Moral Treatment for Material Minds

Lady Mary Shepherd, An Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, pp. 171-172:

Now Mr. Lawrence contradicts at once his own arguments for materialism, as well as nature, and fact; when he says (tauntingly) "thus we come to diseases of an immaterial being! for which suitably enough moral treatment has been recommended," inferring thereby the absurdity of moral treatment to a material mind.

Now moral treatment, according to his own notion of only a material capacity for thought, might still be proper, as it would still act on the material capacity for thought,--and though "arguments, syllogisms, and sermons" might not reach it, of an ordinary kind; yet, the persuasions of friendship; the influence of beauty, and of love; the pleasures of social intercourse; the calm discussions of reason; scenes that please the imagination, or enchant it, will reach it, and do. Nevertheless all this is "moral treatment," and which yet requires the brain and nervous system.

The passage from Lawrence's lectures in context:


Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man Delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons By William Lawrence

I take it that Lawrence's primary point here is that it makes no sense to talk of "diseases of the mind" when 'mind' is an immaterial being; but Lawrence does go much farther, as we see when we turn to the conclusion he draws from this, in the "arguments, syllogisms, and sermons" passage:


Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man Delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons By William Lawrence

But on Lawrence's own materialist principles, it is impossible to draw the line between moral and medical treatment as sharply as Lawrence does here; and Shepherd makes the point very clearly, I think, in the above passage.

Vincula, a.k.a., Links

* Michael Heller, Some Remarks on the Multiverse Concept (PDF)

* In a comment on an old post on the Euthyphro Dilemma, Sam recently pointed out this recent online discussion of the problem.

* Non-German Ph.D.'s in Germany who call themselves "Dr." can be interrogated by the police for breaking the law:

The German doctor rule has been in effect since the 1930s, but it has been only sporadically enforced in recent years.

That changed last fall, when an anonymous tipster filed a complaint with federal prosecutors against seven Americans at the prestigious Max Planck Society, which operates 80 scientific research institutes across Germany. Federal authorities forwarded the complaint to prosecutors and police in at least three states, who decided to take action.

Seriously, what type of person goes around filing complaints against eminent scientists for title abuse? (ht)

* Jonah Lehrer suggests a more Dewey-esque approach to teaching algebra in high schools.

* John S. Wilkins on a very bad philosophy talk. I actually think this is a fairly common problem among both those who self-identify as 'analytic' and those who self-identify as 'continental'. The problem in both cases is that what you're trained to do in both of those approaches is purely general, with a focus on these or those hot topics as paradigms; the ability to use it to good effect in particular fields has to be earned. There is certainly nothing wrong with muddling through, if you're learning; it's a great way to learn, in fact, just like getting lost several times in a city is a very effective way to discover all sorts of great (or bad) things about it. But that's not really a well-chosen time to do a talk on the subject. Perhaps that's a good reason to get a blog....

* Finally a journalist who did a journalistic investigation into how news stories about the Pope end up insanely and obviously wrong. This sort of snowballing error is found in a great many more cases than the one discussed; and the Pope is hardly the only religious figure to have to deal with it. (For that matter, I wouldn't be surprised if many of the wackier science news stories are due to the same snowballing effect.)

* Kenny discusses Berkeley's theory of reference and its use in the critique of materialism.

Sencerly (I Hate You)

This is hilarious. And kind of sad. But mostly hilarious.

Necessity and Connection Without Necessary Connection?

A slightly odd passage in Andrew Ward's "Proof and Demonstration: Hume's Accountof the Causal Relation," International Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1), p. 33:

Although he does sometimes seem to equate the ideas of necessary connection and power, these are quite different ideas for Hume. It is significant that when Hume writes that "the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonimous" (T 157), the expression "necessary connection" is absent.

Well, yes, strictly speaking, but as everyone can see, both "necessity" and "connexion" are right there, and it's hard to see why they would be there at all if it weren't for their association in the phrase "necessary connexion". A better argument, I think, would have been to point out the "nearly" and go on to show (as Ward does reasonably well) that at least some of the time the two can't be strictly synonymous. Weasel words, after all, are usually pretty important when interpreting Hume; he very often leaves himself a little wiggle room. It's one of the reasons why he is simultaneously very readable and very difficult to interpret.

A Letter from Lady Mary Shepherd

Frabjous day! Like everyone else I've had my frustrations with the Google Book search; but I'm feeling very generous tonight toward it because through it I found a letter written by Lady Mary Shepherd, in the Memoirs of Robert Blakey. I transcribe it here.

Cromsley Park, Henley-on-Thames,
May 26, 1843.

DEAR SIR,—

I feel very much flattered by your letter containing a prospectus of your interesting forthcoming work; but through weakness and indisposition I could not find energy enough to answer it as I could wish. Nor do I feel very well able to do so now.

