Music on My Mind

 

Alex Williams (with Gigi Perez), "Eternity".

Habitude XIII

 Intension and remission of habitude plays an important role in the theory of virtue, so it's worthwhile to jump over to some of St. Thomas's discussions of intension and remission of virtue.

Intension of Virtues Generally

In considering whether virtues are all equal, he notes that virtues can be greater than other kinds of virtue by being more closely tied to reason, so that prudence, for instance, is the highest moral virtue. However, he goes on to say, we can also find virtues being greater than other virtues when dealing with the same species of virtue:

And so, according to what was said above, when considering the intensions of habitudes, virtue can be greater and lesser in two ways: in one way, according to itself, in another way, on the part of the participating subject.  Therefore, if it is considered according to itself, its greatness and smallness is directed according to that to which it extends. But whoever has some virtue, such as temperance, has it inasmuch as it extends to all that to which temperance extends. This does not happen with knowledge or productive skill, for not everyone who is grammatical knows all that pertains to the grammatical. And according to this, the Stoics said well, as Simplicius says in the commentary on the categories, that virtue does not admit of more and less, just like knowledge and productive skill, because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

But if virtue is considered on the part of the participating subject, virtue can happen to be greater or lesser, either according to diverse times in the same person, or in diverse human beings. Because in reaching the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either because of accustomedness, or because of better disposition of nature, or because of more perspicacious judgment of reason, or even because of greater gift of grace.... [ST 2-1.66.1]

 

Intension of the Virtue of Charity

Union with God is by virtue of the infused virtue of charity, so as one 'draws nigh' to God, one's charity must increase in intensity. This cannot be by addition, because then it would be a matter of adding new charities on top of distinct old charities; rather, it increases in essence (i.e., being): the person with the virtue of charity participates charity more and more fully.

The spiritual growth of charity is in a way similar to the growth of the body. But bodily growth in animals and plants is not continuous change, that is, such that if something grows so much in so much time, it is necessary that it change proportionally in each temporal part, as happens in place-change, but through some time nature works by disposing to growth and not actually growing anything, and afterwards produces in effect that to which it had been disposed, actually growing the animal or the part. So also not every act of charity actually grows charity, but every act of charity disposes to the growth of charity, inasmuch as from one act of charity a human being is rendered more prompt to act again according to charity, and, ability increasing, the human being breaks out into more fervent act of love, by which he endeavors to advance in charity, and then charity actually grows. [ST 2-2.24.6]

Charity, however, since it is directed to God has no limit; that is, in itself it can grow indefinitely without ever reaching a maximum, and as it grows it gives us the ability to endure even greater charity.

A New Poem Draft

 O Antiphons

O Wisdom, who from out the mouth Most High
from end to utter end dost wholly reach,
as strongly, sweetly, thou all order ply,
come, ways of prudence to our hearts now teach.

O Lord and war-chief of the Israelites,
who through the fiery bush to Moses seemed
and gave him law on Sinai's holy heights,
come, that by outstreched arm we be redeemed.

O Root of Jesse, of all the people sign,
the kings before thee cease to speak their say;
the Gentiles to thee prayerwise will incline;
come free us now and make no more delay.

O Key of David, Israel's scepter bright,
who opes all locks and shuts what none may ope;
for those who sit in darkness of death's night
come, lead them out from prison unto hope.

O Dawn and brightness of the righteous sun,
who shinest with a clear eternity,
enlighten with thy glory everyone
and those in shade of death now swiftly free.

O King of Gentiles, whom all nations crave,
foundation making Jew and Gentile one,
come, and mortal man from shadow save,
who was formed from clay to be God's blessed son.

O Emmanuel, the bearer of all law,
from whom the Gentiles seek the living word,
their Savior and their King held high in awe,
come save your people, God, O holy Lord.

The Damascene

 Today was the feast of St. Yuhana ibn Sarjun, Doctor of the Church; he is most often known in English as St. John Damascene. He was Syrian (although he may have also had Arabic background) and lived in the Umayyad Caliphate; his family were Christian civil servants serving under the Muslim governorship. He himself became a monk, and in Greek is sometimes called Chrysorrhoas (stream of gold) as a compliment to the quality of his writings. From his Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book IV, chapter 13:

God Who is good and altogether good and more than good, Who is goodness throughout, by reason of the exceeding riches of His goodness did not suffer Himself, that is His nature, only to be good, with no other to participate therein, but because of this He made first the spiritual and heavenly powers: next the visible and sensible universe: next man with his spiritual and sentient nature. All things, therefore, which he made, share in His goodness in respect of their existence. For He Himself is existence to all, since all things that are, are in Him, not only because it was He that brought them out of nothing into being, but because His energy preserves and maintains all that He made: and in special the living creatures. For both in that they exist and in that they enjoy life they share in His goodness. But in truth those of them that have reason have a still greater share in that, both because of what has been already said and also because of the very reason which they possess. For they are somehow more dearly akin to Him, even though He is incomparably higher than they. 

