I thought, given my last post, that I would translate Robert Sanderson's account of the category of Habitus from the Logicae Artis Compendium, so that it is more clear what Bentham would have had in front of him (not that he seems to have used it beyond the mnemonic verse, which is the only thing he references on this particular point); it's also interesting in giving us the 'Cliff's Notes' version of how it was understood in the seventeenth century. Seventeenth century textbooks like this are almost always extremely simplified versions of more sophisticated discussions in centuries prior. The universities were in bad shape by this point, and students, rather than doing any deep study or original work, mostly just crammed off compendia and summaries and vocabulary lists, which is one reason for the bad reputation of 'the schoolmen' in the early modern period. Nonetheless, sometimes the textbooks show that genuinely interesting things survived the slow but massive (and remarkably deliberate) brain-damaging of the entire scholastic super-edifice, which by the seventeenth century had been dumbed-down to almost nothing except in a few last redoubts like Coimbra and Louvain. Sanderson was a tutor at Oxford, which was not at all a shining example of university excellence in the seventeenth century, although he himself was fairly impressive (besides this textbook, which became one of the standard logic texts, he became an Anglican bishop famous for his preaching as well as a quite competent Regius Professor of Divinity).
In any case, Sanderson on Habitus:
Habitus is the adjacency of the body and of those things which surround the body: by which the one having, these are said to be had. 'The body having' is the substance; 'The thing had' is an artificial form of the fourth species of quality: the application of this to that is this category of Habitus. Its property is to always be in many; in the having, namely, and in the had: but for different reasons. For it is in the having body, as in a subject; it is in the had thing, as in a cause.
Everything pertaining to this:
1. Kinds of vestments: whether they are worn for the sake of Necessity, as being Shod, Tunicate; or for distinction, as being Ringed, Trousered; or simply for being Adorned, as being Armored, Saddled, Tasselled, etc.
2. Possession, as being Wealthy, being Beneficed, being Described, being Named, etc., and those things that are similar to these.
(My rough translation.) 'Adjacency' could also be translated as 'adjoining'. The fourth species of quality is 'form and figure'. It's interesting that Sanderson assumes that the form must be artificial; covering oneself with leaves would perhaps not count, although maybe 'artificial form' is being used broadly here. Nonetheless, it's interesting that Sanderson holds that in being clothed that we are related to a qualitative trait of the clothes. I suppose that makes some sort of sense -- nobody wears a shirt unless it can be draped over their frame in a way that to some extent fits the frame, because the appropriate draping is what the shirt itself is and does in being worn as a shirt. Besides the explicitly mentioned quality, several other categories are clearly implied as presupposed here: substance and quantity (body), relation (adjacency), where (those things surrounding the body), action and passion (in the had as in a cause).
The examples gave me some trouble; what Latin I have simply doesn't extend very far into words for early modern words for clothes and the like. And, frankly, I don't understand Sanderson's division at all. Why are Shod and Tunicate classed under 'for the sake of necessity' but Trousered under 'for the sake of distinction', and Armored under 'merely for adornment'? I have no idea what principle of classification is going on here. But perhaps this is not intended to be a real classification; the relevant class is just 'kinds of vestments', all together, and Sanderson is simply telling us that all the reasons why one might wear something are relevant. (Notice, incidentally, that he puts 'Saddled' here, thus implicitly providing his answer to whether a horse being saddled counts in this category.)
The second class of Habitus, however, is even more perplexing, and I suspect that Sanderson is just going along with the name of the category ('what is had') rather than having any particular reason for thinking that your having a name is an 'adjacency of a body and what is around that body'. All of this class, I think, would really be metaphorical cases of vestment (in the case of Benefices, literally metaphorical, if you will pardon the expression, because the language of vestment and investiture is actually used as a metaphor to describe it). For purely logical reasons, that perhaps does not matter so much, since the logic would work much the same whether we are being literal or metaphorical, but 'possession' would make this category a massive hodge-podge of very different things whose relations to the actual description of the category are loose at best. Nonetheless, the metaphorical cases are quite important; we use the category as a sort of model or template for talking about a lot of other, very different, topics, namely, whenever one thing can be said to belong to a different thing.
