Sunday, November 18, 2007

Notes and Links

* Stephen Pimentel's summary of Catholic covenantal theology

* Dooyeweerd's 32 Propositions on anthropology, translated by Friesen. A good crash-course in the broad basics of Dooyeweerd's view (which is useful to have if you ever dive into, say, the New Critique).

* The brief correspondence of Ignatius Sancho with Laurence Sterne. Ignatius Sancho, born on an African slave ship, was the first Afro-Briton known to have voted in Parliamentary elections (he qualified because, with the help of the Duke of Montagu, he became an independent householder). He had a rather extensive correspondence. Inspired by reading a passage lamenting the plight of slaves in Sterne's sermons, and being a fan of Tristram Shandy, which was currently being serialized, he sent a brief letter to Sterne asking him to write something against slavery as practiced in the West Indies; Sterne replies graciously and promises to put something in Tristram Shandy if he can. This he did, in volume IV.

* Sancho also wrote a music (and a text on music theory). You can hear mp3's of Sancho's music here. (Unfortunately, there are pop-ups.)

* An article on Jerome Lejeune, the renowned geneticist.

* John Witherspoon's 1776 The Dominion of Providence Over the Passions of Men, in favor of the Revolution.

* Pascal's Wager in the business section. Of course, it's not the real Wager of Pascal (which, I've argued, is a multi-stage dialectical argument directed specifically at agnostics one of whose primary points is that agnostics have no grounds on which to argue that believers are irrational), but that, of course, was not the point. It's interesting anyway to see it pop up.

A commenter at Marginal Revolution brought up Alex Tabarrok's Believe in Pascal's Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You? (PDF). However, as Lars Østerdal pointed out, Tabarrok isn't very explicit about the model of expected utility he's working with; so he develops a model in which Tabarrok's conclusion is valid in Pascal's and Tabarrok's Wagers (PDF). If I understand Tabarrok's argument correctly, the utilities involved would have to be commensurable with both dollars and lives, which would be somewhat curious. What I would suggest that Tabarrok's clever argument really shows, though, if it shows anything, is that Pascal's Wager (taken decision-theoretically) has to be understood to depend on our total state of evidence (with only certain states of evidence allowing the Wager to be made at all, if it can ever be made). Thus we shouldn't think of it in terms of a decision matrix, but in terms of a set of branching decision pathways or pipelines or circuits that, responsive to certain criteria (e.g., the presence of evidence of deception), allow or disallow certain decisions in the first place; travelling along this rather than that pathway can be represented by a decision matrix (but they will be very different types of decision matrices: just as if you had a decision matrix on whether to accept a scientific theory with a decision matrix on whether to apply it to make weapons, they would not consider the same factors or have the same utilities). The decision matrix given by Tabarrok, following Hájek, would just be one of those (granted certain conditions, like the state of evidence, making the factors it considers relevant to actual decision). Again, although it sticks more closely to what Pascal actually says than the usual decision-matrix interpretation, that's not IMHO the real Wager; but it is interesting food for thought. It also gets us into more Jamesian territory.

* Michael Liccione mentions this paper by Alexander Golitzin on an image in Gregory's Fifth Theological Oration. It's an interesting paper, but I'm not sure much can be had from the image. For one thing, Gregory doesn't present it as an analogy to the Trinity but as a counterexample to the reasoning of his opponents; and, for another, if it were an analogy, we would have to be cautious about putting much emphasis on it given that the Oration ends with a well-expressed argument about the inadequacy of analogy and an exhortation to put analogy aside. The passage from St. Symeon, though, is well worth pondering, for other reasons.

* Philosopher's Carnival #57 at Movement of Existence

* Currently reading: Lydia and Tim McGrew's draft, A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth (which is about arguments from miracles in natural theology). It's Bayesian, which means I'll disagree with it, but it should be interesting.