There's also a new article on Plato's Myths and another on Nicole Oresme.
* Martin Luther and being a theologian
* A fragment by C. S. Lewis of what was intended to be a collaborative book between Lewis and Tolkien called Language and Human Nature (but which, despite a publication date being announced, was never actually completed) has been found. It's too bad the collaboration fell through; that would be a book to read.
* Jonah Lehrer has a brief but good article on neuroaesthetics at Psychology Today, and some excellent comments on it at his blog.
* Catarina Dutilh Novaes has been pulling together a list of women who do work in philosophical logic (often thought of as a man's field). It really does represent an impressive amount of work in the field (obviously there are a few big names on the list, but Novaes herself is stunningly talented -- everything I've read by her has been extraordinarily good). Some of the names I've come across before (like Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh, Carrie Jenkins, and of course a number of others), and some I haven't yet but will certainly look into.
* The Everyday Thomist discusses Aquinas on Job and divine providence
* Do you know who was technically bishop of the moon under canon law during the moon landings?
* David Hart discusses The Little Prince and gnosticism.
* While he doesn't seem to have originated the idea of a fallacy of false analogy, the point at which the idea of such a fallacy seems to have entered into general awareness and become part of our philosophical folklore seems to have been A System of Logic, by John Stuart Mill. On Mill's view there is a legitimate form of analogical inference, which is basically nothing other than an inductive argument to raise the probability that this or that cause is operative in a certain kind of phenomena. (Which is almost certainly why a number of late nineteenth century authors treat false analogy as a lapse in causal reasoning, non tali causa pro tali causa.) In other words, analogy is a form of generalization; and false analogy is a form of bad generalization. The bare analogical inference, then, is not enough; you need in addition a reason to think that it takes into account all the relevant conditions. It is because of this that his description of false analogy almost makes it sound like all analogy is out the window:
There is another, more properly deserving the name of fallacy, namely, when resemblance in one point is inferred from resemblance in another point, though there is not only no evidence to connect the two circumstances by way of causation, but the evidence tends positively to disconnect them. This is properly the Fallacy of False Analogies.
Thus all analogical inference is fallacious unless there is "evidence to connect the two circumstances by way of causation." This is the probable reason why all discussions of the supposed fallacy are so confused: they are the end result of trying to take Mill's very stringent strictures on analogy (which follow from certain features of his own view of generalization) and loosening them so that they are more lenient toward analogical inferences themselves. The result is incoherence: you can admit any analogy on the newer accounts, but also reject any analogy, because there is no underlying account of reasoning.
* Sherry's Hundred Hymns List continues:
#56 Praise, My Soul, the King of Heaven
#55 My Hope Is Built on Nothing Less
#54 Holy God, We Praise Thy Name
#53 All Glory, Laud, and Honor
* Currently watching:
Game Theory with Ben Polak
Politics and Strategy with Kathleen Bawn
