Tomorrow (the fifth) is an important memorial of someone who is all too often forgotten: Nicholas Steno, also called Niels Stensen. Steno is one of the most stunning scientific minds in history, and a truly saintly person; I have an old post giving some of the highlights of his life. Strictly speaking, Steno's memorial is only officially celebrated in certain parts of Europe, since he has only been beatified; but it seems worthwhile to mark the day.
It's also worth pointing out, since it is often overlooked, that Steno could plausibly lay claim to being the person who did the work of showing that Descartes was wrong about the pineal gland, at least in the sense that he showed that Descartes made false anatomical assumptions about the pineal gland and argued that, in fact, we knew very little about the brain at all. (He also, and more obviously, showed that Descartes was wrong, and Harvey right, about the heart. He was, however, a very great admirer of Descartes, and explicitly defends him from hasty condemnations, insisting that they overlook the beauty of Descartes's work; in science it really is sometimes the case that refutation is the greatest form of flattery.) You can read a French version of the work in which he does this thanks to Gallica. Their format requires a lot of patience to navigate, but it's worth a perusal, if only to read a lecture in seventeenth-century neuroscience by perhaps its foremost practitioner, laying out the structure of the brain in a way that, given the tools of the time, could only be done by a man with an almost flawless surgical hand, expressing doubts about this whole notion of 'animal spirits', carefully marking off the things not known from things known.
There's an old joke about Aristotle -- how on Monday he wrote the Physics, but getting tired of that subject, wrote the Poetics on Tuesday; figuring that he'd done enough of that for a while, catalogued all the Greek constitutions on Wednesday; then, deciding that was too mundane, wrote the Metaphysics on Thursday; realized he'd forgotten to write something for Nichomachus, so wrote the Nichomachean Ethics on Friday; and decided to take a break from it all on Saturday by writing all the logical works. It's not a very funny joke, but it gives a slightly funny caricature of how stunning -- one might almost say shocking -- it is that a single man was able to do so much even in a lifetime; and everyone always has the same reaction to Steno, whose life is not all that much less stunning than someone proving Harvey right about the heart on Monday, founding the modern understanding of the glands on Tuesday, proving Descartes wrong about the brain on Wednesday, then settling down for the easy tasks of inventing paleontology on Thursday and geology on Friday before he takes the weekend off to become a saint. It's a funny caricature, but, allowing for all the exaggeration, it's uncomfortably like its original.
Monday, December 04, 2006
Sunday, December 03, 2006
Religion and Intolerance
Because Atran [fixed link --ed.] mentioned him recently, I've looked up Jeremy Ginges, a social psychologist who does research relevant to conflict resolution. In his paper on Religion and Support for Suicide Bombing (PDF) he looks at the relation between religion and support for suicide bombing (as you might have guessed). Does religious devotion contribute to support for suicide bombing? His suggestion is both a yes and a no; particular beliefs don't seem to play much of a role, but there is a probability that religious rituals, insofar as they encourage expressions of devotion to the community, may play some role. Support for suicide bombing does not appear to be influenced by frequency of prayer among Muslims in Palestine -- the dominant form of religious devotion in Muslim life -- but it does appear to be influenced by mosque attendance. As he notes explicitly in the paper, this does not mean that mosque attendance in general increases support for suicide bombing, since that would obviously depend on things like local leadership and and ambient culture; what it does show is that even when there is an influence, there appears to be a sharp difference between religious acts like prayer and religious acts like mosque attendance, and it suggests that, to the extent religion is playing a role, it is doing so in the sense of providing a forum for leaders drumming up support for suicide bombing.
People who are interested in the work of Jeremy Ginges might also be interested in the work of Ara Naranzayan. I recommend his Yin and Yang and Heaven and Hell (PDF), which discusses the complex issues involved in studying the relationship between religion and intolerance. Naranzayan points to evidence that when you don't control for certain factors, measures of religiosity show some reliability in predicting intolerance, and when you control for those factors, measures of religiosity show some reliability in predicting tolerance. Prayer, for instance, appears to be consistently associated with tolerance; and, noteworthily, prayer is one of the features of religion most intensely associated with religious devotion and belief in God. So religious devotion appears to be a good predictor of at least certain kinds of tolerance; but the paradox is that religious devotion is also linked to certain predictors of certain kinds of intolerance. This explains why study of the subject has had such difficulty achieving any clear conclusions -- the relationship between religious factors and tolerance are not straightforward, but highly complex. He also notes more evidence along the lines noted in the Ginges paper linked above.
