* Johan Olsthoon, The problem of penal slavery in Quobna Ottobah Cuguano's abolitionism (PDF)
* Michael Walschots, The Rationality of Love: Benevolence and Complacence in Kant and Hutcheson (PDF)
* Daniel O'Malley, A Thomistic Argument against the Simulation Hypothesis, at "Reality"
* Cheryl Misak, C. David Naylor, Mark Tonelli, Trisha Greenhalgh, and Graham Foster, Case Report: What—or who—killed Frank Ramsey? Some reflections on cause of death and the nature of medical reasoning, at Wellcome Open Research
* Elzė Sigutė Mikalonytė, Musical Works Are Mind-Independent Artifacts (PDF)
* Roe Fremstedal, Kierkegaard on the Metaphysics of Hope (PDF)
* John Michael Greer, Science as Enchantment, at "Ecosophia"
* Andrea Raimondi & Ruchika Jain, Dispositions, Virtues, and Indian Ethics (PDF)
* Aaron Wells, Du Chatelet's Philosophy of Mathematics (PDF)
* Michael Lind, Profit, Power, and Purpose: Rethinking the Modern Corporation, at "The Hedgehog Review"
* John Schwenkler, The Categories of Causation (PDF)
* Tony Svoboda, A Kantian Approach to the Moral Considerability of Non-human Nature (PDF)
* A new open access philosophy journal: Philosophy of Physics
* Raffaele Carbone, Cartesian and Malebranchian Meditations (PDF)
* Kevin J. Lande, Pictorial Syntax (PDF)
* Razib Khan, Genomics Has Revealed an Age Undreamed Of, at "Palladium"
* James Mahon, Getting Your Sources Right: What Aristotle didn't say (PDF), on metaphor
* Helga Varden, How to Move Beyond Our Endless Disagreements over Abortion Policies, at "Public Seminar". The position in the article does not, in fact, do anything to move beyond disagreements over abortion policies; and, despite Varden calling it 'Kantian', I think the particular distinction in the article between 'personal' and 'legal' conceptions is not at all Kantian. In a genuine Kantian position, the 'legal' only covers external behavior, and the contrast is not with the 'personal' but the 'moral', which is more, not less, common than the legal, since it obligates all rational beings. I think Varden's Step Two also underestimates the extent to which legal classifications do, in fact, presuppose moral classifications; the particular kind of legal positivism that Varden's argument seems to presuppose is also definitely not Kantian. It's also notable that Varden puts her hand on the scale, and assumes (what is in fact one of the major points of contention) that there is a moral right to an abortion; her 'let's all get along' position is not really a resolution but boils down to 'Pro-choicers should make minor concessions and pro-lifers should make major concessions'. Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, I think Varden's argument is interesting, and I do think there is a tendency to overlook the ways in which the gap between the statutory and the moral complicates the situation of what laws to have whenever controversies arise on matters intimately associated with our lives as persons.