 Man, however, being endowed with reason and free will, received the power of continuous union with God through his own choice, if indeed he should abide in goodness, that is in obedience to his Maker. Since, however, he transgressed the command of his Creator and became liable to death and corruption, the Creator and Maker of our race, because of His bowels of compassion, took on our likeness, becoming man in all things but without sin, and was united to our nature.For since He b estowed on us His own image and His own spirit and we did not keep them safe, He took Himself a share in our poor and weak nature, in order that He might cleanse us and make us incorruptible, and establish us once more as partakers of His divinity.

Habitude XII

 After he discusses the causes of habitudes, St. Thomas goes into the important question of the intension and remission of habitude. The importance of this question cannot be overestimated. In working out intension and remission of habitudes, scholastics tried to clarify the matter by expanding their view to the intension and remission of dispositions generally, and it is out of this that the late medieval scholastics discovered the Mean Speed Theorem, the Calculatores first began applying crude geometrical tools to explore how acceleration works, and the first tentative shifts away from Aristotelian physics began to pick up steam so that the early modern experimental revolution should begin to happen. The topic that particularly precipitated all of this, however, was originally not a physical one but an extremely important one for spiritual life: the increase and decrease of the virtue of charity. Thus it is quite important. It also leads to some relatively technical discussions. So I've decided to do here what I did with the topic of the subject of habitudes: I'll mix commentary and selective translation.

Increase and Decrease of Habitude

The first question that has to be asked, of course, is whether habitude admits of intension and remission. Intension is a kind of increase, and remission a kind of decrease, and we mostly associate increase and decrease with quantity. However, says Aquinas, we transfer the idea to capture that is true about quality: that just as there is a kind of distinguishable completeness that is tracked by quantitative increase, so there is a kind of distinguishable completeness for quality. We can recognize greatness not just of (say) size, but also goodness. The quantitative analogue is exactly that, only an analogue, but the analogy can sometimes be quite tight. This is a point that distinguishes both quality and quantity from substance, for instance. Not all qualities have this feature, however; it is a feature of quality that arises from how the quality relates to other things. As St. Thomas says:

If any form, or anything whatsoever, gets the notion of the species from itself or from something of itself, it has a determinate notion, which is able neither to exceed by more nor to fail by less, and such are hotness and whiteness, and other suchlike qualities, which are not said by ordering to another, and even more so substance, which is being per se. But those which receive their species from something to which they are ordered can be diversified in themselves by more or by less, and nonetheless be the same species, according to the unity of that to which they are ordered, from which they receive their species. [ST 2-1.52.1]

Health, for instance, varies according to more and less, because it is a disposition that concerns something other than itself, and can be related to it in various ways (generally by various excesses and deficiencies) while still being health. If we only called health what was completely healthy, then there would be no increase or decrease of health, by definition; but 'health' would then be the maximum, or the most perfect balance, of something that did admit of more and less. 

This, however, is only one of the ways a disposition can increase or decrease, namely, by the very nature of its form as related to other things. Dispositions can also vary by how their subjects participate that form. If a form consitutes the very species of a thing, then that thing does not have a participation that admits of more and less; this is the case with substantial forms. This is also with quantitative forms or qualitative forms like shapes that are derive very closely from substances and quantities, because they are not just divisible in a way that admits of more and less. Actions that are more associated with actions and passions, however, are 'farther away' from substance and quantity; their subjects may participate them to a greater or lesser degree.

Thus habitudes may increase or decrease (1) in themselves or (2) according to participation by subject.

The Manner of the Increase and Decrease

This increase and decrease, however, that we find in intension and remission of qualities, cannot be by addition (which would effectively make it reducible to quantity. If something is more intensely Q, this is not the same as having more of Q. As Aquinas likes to put it, more and less white is not the same as larger and smaller white. If we consider intension and remission of the quality in itself, any addition or subtraction would actually change the kind of thing we are talking about; we would have a new thing that was not the previous quality. This doesn't rule out there being a kind of addition or subtraction for quality. You can for instance, know more or fewer things just as you can know them more or less well. But this is not guaranteed either; Aquinas points out that bodily habitudes like health, while admitting greater and lesser degree, do not themselves admit of larger and smaller amounts, at least if we're not just using a metaphor.

We've seen, however, that habitudes can be caused by multiplication of acts, and so we can ask if they are increased in some kind of one-to-one way with those acts. Aquinas's answer is interesting:

Because the use of habitudes consists in human willing, as is obvious from what was said above, then as one who has the habitude might not use it, or even act contrarily to it, so also can it happen that the habitude is used according to an act not proportionally corresponding to the intensity of the habitude. Thus if the intension of the act is proportionally equated to the intension of the habitude, or even exceeds it, then each act either increases the habitude or disposes to its increase, so that we may speak of the increase of the habitudes on a similarity to animal increase. For not all food taken in actually increases the animal, as not every drop hollows out a stone, but food being multiplied eventually makes an increase. So also, with multiplication of acts, the habitude grows. But if the intension of the act proportionally falls short of the intension of the habitude, such an act does not dispose to the increase of the habitude, but rather to its decrease. [ST 2-1.52.3]

'Intension' could also be translated as 'intensity'. Thus, for instance, if we have a virtue, let's say generosity, that is of such-and-such intensity, acts of generosity that are less intense than that will eventually reduce the intensity of the generosity. To increase in virtue, or knowledge, or such, the intensity of the acts matters. And much the same is true of remission or decrease, mutatis mutandis.