As always with this sort of thing, or indeed with most studies in cognitive science and social psychology generally, I recommend a grain of salt; the science on the topics studied is still usually in a very formative state -- there are all sorts of things that might not have been adequately studied yet that would shed new light on what scientists are studying. But a grain of salt is subtly different from skepticism; studies like the ones given here do represent a serious advance in our understanding of the issues, since they give us suggestive data useful for further inquiry.
People who are interested in the work of Jeremy Ginges might also be interested in the work of Ara Naranzayan. I recommend his Yin and Yang and Heaven and Hell (PDF), which discusses the complex issues involved in studying the relationship between religion and intolerance. Naranzayan points to evidence that when you don't control for certain factors, measures of religiosity show some reliability in predicting intolerance, and when you control for those factors, measures of religiosity show some reliability in predicting tolerance. Prayer, for instance, appears to be consistently associated with tolerance; and, noteworthily, prayer is one of the features of religion most intensely associated with religious devotion and belief in God. So religious devotion appears to be a good predictor of at least certain kinds of tolerance; but the paradox is that religious devotion is also linked to certain predictors of certain kinds of intolerance. This explains why study of the subject has had such difficulty achieving any clear conclusions -- the relationship between religious factors and tolerance are not straightforward, but highly complex. He also notes more evidence along the lines noted in the Ginges paper linked above.
As always with this sort of thing, or indeed with most studies in cognitive science and social psychology generally, I recommend a grain of salt; the science on the topics studied is still usually in a very formative state -- there are all sorts of things that might not have been adequately studied yet that would shed new light on what scientists are studying. But a grain of salt is subtly different from skepticism; studies like the ones given here do represent a serious advance in our understanding of the issues, since they give us suggestive data useful for further inquiry.
Chrysorrhoas
Tomorrow (December 4) is the Feast of St. John Damascene, so I thought I'd post something. This is from the De Fide, Book I, chapter viii:
We believe, then, in One God, one beginning, having no beginning, uncreate, unbegotten, imperishable and immortal, everlasting, infinite, uncircumscribed, boundless, of infinite power, simple, uncompound, incorporeal, without flux, passionless, unchangeable, unalterable, unseen, the fountain of goodness and justice, the light of the mind, inaccessible; a power known by no measure, measurable only by His own will alone (for all things that He wills He can), creator of all created things, seen or unseen, of all the maintainer and preserver, for all the provider, master and lord and king over all, with an endless and immortal kingdom: having no contrary, filling all, by nothing encompassed, but rather Himself the encompasser and maintainer and original possessor of the universe, occupying all essences intact and extending beyond all things, and being separate from all essence as being super-essential and above all things and absolute God, absolute goodness, and absolute fulness: determining all sovereignties and ranks, being placed above all sovereignty and rank, above essence and life and word and thought: being Himself very light and goodness and life and essence, inasmuch as He does not derive His being from another, that is to say, of those things that exist: but being Himself the fountain of being to all that is, of life to the living, of reason to those that have reason; to all the cause of all good: perceiving all things even before they have become: one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one authority, one dominion, one sovereignty, made known in three perfect subsistences and adored with one adoration, believed in and ministered to by all rational creation, united without confusion and divided without separation (which indeed transcends thought). (We believe) in Father and Son and Holy Spirit whereinto also we have been baptized. For so our Lord commanded the Apostles to baptize, saying, Baptizing them in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Feast of Copernicus
Scott Atran at The Edge:
As people often said, Comteanism is Catholicism that has ceased to be Christian. In case you are wondering, today, being the first of Bichat (the month devoted to modern science), is the Feast of Copernicus in the Positivist Calendar. Since the Positivist Calendar is a perennial calendar, its days of the week don't shift as they do for our Gregorian Calendar, and thus it is a Monday, as it always is on the first of Bichat. Bichat (1771-1802), after whom the month is named, is the father of histology and pathology, and best known for the groundbreaking shift of research from whole organs to organ tissues.