The Essay on "Cause and Effect" is now entirely out of print; insomuch that Dr. Forster returned me his copy for a reprint. The ideas there advanced are the foundation of all sound philosophy. This copy I lent to a gentleman, who, I understand, has returned it to Mr. Shepherd, in Hyde Park Terrace. I have requested him to have it made into a parcel and sent to you.

This " Essay" and that on " Final Causes," together with that on " Single and Double Vision," are the three whose secret principle, I think, you will not find in any other authors named in your prospectus. They confute modern Atheism, founded, as it is, upon fallacious inferences, from Locke, Newton, Hume, and Berkeley. For unless there be a cause, there exists no first, essential, or necessary cause. Unless final causes are physical efficients, they could not operate, unless upon every theory of the mind. The fact of single and double vision cannot be explained consistently with any theory, and as being deducible from the general laws of causation. Such a theory is null, for two reasons; therefore, I encourage myself to hope for the future success and prevalence of my own notions. Firstly, for truth's sake, which is the Word of God ; secondly, for God's sake, because Atheists, more than all others, are feeling after Him, but cannot find Him, as ever existing, though invisible. To do this must be an honourable calling, and one which may prove successful whether I know it or not.

I should wish, therefore, my name were mentioned in your prospectus. I conceive there can be little doubt but that the Essay on " Cause and Effect" made a decided impression on the Edinburgh School. When I first married, about thirty years ago, every ambitious student piqued himself on maintaining there was no such thing as Cause and Effect. It was one of that school—but one wiser and better informed—that, on reading my Essay, was startled by the discovery, he was pleased to say, I had made, as to the reality and attributes of Causation. But through indisposition, I am scarcely able to discuss this greatest of all subjects which can occupy the spirit of man.

I am, yours respectfully,
MARY SHEPHERD.

R. Blakey, Esq.

Shepherd was in her sixties at the time; the prospectus mentioned in the letter was Blakey's History of Philosophy, which does have a brief section on her. Some parts of the letter I find obscure, but notable points:

(1) The importance placed on the vision essay is unexpected; but if she did think that it an especially significant example showing the superiority of her theory over others, that makes it much more interesting than it would otherwise be.

(2) Shepherd herself assesses the Enquiry as having had a definite effect on Scottish philosophy; I wish we knew who the member of the Edinburgh school mentioned in the last paragraph was.

[Incidentally, related to my research on Lady Mary, I'm looking for good works on Thomas Ignatius Forster, who was one of her biggest fans -- he gushes about her works in a number of his writings. If you know of any, or have found works on other topics that discuss him at some length, let me know.]

Some Comments on the Respecting Beliefs Discussion

Looking at the recent discussions of Blackburn's paper on the religion and respect, one notices a number of recurring confusions. One of the most obvious is the confusion between 'admire' and 'respect'; clearly the terms are not synonymous, but there is a tendency of opponents of the claim that we can respect false beliefs to try to gloss this as the claim that we should admire them. A similar sort of confusion occurs when people take the claim, 'we can respect this false belief', and assume that it means 'there is no significant different between false beliefs and true beliefs'. Yet a third confusion is the one that runs throughout Blackburn's own argument, the sliding back and forth between 'false' and 'irrational'. This is not a minor confusion. A very natural way of glossing the claim that a belief is 'irrational' is to interpret it as saying that it is unworthy of respect on rational grounds. If one assumes, as most people in the discussion seem to assume, that these are the only relevant grounds for respect, then to call a belief irrational is already to have evaluated it as unworthy of respect. Thus one of the most common arguments I have seen in the discussion turns out to be question-begging: namely, that such-and-such belief is irrational and therefore unworthy of respect. This is, on the assumption, a circular argument: you are merely identifying unworthiness of respect as your reason for not considering an argument worthy of respect. If we don't make the assumption, on the other hand, the argument is inconclusive: there are other relevant grounds of respect, and the conclusion does not follow unless they have also been eliminated. Either way, it's a non-starter of an argument: a thinly veiled attempt to dress up mere emphatic restatement in the form of argument.

Thus a rational process of determining whether a belief is irrational is nothing other than a process of determining where it stands with regard to one possible ground of respect. And note that I say 'rational process'; a mere vague feeling that it is so, or an inability to see how it is true are not rational processes for determining whether anything is irrational. Without actually identifying such a process, one that can withstand scrutiny, dragging irrationality into the mix is simply question-begging.

