Friday, January 05, 2007

The Sun Again


You are The Sun


Happiness, Content, Joy.


The meanings for the Sun are fairly simple and consistent.


Young, healthy, new, fresh. The brain is working, things that were muddled come clear, everything falls into place, and everything seems to go your way.


The Sun is ruled by the Sun, of course. This is the light that comes after the long dark night, Apollo to the Moon's Diana. A positive card, it promises you your day in the sun. Glory, gain, triumph, pleasure, truth, success. As the moon symbolized inspiration from the unconscious, from dreams, this card symbolizes discoveries made fully consciousness and wide awake. You have an understanding and enjoyment of science and math, beautifully constructed music, carefully reasoned philosophy. It is a card of intellect, clarity of mind, and feelings of youthful energy.


What Tarot Card are You?
Take the Test to Find Out.



If nothing else, I am consistent: I am always the Sun. See here for when I took a different quiz with the same result. (Ht: air pollution)

Epistemic Ought and Can

Carrie Jenkins has an interesting post at "Long Words Bother Me" on the question of whether epistemic 'ought' implies 'can', at least if 'can' is taken fairly robustly. She provides a recipe for arguments that it does not:

There's a recipe for creating counterexamples to 'ought' implies 'can' in the epistemic case which helps convince me of this. Take your favourite case of someone holding an irrational belief that she epistemically ought not to hold. (E.g. Carrie's believing at 5.40pm that aliens are invading the Earth despite there being absolutely no evidence to that effect.) Then make it so that the subject's holding that belief is beyond her control in your favourite sense. (E.g. Specify that Daniel has attached a brain-manipulating device to Carrie's head so that when he presses his remote control button at 5.40pm she will start believing that aliens are invading the Earth, despite having absolutely no evidence to that effect.) These will be cases where the subject epistemically ought to refrain from believing the proposition in question yet it's not the case that she can refrain from believing it.


I think it's actually rather plausible that there are epistemic 'oughts' that don't imply robust 'cans'; but I don't think the above recipe will yield any good arguments for it. My reason for thinking this is that we never identify an epistemic 'ought' independently of circumstances, but this is, effectively, what the recipe requires us to do -- identify an epistemic ought and then change the circumstances. This seems to me to be a sort of philosophical sleight-of-hand. I also worry about question-begging: The key question is whether the recipe generates coherent cases; but, given the way it is set up, it can only do so if ought and can are detachable in such a way that ought does not imply can. If there were some other way to show that the cases in question were coherent -- that changing circumstances does not change 'oughts' -- then it wouldn't be question-begging; but I don't see what such an other way could be.

UPDATE: In a useful clarificatory comment to a commenter making a similar objection, Jenkins responds by suggesting that epistemic oughts aren't, in fact, very context-sensitive, as can be seen by the fact that we hold stupid people to the same epistemic standards as (for instance) clever people who aren't thinking as they should. But I'm not convinced this is really true; we hold stupid people to the same standards only insofar as we think the difference between them and clever people is not enough to excuse. But if we really look at the sliding scale of IQ, I think it will be found that no one in their right mind holds people with an IQ of 60 to the same standards as people with an IQ of 130 except in the bare basics that they have in common.. In other words, we may hold A, who is a little slower than B, to the same standards as B; but no one can reasonably do so if the difference is drastic. And the difference created by the recipe is, in fact, drastic -- far more drastic, in fact, than the difference between someone with an IQ of 60 and someone with an IQ of 130.

Thursday, January 04, 2007

Seventh Day of the Month

Various bloggers are doing things to mark the turning of the year; a number of them are following Richard's example of making a web of beliefs post; I'd do the same, except my blogging is so eclectic and unsystematic that I don't think it's feasible. Likewise, since this weblog is basically an online notebook, it doesn't make much sense to me to do a 'My Best Posts of 2006' post. Instead, I offer a mere sample: everything I blogged on the seventh day of every month of 2006. It does give some sense of this weblog for 2006.