In case you are wondering. As Atran basically notes, it's very unlikely that you are, because it's very unlikely that you care about Comtean Positivism.
On rituals: 19th century French positivists proposed very much what Dr. Porco proposes in terms — albeit somewhat tongue in cheek — of awe-inspiring ceremonies and even temples to science. Apart from the few who founded these practices and artifacts, the attempt failed utterly to woo any significant portion of the general population, or even make further inroads among the scientific community. Most scientists rightly thought these efforts were artificial and absurd. Most religious people thought the same.
As people often said, Comteanism is Catholicism that has ceased to be Christian. In case you are wondering, today, being the first of Bichat (the month devoted to modern science), is the Feast of Copernicus in the Positivist Calendar. Since the Positivist Calendar is a perennial calendar, its days of the week don't shift as they do for our Gregorian Calendar, and thus it is a Monday, as it always is on the first of Bichat. Bichat (1771-1802), after whom the month is named, is the father of histology and pathology, and best known for the groundbreaking shift of research from whole organs to organ tissues.
In case you are wondering. As Atran basically notes, it's very unlikely that you are, because it's very unlikely that you care about Comtean Positivism.
Kyle
| Which South Park kid are you most like? Kyle You are clever, and often come up with intelligent and funny comebacks to other people's stupid remarks. |
| Click Here to Take This Quiz Brought to you by YouThink.com quizzes and personality tests. |
I'm borderline, though, because a shift in one of the questions to which I could have given two different answers makes me Butters. And I really must rise to the defense of young Leopold Stotch, because this is the tagline given for him:
Butters: You are extremely naive. You'll believe whatever anyone tells you. This is because your parents have sheltered you.
Err....It needs to be said that this is most assuredly not right. Butters's parents are very authoritarian, but what they do can't be called 'sheltering'. The most controversial arc in the Butters character is that his parents abuse him terribly; what makes the character so endearing is that he's such a cute, innocent sweetheart despite the fact that he has a horrible life (his birthday, for instance, is September 11; his parents tried to sell him as a pet to Paris Hilton; his mother attempted to drown him at one point; his tapdancing at the National Tap Dancing Competition inadvertently led to the death of eleven people; etc.). The glimpses of abuse were so controversial that Stone and Parker were actually told by the network never to show such things again.
Inductive Epochs
...These primary movements, when the Inductive process, by which science is formed, has been exercised in a more energetic and powerful manner, may be distinguished as the Inductive Epochs of scientific history; and they deserve our more expressed and pointed notice. They are, for the most part, marked by the great discoveries and the great philosophical names which all civilized nations have agreed in admiring. But, when we examine more clearly the history of such discoveries, we find that these epochs have not occurred suddenly and without preparation. They have been preceded by a period, which we may call their Prelude, during which the ideas and facts on which they turned were called into action;--were gradually evolved into clearness and connection, permanency and certainty; till at last the discovery which marks the epoch, siezed and fixed forever the truth which had till then been obscurely and doubtfully discerned. And again, when this step has been made by the principal discoverers, there may generally be observed another period, which we may call the Sequel of the Epoch, during which the discovery has acquired a more perfect certainty and a more complete development among the leaders of the advance; has been diffused to the wider throng of the secondary cultivators of such knowledge, and traced into its distant consequences. This is a work, always of time and labor, often of difficulty and conflict. To distribute the History of science into such Epochs, with their Preludes and Sequels, if successfully attempted, must needs make the series and connections of its occurrences more distinct and intelligible. Such periods form resting places, where we pause till the dust of confused march is laid, and the prospect of the path is clear.
[Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, Volume I. D. Appleton and Company (New York: 1858) p. 47.]
An example might suffice to clarify. Whewell identifies an early inductive epoch in astronomy, which he calls the Inductive Epoch of Hipparchus. The scientific problem with which it dealt was the problem of the wandering bodies, i.e., planets, which appeared to defy the otherwise rigid order of the heavens. Bit by bit people had begun to develop rules for describing their motions, tracing over long years the various cycles that the various planets undergo. But this on its own doesn't get you very far; it just gives you Bradshaw, not the train. By thinking about the planets on analogy with wheels and the like, they were able to come up with the notion of an epicycle. This handled otherwise puzzling problems like retrograde motion; but astronomers were forced to extend it by further anomalies uncovered by close examination of the data, such as the peculiarities involved in the paths taken by the moon and the sun across the sky. It doesn't take much to see that the notion of an epicycle can easily handle this sort of problem; so it was extended. Thus we have a progress in conceptions of the epicycle going with progress in acquaintance with facts. All these were prerequisites for the first great theory of astronomy, that of Hipparchus.
