One source, in England at least, of knowledge about common beliefs about the virtues in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the Church of England tombstone or memorial in church or graveyard. Neither Protestant dissenters nor Roman Catholics generally carried on this practice of funerary inscription in a systematic way in this period, so that what we learn from tombstones concerns only one section of the population, and one moreover ostensibly still committed by its religious allegiance to a Christian teleology. But this makes the degree of variation in funerary catalogues of the virtues all the more impressive. There are for example Humean inscriptions: the memorial to Captain Cook erected by Sir Hugh Palliser in 1780 on his own land speaks of Cook as possessing 'every useful and amiable quality'. There are inscriptions in which 'moral' has already acquired a highly-restricted meaning, so that to praise someone's virtues you must praise more than his or her morality: 'Correct in Morals, Elegant in Manners, Steady in Friendship, Diffusive in Benevolence,' says the tablet commemorating Sir Francis Lumm in St. James's Piccadilly in 1797, in a way that suggests that the Aristotelian ideal of the great-souled man still lives. And there are distinctively Christian inscriptions: 'Love, Peace, Goodness, Faith, Hope, Charity, Humility, Sincerity, Gentleness' are the virtues ascribed to Margaret Yates in the same church in 1817.
[Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., Duckworth (London: 1987) 235.]
Of course, one can conceive it being done on a more systematic level than this, and with perhaps a bit more caution in interpretation. But this is a good move; there is a great deal about commonly accepted ideas of the good life that can be learned from funerary inscriptions; one could, depending on the period, branch out into eulogies and obituaries and the consolation genre for supplementary information; and from this all draw a picture of how more technical and sophisticated moral philosophy is filtering down among the people (or, for that matter, filtering from common society into more sophisticated forms of moral philosophy). This is only an example of the sort of thing one could do, of course; there are many other possible ways of supplementing the more standard fare.