January: On Hiatus

February: The Jyllandsposten Controversy
Malebranche Against Spontaneous Generation

March: Plain Michael Faraday
I Am Indeed a Tricky One

April: no post for the seventh

May: no post for the seventh

June: Whewell on Natural Classification
Typology and Natural Classification

July: Original Sin
Musing on Witherspoon
Fogelin's A Defense of Hume on Miracles
Cottingley Fairies

August: Feast and Afterfeast

September: False, False, False
The Plans of Burnaby

October: Sommers-Englebretsen Term Logic Part VIII

November: Knowing Different Things at Different Times
Thoughts on Voting
Malebranche Quote for the Day
Philosophers' Carnival XXXVIII

December: The Mysterious Rest of Us

Wednesday, January 03, 2007

Complicity and Solidarity

I was considering what I might write about reconciliation for the upcoming Carnival of Citizens; but I quickly ran into a wall that I suspect is common with this topic -- try to speak of reconciliation as such, and you quickly start repeating truisms and vague generalities, and end up contributing nothing. So I decided instead to throw out some thoughts, half-formed, about complicity and solidarity; a topic that does, in fact, link up to the topic of reconciliation, even if only obliquely.

The usual question that arises when we talk about complicity in evil is, "In what evils are we really complicitous?" As it happens, I am universalist, or a near universalist, when it comes to complicity; I think that, as a matter of fact, there are few evils in which we do not tend to be complicitous. Of course, it makes it easy to answer the question in most cases -- we are really complicitous in most evils for which the question can arise at all. If we can seriously debate whether we are accomplices, it's usually a sign that we are. But it raises the complementary question: what do we do about our complicity in evil?

A distinction should perhaps be made between material complicity and formal complicity. Material complicity occurs when, given someone engaging in some wrongdoing, we make their wrongdoing possible through our association with them. Formal complicity occurs when through our association we make possible their wrongdoing in the very aspect in which their actions are wrong. It's a sharing in the very perversity of the action. Thus, if an antisemite insults a Jew, you and I are materially complicitous in the action; for instance, we allow the freedom of speech that makes possible the antisemite's wrongdoing. We become formally complicitous if we somehow share in the insult, for instance, by condoning it. This distinction between material and formal complicity is often not made; people tend to assume that the only complicity is formal complicity. The reason is not hard to find, I think; many cases of merely material complicity are not culpable, and we tend to assume that relationships that don't involve culpability involve no moral problem. Thus, we tend to assume our material complicity in the antisemite's action raises no moral problem; the moral problem only arises if we somehow directly share in its blameworthiness. It's clear, however, that this is an untenable assumption.

Not all moral problems have to do with culpability. Culpability, blame, usually suggests that we have lapsed in our responsibility; but there are moral problems that arise when we follow through on our responsibilities. A common problem of this type has to do with cases where we have to take responsibility for someone. If a family member misbehaves in an especially egregious way, for instance, we often can't simply shrug it off as not our fault. It doesn't always matter whether it is our fault; it is a moral problem we have to deal with. In a case like that of the antisemite, being innocent of antisemitism ourselves is not enough to resolve all moral problems. Our material complicity raises a serious moral problem that can't be shirked -- at least, shirking such problems is usually regarded by reflective people as itself blameworthy. At the very least, given that we basically allow the antisemite a space to insult Jews maliciously, we face the question: What are we to do about it? (I won't argue it here, but I would suggest that in fact all rights recognized by society work in exactly this way: By recognizing a right, we affirm that we will all accept responsibility for any problems following from the exercise of that right, because we regard the right as sufficiently important for such a serious commitment. Thus all recognition of rights raises the question of material complicity in the abuse of such rights.)

One of the tricky things about material complicity is that we often can't rid ourselves of it. There are very good reasons why we should allow the freedom of speech the antisemite is able to abuse. So we can't deal with the problem of material complicity by eliminating the right. Are we just stuck with an unresolvable problem? I don't think so. I think there's a natural resolution to (at least many) problems of material complicity, namely, developing forms of solidarity that counteract the problem in question. To return to the antisemite example, the most natural and obvious response to antisemitism is solidarity with the victims of antisemitism.

I say 'natural' but not 'easy'. In fact solidarity is always a very difficult thing to establish. You don't establish solidarity with Jews in the face of antisemitism by saying, or even shouting, "Attention, everyone; I am in solidarity with all Jews everywhere." Solidarity involves working together with someone; this is impossible without establishing some set of shared interests, projects, desiderata, etc. and acting accordingly. Thus the resolution of the problem of material complicity is a serious change in one's life. Such a change doesn't eliminate our material complicity in wrongdoing, or, at least, does not usually do so; it involves taking a stand against the wrongdoing itself, in union with those who are wronged. It involves speaking for the voiceless, defending the defenceless. All this is terribly difficult, and, more seriously, there is no way, by natural lights at least, to do it systematically. Every case is different, and we are complicitous in too many different things. To some degree we can prioritize. We are not equally complicitous in everything in which we are complicitous. Our associations with wrongdoing, even our innocent associations, are not all the same, and some raise problems more urgently than others. But even holding the solution to the problem of material complicity, we are still left with the problem. There are so many demands. The problem has a solution in principle; but practice is another story.