I've also noticed an odd tendency to try to enlist preference into the argument; this is found in Blackburn's argument, where "We would prefer them to change their minds" is given as a reason for saying that we cannot respect them for believing X in a sense stronger than 'minimal tolerance'. This, of course, is pure non sequitur. I would prefer my colleagues to change their minds about the advisability of teaching the rule of Addition as the disjunction introduction rule. This has no relevance whatsoever to whether I can respect their beliefs about that advisability; the fact that I would rather that someone change their mind about X does not imply in any way that I can only give minimal tolerance to X. Thinking that the one is relevant to the other is rather odd.

Richard has an interesting argument, one that doesn't involve confusions, that I want to say something about:

I'm intrigued by Brandon's suggestion that false belief contents may warrant respect "as beautiful, ingenious, or such". Such aesthetic values might ground respect for a fictional story or a mental state like imagining, which does not aim at truth. But belief aims at truth. So I do not think that these values can make the contents in question respectable as beliefs.

I think that this might be a reasonable argument if belief aims at truth. But while the mind may aim at truth, belief doesn't aim at truth. Indeed, it has no way of doing so; there are no means or mechanisms whereby it could, unless we assume that God has simply give believing that sort of teleology. I may know something by recognizing that it is true, but it makes no sense to say that I believe something because I think it true; thinking something true is nothing other than believing it. So what is the aim of thinking something true? I think there are only two possibilities: inquiry and practice. (Actually, since inquiry can be treated as a particularly important practice, we can treat it as one possibility if we choose.) These are the things belief aims at; its purpose is, given the fact that we need a way to inquire and act in the world, and both would be extraordinarily difficult without belief, to facilitate acting the world. (Of course, the inquiry of which the belief is a part may aim at truth.) And in both cases there is nothing that prevents false beliefs from contributing to the aim, even if, as we would tend to assume, they do not generally do so as well as true beliefs.

Directory to the Discussion

This was getting a little unwieldy in its original place, so I'm starting it again here. I'll add to it if there are any more. I have put asterisks beside the ones that I personally think are most worth reading, although it must be understood that this is comparative; it doesn't imply that the ones I don't mark aren't worth reading.

Regardant les nuages *
Crooked Timber
Mixing Memory *
A brood comb
Siris
Gene Expression
Greg Sanders
Minds and Brains
Philosophy, et cetera *
EvolutionBlog
Mormon Metaphysics
Mixing Memory (II)
Faith in Honest Doubt
Mormon Metaphysics (II)
Free Thinking Joy

Notes and Links

* One of my friends from grad school was mentioned in the Washington Post the other day. I co-taught a course with Julie one summer; we were both very big on improving the way philosophy was taught. We had different teaching styles (she's better at it than I am) but it worked out very well precisely because we were both so interested in that. I'm delighted to see that she's still fighting the good fight on that front.

* Speaking of education, I'm largely in agreement with Bora about the 'Facebook scandal'. On that particular scandal: rules that are unenforceable except in unusual cases are poor pedagogy. This precisely what that rule was. If it were essential that the assignment be done individually, each student in isolation, this should have been arranged by the instructor; as it was, the instructor was pretending to have authority and jurisdiction he did not, and students are suffering as result of such incompetence. On more general matters, some food for thought from Bora's post:

This all stems from the old German universities of a couple of centuries ago, where getting a degree was essentially a hazing process. Toughening the individual. For what? For replicating and preserving the hierarchy, both within the academia and in society as a whole. The educational systems around the world, at all levels, are still based on such outrageous ideas.

No individual can know everything needed knowing. No individual can make the necessary societal changes on one's own. So why teach them as if it is all up to an individual? Both learning and social change are communal processes. What we need to be teaching is how to be a member of a community, how to network, how to contribute, how to share, how to pull together in order to increase the global knowledge and, by using this knowledge, to increase the global welfare.

There are, of course, many ways to do something like this, and how one goes about it will vary a bit from discipline to discipline. But it's not a minor issue. As Randall Collins has noted in a few works, every system of credentials goes through boom and bust cycles; the pressure is always toward credential inflation, which reduces the value of the credentials. Institutions that keep to the same evaluative approaches, and that do only the same things as everyone else, suffer or fail, while those institutions weather the collapse best that have been innovative rather than stagnant in their approach.

* An interesting paper arguing for a different understanding of Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous paper, "A Defence of Abortion": Michael Watkins, Re-Reading Thomson (PDF) in vol. 20 of the Journal of Libertarian Studies

* The Washington Post editor who came up with this headline ought to be given a bonus. (ht)

* Tim McGrew has a nice annotated bibliography on major works of historical apologetics (1697-1893) that are easily accessible online. (ht)

* Per Caritatem recently had a series of posts on Hobbes's religious views: Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV

* Currently reading: Baez and Stay, Physics, Topology, Logic, and Computation (PDF)
Robin Hanson, Economic Growth Given Machine Intelligence (PDF)

* The first 44 episodes of Philosophy Bites