The scientific problem as developed in the prelude to the epoch, then, was to reconcile the celestial phenomena by means of equable circular motions. Whewell notes that, while we tend to dismiss this problem (since the circularity condition is inconsistent with nature), as a part of the prelude it not only makes sense, it is a reasonable thing to try, since, if it panned out, it would give you the phenomena by way of the simplest and most manageable conjecture. The bad name epicycles have received is due not to the work done in the prelude, nor Hipparchus's advance in constructing a fully successful theory of epicycles and eccentrics, but to the quirks of the sequel to the epoch, in which the circularity condition was held with great tenacity even in the face of mounting evidence against it, precisely because it was such a simple and elegant supposition. There's an ambivalence to it: Whewell puts it forward as an example of the love for simplicity that both drives scientific progress and creates impediments to the same.
In any case, Whewell identifies Hipparchus as the cardinal point in astronomical progress during this epoch, on the basis of the maxim that he who proves, discovers. The epicycle was nothing new when Hipparchus came along; it had already been in use for the purposes of explaining anomalies in the wandering bodies. Similarly with the eccentric. To have a genuine theory of epicycles and eccentrics, however, you need to be precise: you need to identify the magnitudes, distances, and positions of the of the circles you are positing, in such a way that the circles capture the irregular and anomalous motions for which you are trying to account. One of the signs of Hipparchus's genius was his ability to come up with this on the basis of surprisingly limited data; the tables he constructed stood up to the test of predicting eclipses, the most serious and important test of any astronomical model at the time. By doing so, they showed that they were an adequate representation of the path of the sun to the level of precision required for tracking eclipses. Hipparchus did the same with the moon, to the same level of precision, on the basis of only six recorded eclipses. This formed a clear and definite basis for people to extend the same idea to the bodies of the planets. Hipparchus did not complete this task, but famously gathered together much of the material for it; according to Ptolemy the whole mass of astronomocial observations left to posterity by Hipparchus' time was dwarfed by the mass left to posterity by Hipparchus himself.
Again, we have a tendency to underrate the importance of this theory of eccentrics and epicycles; we now know that perhaps its key postulate is false, and we tend to think of the theory as inordinately complicated and tangled. In fact, this is in great degree an illusion of hindsight, and to the fact that we are separated from Hipparchus's actual epoch of discovery by a long and complicated sequel. As Whewell notes, the value of a true part of a theory may far outweight its error; and the usefulness of a rule does not always depend on its simplicity. As he notes, "The first steps of our progress do not lose their importance because they are not the last; and the outset of the journey may require no less vigor and vitality than the close" (p. 152). What is true about the theory of Hipparchus is its resolution of the phenomena into circles; it as true that they can be so resolved today as it was then. This resolution allows us to construct precise tables by which we can clearly determine the position of the planets at any time. The assumption that made this resolution possible, and thus the precise predictions, was false; but some assumption is needed for any theory of motions, and it was a simple and straightforward assumption to make. We tend to look at the result and say, "How complicated!" But the simplicity of the theory was not in its final conclusions but in the fact that from a very small set of data, from just a few features of planetary motion, you could derive the principles that would allow you to explain a an immense array of extremely disparate observations. Eccentrics and epicycles were perfectly capable of representing the quantity of the inequalities in planetary motion; and this is not a small thing. So well does it do so, in fact, that for the convenience of calculation of this inequality, the theory first put forward by Hipparchus is very difficult to beat; as Whewell notes, if we complain about the complexity of an unusually simple method of calculation for a given natural quantity, what we are really complaining about is nature, not astronomy. Moreover, we tend to assume that astronomers gave the same faith to epicycles and eccentrics that we do to Kepler's ellipses; when in fact they were much more ambivalent, and were usually quite explicit about its being simply the best hypothesis on hand. The precise representation of apparent motion provided by the theory, however, allows you to collect the data that is needed before you can identify the actual motion of the planets; without Hipparchus, there would be no Kepler.