Of course, to some extent, all one can do in such a situation is one's best -- start with the obvious and work out from there. It remains, however, an issue worthy of further thought.

As for reconciliation, it seems clear to me that a great many of the problems involved in reconciliation are related to these problems of material complicity; however, reconciliation also has to deal with the thornier problems of formal complicity. How far we can take solidarity in dealing with those problems is, I think, a controversial question. But here, too, is a matter for further thought.

Two Poem Drafts

Desolation

I was walking once,
a pain upon my side.
I wanted to return;
the way was blocked by pride.
The clouds were dark above,
with malice raining down.
The thunder's call was loud
and rumbled through the ground.

I was walking once,
a pain upon my side,
no hope before my face,
no chance to turn aside.
The hardness of the stone
bit deep into my feet;
the sky was raining down
upon an empty street.

I wish I had a way
to counteract the ache,
with so much on the line,
so much of life at stake.
But my knowledge is a void,
no remedy have I;
but to walk this lonely road
till sun sets and I die.

Where do you go, my friend,
weathered by the rain?
How do you see ahead
through the water and the pain?
I cannot see ahead
through the tears I cry;
but soon I will be dead
when sun sets and I die.

I was walking once;
I walked a lonely road.
The water splashed around,
its message all in code.
Some meaning must it have,
some language born of rain,
but nothing can I hear
through the whisper of the pain.

I was walking once
along an empty street.
The water had a chill
that numbed my weary feet.
All our hope was lost,
the futures all had died;
I just walked alone,
a pain upon my side.

The Box Pandora Broke

We were truly great once,
less in power than in hope;
we lost that hero's laurel
somewhere on this winding road.
And somewhere all our dreams
wandered off and disappeared,
never seen again
in this messy vale of tears.
Would that I were wise,
and knew the future's course;
then the box Pandora broke
might not hold such dreary curse.
Would that I were mighty
beyond the strength of steel;
then perhaps the sea-tide
could be turned by will.
But our wisdom is too worldly,
the knowing wink and sneer
of the lecher who for heartache
or for honor does not care;
our strength is but the mimic
of the bullies that we beat:
we made their brutish wishes
a project to complete.
Look in the child's eyes;
no wonder will you find.
They echo back the darkness
found in yours and mine.
Our hands are mighty clever;
we ape the lives of gods;
we distract ourselves from thinking
and rush on without pause.
We were truly great once;
what's past is not reclaimed.
We will lose ourselves in credit
that is drawn upon our name
until our debt mounts upward
to feed our dread and fear
and we fade away forever
from this messy vale of tears.

Tuesday, January 02, 2007

They Also Serve

The following is my favorite poem by John Milton; for me it very powerfully conveys the difficulty and glory of the virtue of patience. The poet is blind, and feels that it turns all his talents useless; how can he serve God, being blind and apparently useless? But, as patience tells him, God does not need his work, and that there are many forms of service, and we are not called to them all. I think it's a lesson from which we all occasionally could benefit.

On His Blindness

When I consider how my light is spent
E're half my days, in this dark world and wide,
And that one Talent which is death to hide,
Lodg'd with me useless, though my Soul more bent
To serve therewith my Maker, and present
My true account, least he returning chide,
Doth God exact day-labour, light deny'd,
I fondly ask; But patience to prevent
That murmur, soon replies, God doth not need
Either man's work or his own gifts, who best
Bear his milde yoak, they serve him best, his State
Is Kingly. Thousands at his bidding speed
And post o're Land and Ocean without rest:
They also serve who only stand and waite.

The Shortest Distance Between Two Points...

...always depends on your means of travel. Just ask the engineers who had to transport the KATRIN Main Spectrometer from Deggendorf to Karlsruhe. The map halfway down the page says it all. Because there was no way to move the spectrometer directly across the 400 kilometers between the two places, they had to move it along the shortest path across which they could actually transport it: a route that was, more or less, 9000 kilometers long.

(Hat-tip to The Truth Makes Me Fret)