Corruption of Habitude

Forms perish, or are corrupted, either by their contraries or the corruption of their subjects. Your health can break down either by a sickness being introduced or you dying. In an incorruptible subject, of course, the latter sort of loss of form cannot occur. What this means is that whether or not a habitude can be lost simply depends, in the case of corruption by subject, on the corruptibility of their subject; habitudes depend for their existence on the existence of their subjects.

Corruption by contrary is a somewhat more complicated matter. It of course depends first and foremost on whether the habitude has a contrary. Intelligible species in the agent or potential intellect do not have a contrary, so any intelligible species caused in the latter by the former is incorruptible. Examples of this are first principles, both of the theoretical and of the practical intellect, "which by no oblivion or deception are able to be corrupted" (ST 2-1.53.1). However, habitudes concerned with conclusions do admit of contraries, either because they depend on assumptions that are not necessarily known, or because false reasoning can lead to a different conclusion. So habitudes like knowledge or opinion are corruptible and can be lost. Moral virtues likewise can be lost, as we know all too well, because they presuppose the movement of reason, and so they can be erased, whether through ignorance or the influence of the passions or deliberate choices; fortunately, moral vices can also be lost, for essentially the same reason.

In some cases habitudes can be lost not merely by acts themselves that are contrary, but simply through the cessation of some sustaining act. This occurs when the action is removing some impediment to the habitude, and therefore removing the action results in an external contrary being imposed. This is especially true in the case of both moral virtues and intellectual virtues, which begin to erode if you stop using them. You eventually stop knowing things that you don't actively know; you eventually lose opinions just from not doing anything with them; you eventually stop being honest by no longer doing honest things. How quickly this happens, of course, depends on the opposing forces and the extent of one's exposure to them.

Witching Softness, and Eye-Soothing Sheen

December's Moonlight
by Anne Garton 

Sure it was not remembered, placid moonlight,
When dread December darkly flitted past,
The gloomy fancy -- nought save the stormy night,
With its chill breath and wildly howling blast!
Now on the gaze fair sights are opening fast;
So purely calm, it seems almost a scene
Bestowed from Paradise! The shining queen,
Smiling on courtly stars around her cast,
In stateliest silence moves -- a golden zone
Circling her silver vest. The blue demesne
Is sweetly decked with fabrics, not of stone,
But witching softness, and eye-soothing sheen.
 Its influence lights on dreary plains below,
 For Autumn's parted spells I will not languish now.

Links of Note

 * Daniel D. De Haan, Thomist Classical Theism: Divine Simplicity within Aquinas' Triplex Via Theology (PDF)

* Henry Oliver, The triumph of logical English, at "Works in Progress"

* Daniel Klugman, Cracked Foundations: Pascal's Internal Critique of Descartes's Theory of Knowledge (PDF)

* Miles Hentrup, Hegel's Theory of Rational Proof (PDF)

* Bradley J. Birzer discusses Stephen Lawhead.

* Miguel Garcia Godinez, The Ontology of Social Practices (PDF)

* Nicholas Hune-Brown, Investigating a Possible Scammer in Journalism's AI Era, at "The Local", on a rising worry about journalistic scams.

* Michael Deigan, Questions Should Have Answers (PDF)

* Flame & Light, Word-Sculpture

* Alex Ding Zhang, Hugo Grotius on the Loose Obligation of Natural Law (PDF)

A Poem Draft and a Poem Re-Draft

 The Engineer

I walk the world with weary blade
that cuts the knots that have no name;
unconquered kingdoms I have saved;
I've sought, though never grasped, the grail.
To know the word that worlds will kill
yet never wield it, is my whim,
of box of trouble, loose the lid,
but never open, thus to win;
and should those problems prison fly
I hunt each one both day and night
in quest that is all front, no side,
with little deeds until I die.
At end no marble marks my grave
save massive monuments I've made
that line the ever-widening ways
of palaces where children play.

Aiming for Love Enduring 

 Even the overwhelming sun shall die,
but not my love; it shall, I swear, endure,
and remain in youth while stars flare out in sigh;
my love shall last, for it is holy, pure.
You scoff? My friend, you see the slightest part;
your equations cannot be stretched so far;
you have no experiments in the ways of the heart,
have never measured love against a star.
Your scoffing is just that, mere scoffing,
bare assertion that no evidence has known,
but if you are right, then at your death-coughing
you will have had a scoff, but be all alone.
But if I am wrong, I yet will live more sane,
and if I am right, I have truly soared above;
for if I am right, my love shall ever remain,
and if I am wrong, I shall have ventured in love.