 'It is impossible for our intelligence to think a happening without thinking a cause that produced it.' To show that 'a happening without a cause cannot be thought', we must show that 'the concept of a happening without a cause involves contradiction.' Once this is demonstrated, we will have deduced the principle of cause from the principle of contradiction.

The demonstration is as follows: to say 'What does not exist, acts' is a contradiction. But a happening without a cause means 'What does not exist, acts.' Therefore a happening without a cause is a contradiction. The proofs follow.
As regards the major: to conceive mentally an action (a change) without an ens, is to conceive without conceiving, which is a contradiction. Indeed, the principle of knowledge states: 'The object of thought is ens'; therefore without an ens, we cannot mentally conceive. To conceive an action without conceiving an ens that performs the action, is to conceive without conceiving. Therefore to apply the action to something that does not exist is a contradiction in terms, which was to be proved.

As regards the minor: a happening is an action (a change). If this action has no cause, it is conceived by itself, without belonging to an ens; there is then an action without ens or, which is the same, what does not exist, acts. Thus the minor is proved (cf. 350-352).

Antonio Rosmini, New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas, Volume 2, Part III, Chapter 2. To put the argument in another format:

Major: 'Something that does not exist, acts' is a contradiction.
(1) What is conceived is conceived as a being.
(2) An action conceived without being conceived as a being acting, is not conceived as a being.
(3) Therefore, an action conceived without being conceived as a being acting is a contradiction.

Minor: A happening without a cause entails that something that does not exist, acts.
(1) A happening is an action.
(2) An action conceived without a cause is not conceived as a being that acts.
(3) Therefore, a happening conceived without a cause is not conceived as a being that acts.

The section references to 350-352 is from Rosmini's criticism of Kant in Volume 1. There Rosmini argues that 'what happens' conceptually includes the notion of 'cause', and thus the judgment is analytic and not, as Kant would have it, synthetic. As he puts it:

The following, therefore, is the sequence of our conceptions:

1. We conceive coming into existence, a concept which includes that of change.
2. The concept of change contains that of new operation.
3. The concept of new operation contains that of prior existence.
4. The concept of prior existence contains that of cause.

Conclusion: A happening without a cause is a contradiction.

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Siesta of a Hungarian Snake
by Edwin Morgan

s sz sz SZ sz SZ sz ZS zs ZS zs zs z

I am currently in the last week of term, so I am envying the Hungarian snake's dormition.

Metaphysics of Pregnancy

At Philosophers' Zone there's a summary of a discussion with Elselijn Kingma on the metaphysics of pregnancy. It's an interesting subject in itself, with important ramifications for many philosophical problems (as Kingma notes). And it is particularly interesting this time of year, since Monday was the Feast of the Immaculate Conception and Christmas is in two weeks. Kingma summarizes her view of pregnancy in the following way:

‘My view is that the way to think of the foetus is to think of it as part of the pregnant organism. So that means we have one organism throughout the pregnancy and only at birth does this organism split and becomes two organisms.’

She opposes this view to what she calls the "foetal container model", in which "the pregnancy is literally a container and in the middle of the container there is a hollow in which sits the foetus—and there is no problematic part-whole relationship." (I take it that the key point here is the 'no problematic part-whole relationship', since spatially the fetus is literally contained. That is, the point is that the fetus is not contained in a pregnant organism the way a gift is in a box but is integrated into it in complex ways.) Unfortunately, we don't get Kingma's argument for the one organism view. There are other views than these two on the table. For instance, my own view of the matter, which I've mentioned before, is a two-organism view in which one organism is an integrated and dependent functional part generated in the other. (Of course, there is always some complication with what, precisely we mean by 'organism', since the term notoriously has no strict definition; but in the human case, I would say the same with 'human being': a pregnant mother is a human being who has another human being as a proper part.) The pregnant mother is not a mere container for the fetus; like Kingma's model, it is a part-whole model, since the fetus is literally and physically an interactive part of the mother, qua mother. But nothing about this, as far as I can see, requires that we hold there is only one organism. One potential worry about Kingma's one-then-two view is that birth is not a momentary happening,but a rather extended and complicated process; while the position looks like it would have a fairly simple way to distinguish organisms in the pregnancy case, it cannot actually do so. Is the relevant point the beginning of labor? The exit through the birth canal? The cutting of the umbilical? The first breath (after all, merely severing your hand doesn't make it a different organism, even though vital functions continue for a while)? There's no obvious way to answer this, and this seems to suggest that at least at some point in the process we can perfectly well have one organism that is still in some strict sense part of another, and if that's the case, it isn't clear why we shouldn't have said that all along -- or, at least, it seems that we could have said it much earlier just as well as later.

Kingma also considers ethical implications of her model. Unfortunately, it's not in the audio excerpt, and I find the written summary difficult to follow. She says,

‘When I do harm I have to cross through space to interfere with you. When I allow it to happen I just don’t get involved; it will happen regardless of my involvement. Pregnancy is not wired up like that. A pregnant woman who does anything at all does not cross space to interfere with her foetus.’

I find the idea that 'crossing through space' has much to do with whether one is doing harm difficult to understand. We obviously can harm ourselves. And we can clearly draw a distinction between doing and allowing even with regard to ourselves; most of what happens in our bodies we simply allow, although sometimes our allowance is more active and sometimes less. This is a worrisome fact, given that the position attributed to Kingma is that subject/object (or doer and done-to) break down, so that, in her words, "a doing-and-allowing construction (of harm) cannot be applied to pregnancy"; but if we're talking subject and object of actions, it is unclear how this can be the case. We can clearly be both subject and object of active harm to ourselves. Since the doing-and-allowing construction doesn't break down even in cases where there is obviously only a single organism and no question of pregnancy, it isn't clear at all to me why we would think it would break down here. The more obvious implication of Kingma's model (it is an implication of my own, as well) is that, at first approximation, for a mother to harm her fetus is to harm herself, and to harm a fetus is to harm the mother (although this is not necessarily a straightforward matter since part-whole relations are not always straightforward when it comes to harms); this is not, I suspect, where Kingma wishes to go with the matter. The assumption in the not-very-elaborated comments in the summary seems to be that Kingma holds that we cannot harm ourselves. This is, to say the least, very counterintuitive, and there are very good reasons to reject any such assumption. But it is perhaps an artifact of the summary rather than Kingma's own view.

Kingma is certainly right, though, that pregnancy is worth some thought. For such a common thing, it is remarkably overlooked when people talk about matters to which it would obviously be relevant.