After the epoch of induction, we entered the sequal, a period of development, verification, application, and extension. This period was started by Hipparchus himself, who developed a catalogue of stars for more accurate record-keeping, showed with greater precision the length of years and days. He also began discovering points that did not confirm the theory -- parallaxes, for instance -- but which astronomers at the time lacked the ability to be precise enough to handle properly. (One of the problems parallax shows in the theory is that while it can accurately chart apparent position, it has serious trouble getting the distances correct.) The most famous person in the sequel, however, is naturally Ptolemy, whose development, extension, and popularization of the Hipparchian theory is what became dominant, and is, in fact, our primary source for knowing anything about Hipparchus at all. One of Ptolemy's contributions was the discovery of yet another celestial inequality, the evection of the moon, and his accounting for it by the theory of epicycles. This discovery was quite crucial to astronomy, or would become so much later on, because it suggested that there might be numerous inequalities that were yet remaining to be discovered, and that the confirmation of the theory lay in its power to explain such residual phenomena. It was also one of the first in a long line of discoveries of inequalities in the moon's motion that are due to the pull of the sun; and the importance of those for the Newtonian discovery of universal gravitation can hardly be underestimated. From Ptolemy the sequel extends through very long years, until the rise of a new inductive epoch.
Thus we have a sort of stage in astronomical progress, involving a prelude of preparation, an epoch of induction, and a sequel of development.
[Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, Volume I. D. Appleton and Company (New York: 1858) p. 47.]
An example might suffice to clarify. Whewell identifies an early inductive epoch in astronomy, which he calls the Inductive Epoch of Hipparchus. The scientific problem with which it dealt was the problem of the wandering bodies, i.e., planets, which appeared to defy the otherwise rigid order of the heavens. Bit by bit people had begun to develop rules for describing their motions, tracing over long years the various cycles that the various planets undergo. But this on its own doesn't get you very far; it just gives you Bradshaw, not the train. By thinking about the planets on analogy with wheels and the like, they were able to come up with the notion of an epicycle. This handled otherwise puzzling problems like retrograde motion; but astronomers were forced to extend it by further anomalies uncovered by close examination of the data, such as the peculiarities involved in the paths taken by the moon and the sun across the sky. It doesn't take much to see that the notion of an epicycle can easily handle this sort of problem; so it was extended. Thus we have a progress in conceptions of the epicycle going with progress in acquaintance with facts. All these were prerequisites for the first great theory of astronomy, that of Hipparchus.
The scientific problem as developed in the prelude to the epoch, then, was to reconcile the celestial phenomena by means of equable circular motions. Whewell notes that, while we tend to dismiss this problem (since the circularity condition is inconsistent with nature), as a part of the prelude it not only makes sense, it is a reasonable thing to try, since, if it panned out, it would give you the phenomena by way of the simplest and most manageable conjecture. The bad name epicycles have received is due not to the work done in the prelude, nor Hipparchus's advance in constructing a fully successful theory of epicycles and eccentrics, but to the quirks of the sequel to the epoch, in which the circularity condition was held with great tenacity even in the face of mounting evidence against it, precisely because it was such a simple and elegant supposition. There's an ambivalence to it: Whewell puts it forward as an example of the love for simplicity that both drives scientific progress and creates impediments to the same.
In any case, Whewell identifies Hipparchus as the cardinal point in astronomical progress during this epoch, on the basis of the maxim that he who proves, discovers. The epicycle was nothing new when Hipparchus came along; it had already been in use for the purposes of explaining anomalies in the wandering bodies. Similarly with the eccentric. To have a genuine theory of epicycles and eccentrics, however, you need to be precise: you need to identify the magnitudes, distances, and positions of the of the circles you are positing, in such a way that the circles capture the irregular and anomalous motions for which you are trying to account. One of the signs of Hipparchus's genius was his ability to come up with this on the basis of surprisingly limited data; the tables he constructed stood up to the test of predicting eclipses, the most serious and important test of any astronomical model at the time. By doing so, they showed that they were an adequate representation of the path of the sun to the level of precision required for tracking eclipses. Hipparchus did the same with the moon, to the same level of precision, on the basis of only six recorded eclipses. This formed a clear and definite basis for people to extend the same idea to the bodies of the planets. Hipparchus did not complete this task, but famously gathered together much of the material for it; according to Ptolemy the whole mass of astronomocial observations left to posterity by Hipparchus' time was dwarfed by the mass left to posterity by Hipparchus himself.
Again, we have a tendency to underrate the importance of this theory of eccentrics and epicycles; we now know that perhaps its key postulate is false, and we tend to think of the theory as inordinately complicated and tangled. In fact, this is in great degree an illusion of hindsight, and to the fact that we are separated from Hipparchus's actual epoch of discovery by a long and complicated sequel. As Whewell notes, the value of a true part of a theory may far outweight its error; and the usefulness of a rule does not always depend on its simplicity. As he notes, "The first steps of our progress do not lose their importance because they are not the last; and the outset of the journey may require no less vigor and vitality than the close" (p. 152). What is true about the theory of Hipparchus is its resolution of the phenomena into circles; it as true that they can be so resolved today as it was then. This resolution allows us to construct precise tables by which we can clearly determine the position of the planets at any time. The assumption that made this resolution possible, and thus the precise predictions, was false; but some assumption is needed for any theory of motions, and it was a simple and straightforward assumption to make. We tend to look at the result and say, "How complicated!" But the simplicity of the theory was not in its final conclusions but in the fact that from a very small set of data, from just a few features of planetary motion, you could derive the principles that would allow you to explain a an immense array of extremely disparate observations. Eccentrics and epicycles were perfectly capable of representing the quantity of the inequalities in planetary motion; and this is not a small thing. So well does it do so, in fact, that for the convenience of calculation of this inequality, the theory first put forward by Hipparchus is very difficult to beat; as Whewell notes, if we complain about the complexity of an unusually simple method of calculation for a given natural quantity, what we are really complaining about is nature, not astronomy. Moreover, we tend to assume that astronomers gave the same faith to epicycles and eccentrics that we do to Kepler's ellipses; when in fact they were much more ambivalent, and were usually quite explicit about its being simply the best hypothesis on hand. The precise representation of apparent motion provided by the theory, however, allows you to collect the data that is needed before you can identify the actual motion of the planets; without Hipparchus, there would be no Kepler.
After the epoch of induction, we entered the sequal, a period of development, verification, application, and extension. This period was started by Hipparchus himself, who developed a catalogue of stars for more accurate record-keeping, showed with greater precision the length of years and days. He also began discovering points that did not confirm the theory -- parallaxes, for instance -- but which astronomers at the time lacked the ability to be precise enough to handle properly. (One of the problems parallax shows in the theory is that while it can accurately chart apparent position, it has serious trouble getting the distances correct.) The most famous person in the sequel, however, is naturally Ptolemy, whose development, extension, and popularization of the Hipparchian theory is what became dominant, and is, in fact, our primary source for knowing anything about Hipparchus at all. One of Ptolemy's contributions was the discovery of yet another celestial inequality, the evection of the moon, and his accounting for it by the theory of epicycles. This discovery was quite crucial to astronomy, or would become so much later on, because it suggested that there might be numerous inequalities that were yet remaining to be discovered, and that the confirmation of the theory lay in its power to explain such residual phenomena. It was also one of the first in a long line of discoveries of inequalities in the moon's motion that are due to the pull of the sun; and the importance of those for the Newtonian discovery of universal gravitation can hardly be underestimated. From Ptolemy the sequel extends through very long years, until the rise of a new inductive epoch.
Thus we have a sort of stage in astronomical progress, involving a prelude of preparation, an epoch of induction, and a sequel of development.
Adventus Redemptoris
You know what hour it is,
how it is full time now for you to wake from sleep.
For salvation is nearer to us now than when we first believed;
the night is far gone, the day is at hand.
Let us then cast off the works of darkness
and put on the armor of light;
let us conduct ourselves becomingly as in the day,
not in reveling and drunkenness,
not in debauchery and licentiousness,
not in quarreling and jealousy.
But put on the Lord Jesus Christ,
and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires.
Romans 13:11-14
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